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I.

LIST OF THE PARTIES
Intervenors/ appellants: The following are the Intervenors in the proceedings in the

Fifth Judicial Court in and for Washington County, Utah:
1. Mary Ruth Cooper,
2. Steven E. Kirkland II,

3. Benjamin T. Kirkland,

4. Linton C. Kirkland,
5. Hylan F. Kirkland,
6. John H. Kirkland,

7. David R. Kirkland,
8. Kevin B. Kirkland,
9. Richard A. Kirkland,
10. Kirk B. Kirkland,
11. Daniel B. Kirkland,
12. James H. Kirkland, and
13. Ephraim B. Kirkland (collectively referred to as the "Beneficiaries").

Plaintiff and Defendants/appellees: The following are the plaintiff and defendants in
the proceedings in the Fifth Judicial Court in and for Washington County, Utah:
1. Vaiden Cram as the former Executive Trustee of the Terrestrial Kingdom of
God Trust, and
2. Penn Smith as Plaintiff in his individual capacity and as a defendant in his
former capacity as trustee of the Terrestrial Kingdom of God Trust
(collectively referred to as the "Defendants").
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IV.

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The Fifth Judicial District in and for Washington County, Utah (the "District

Court") issued a final order on June 26, 2015. On August 5, 2015, the Supreme Court of
the State of Utah issued an order transferring this matter to the Utah Court of Appeals
(the "Court") pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Therefore, the Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §78A-4-103(2)(j): "The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction... over: (j)
cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court."

V.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Issue: Whether Genuine issues of Material fact preclude summary judgment.
The first issue on review is whether the District Court erred in granting

Defendants summary judgment when there were genuine issues of material fact and
Defendants were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
a. Standard of review: "[T]he appellate court reviews a grant of summary judgment
for correctness, giving no deference to the [district] court's decision." Schroeder

Investments, LC v. Edwards, 2013 UT 25, ,I9, 301 P. 3d 994,996 (citing Bahr v.
Imus, 2011 UT 19, ,I15, 250 P.3d 56).
b. Citation to the Record: See Motion to Strike at See R. 5669; 54(b) Motion to
Reconsider at R. 5750; 60(b) Motion at R. 6074; 60(b)(6) Motion at R. 6300;
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgement 1 ("MSJ I") at R.
5465; and Transcripts of oral arguments at R. 6581 and 6291.
8

2. Issue: Whether the district court should have allowed Beneficiaries more
time to oppose the 2nd Motion for Summary Judgment instead of granting it
at a pretrial conference.
The second issue is whether the District Court abused its discretion in not allowing
Beneficiaries more time to oppose MSJ2 before granting Defendants' MSJ2 at a pretrial
conference, considering that the district court had previously granted Defendants latitude
on procedural issues or failures to oppose motions within the allotted time; and
considering that there was already a great amount of evidence in the record that there
were genuine issues of material fact that precluded summary judgment.
..•

~

a. Standard of review: We review a district court's denial of a rule 60(b) motion for
relief from judgment for an abuse of discretion." Jones v. Layton/Ok/and, 2009 UT
39, ,r 10,214 P.3d 859. However, we review any underlying legal questions for
correctness. See Fisher v. Bybee, 2004 UT 92, iJ 7, 104 P.3d 1198. See also

Robinson v. Baggett, 2011 UT App 250, ,I24, 263 P .3d 411.
b. Citation to the Record: See Motion to Strike at See R. 5669; 54(b) Motion to
Reconsider at R. 5750; 60(b) Motion at R. 6074; 60(b)(6) Motion at R. 6300;
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgement 1 ("MSJl") at R.
5465; and Transcripts of oral arguments at R. 6581 and 6291.

3. Issue: Whether the award of attorney fees to Defendants was improper.
The third issue is whether the District Court erred in awarding attorney fees to
Defendants under UTA §78B-5-825(1) when there was no evidence and no findings of
"bad faith" or ''without merit" against Beneficiaries.

9

a. Standard of review: We give no deference to the trial court's determination as to
whether attorney fees were allowed under a statute. See Still Standing Stable, LLC

~

v. Allen, 2005 UT 46, ,r 8, 122 P .3d 556 ("Whether the trial court properly
interpreted the legal prerequisites for awarding attorney fees under [a statute] is a
question oflaw that we review ... for correctness.")." Fisher v. Fisher, 2009 UT
App 305, iJ8, 221 P. 3d 845.
b. Citation to the Record: Transcript of February 7, 2015 oral arguments at R.
6582.

4. Issue: Whether Beneficiaries' first, ninth, and eleventh claims were before the
trial court on MSJ2 and whether they should have been dismissed at that
time.

~

Did the trial court err in granting Defendants' summary judgment on Intervenors' First,
Ninth, and Eleventh Causes of Action when these claims were not part of Defendants' Second
Motion for Summary Judgment?

a. Standard of review: "[T]he appellate court reviews a grant of sunnnary judgment
for correctness, giving no deference to the [district] court's decision." Schroeder,
2013 UT 25, iJ9.
b. Citation to the record: See 54(b) Motion to Reconsider at R. 5750; 60(b) Motion
at R. 6074; 60(b)(6) Motion at R. 6300.

5. Issue: Whether the failure of the Trustor in preparing and delivering the lease and
stewardship agreements invalidated the Trust.

10
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Did the trial court err in granting Defendants' partial summary judgment ("MSJ 1") in
determining that the failure of the Trustor to prepare or deliver the Lease and Stewardship
agreements to the Beneficiaries of the Trust before his death did not invalidate the Trust itself?
a. Standard of review: "Reformation is an equitable remedy and 'because of the
advantaged position of the trial court, we give considerable deference to [the trial court's]
findings and judgment."' Bowen, 2011 UT App at,I14 (citing Jacobson v. Jacobson, 557
P.2d 156, 158 (Utah 1976)).

b. Citation to the record: Memorandum in Opposition to MSJI at R. 5465; and
Transcript of oral arguments at R. 65 81.

VI.

STATUTES OR RULES OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 7(c)(3)(A) (2013):
A memorandum supporting a motion for summary judgment shall contain a statement of
~

material facts as to which the moving party contends no genuine issue exists. Each fact
shall be separately stated and numbered and supported by citation to relevant materials,
such as affidavits or discovery materials. Each fact set forth in the moving party's
memorandum is deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless
controverted by the responding party.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(c) (2013).
Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in
accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
11

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment,
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there
is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
ii)

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(e) (2013).
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all
papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served

~.:,

'ilfJil

therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions,
answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is
made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for

w

trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file
such a response.
Utah Code Ann§78B-5-825:
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney fees to a prevailing party
if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was without merit
and not brought or asserted in good faith, except under Subsection (2).
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a party under
~-

Subsection (1 ), but only if the court:
12

(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action before the
court; or
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees under the
provisions of Subsection (1 ).

Utah Code Ann§75-7-415: Reformation to correct mistakes.
The court may reform the terms of a trust, even if unambiguous, to conform the terms to
the settlor's intention if it is proved by clear and convincing evidence that both the
settlor's intent and the terms of the trust were affected by a mistake of fact or law,
whether in expression or inducement.

VII.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case began in 2006 and involves disputes between the Beneficiaries of the

Terrestrial Kingdom of God Trust ("Trust") and the trustees. The Beneficiaries of the
Trust filed a complaint against the trustees (the Defendants and Plaintiff) for various
breaches of their fiduciary duties and in order to prevent one of the trustees, Plaintiff
Penn Smith ("Smith") from obtaining compensation based on what the Beneficiaries
believe is a violation of the trust provisions.
The Trust states that the trustees shall serve without compensation, but it also
states that someone may be appointed a Trust Manager and receive reasonable
compensation for his/her time. From its inception in 1993 until around 2006, one of the
Beneficiaries served as the Trust Manager without pay. Then around 2006, the trustees
named one of their own, Smith, as Trust Manager and agreed to pay him $50 per hour.
13

Beneficiaries contend that Smith improperly began charging the Trust for his trustee
activities under the guise of Trust Manager and sought compensation in violation of the
Trust provisions. Smith then sued the Trust for compensation but neither he nor the other
trustees informed the Beneficiaries of the filed complaint. The other trustees did not
respond to Smith's complaint and Smith obtained a default judgment.
After learning of these events after-the-fact, the Beneficiaries intervened in
Smith's lawsuit and filed their own complaint against the trustees/Defendants and
Plaintiff Smith for various breaches of their fiduciary duties and to deny Smith the
compensation he sought. Defendants and Plaintiff contended that they did nothing wrong
and everything they did was within the law and their authority under the Trust.
In 2008 the Beneficiaries filed two motions for summary judgment, asking the
court to find that (1) the Defendants breached their duties and (2) Smith was not entitled
to compensation. The district court granted the two motions after Defendants failed to
respond. However, in 2009 the district court granted Defendants' 60(b) Motion. In 2013,
Defendants filed their own summary judgment ("MSJ 1") and obtained partial summary
judgment. Shortly thereafter, Defendants filed a second motion for summary judgment
("MSJ2"), seeking judgment on the issues that remained after MSJl. Beneficiaries filed a
Motion to Strike MSJ2, but the district court granted Defendants' MSJ2 and determined
that all issues before the court had been decided. Beneficiaries now appeal the district
courts' granting of MSJl and MSJ2.
1. Statement of Facts

14
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The following are the facts relevant to the issues that are presented to this Court
for review:
a.

On or around November 26, 1993, the trustor Steven E. Kirkland

{"Trustor") executed a Declaration of Trust naming some of his children and his wife as
beneficiaries. See Trust at R. 5498.
b.

The Trust requires that Trustor "prepare and deliver" to the beneficiaries

Lease and Stewardship Agreements ("LSAs") signed by Trustor and the Trustees. Id. at

c.

Trustor did not deliver the LSAs before his death a few years later to be

signed. See R. 5469:,rl-5470:,r7.
d.

Since the inception of the Trust, some of the Beneficiaries served on a

Board of Managers without pay. See R. 203-204:116-7.
e.

On or about February 15, 2006, Defendants appointed themselves as

managers and began charging the Trust $50/hour for their services. Id.
f.

On September 1, 2006, the parties submitted to a Board of Arbitration

("2006 Board") that determined the Defendants breached their fiduciary duties in
multiple respects and the amount of compensation Smith was demanding was
inappropriate based on the Trust. See 2006 Board Findings at R.1678-1685.
g.

On September 26, 2006, Plaintiff Smith filed a lawsuit against the Trust,

seeking compensation. Id. at 11 1.
h.

The Defendants/Trustees did not oppose the lawsuit nor did they tell

Beneficiaries about it. See R. at 5470:117-8.
15

i.

Smith obtained a default against the Trust. Id. at if8.

j.

Beneficiaries found out about what happened after-the-fact and on

November 14, 2006 filed suit against Defendants/Trustees. The complaint alleged
multiple breaches of fiduciary duties by Defendants. See Complaint at R. 928.
k.

Defendants asked for another Board of Arbitration on February 13, 2007, in

which Beneficiaries did not participate, that made determines on issues that were not
before the district court. See 2007 Board Findings at R. 1773-1774.
I.

On April 18, 2008, Beneficiaries filed two motions: Motion to Remove

Trustees and Motion to Void Transactions, seeking to remove Defendants for breaches of
fiduciary duties and to prevent Smith from obtaining compensation from the Trust. See R.
152-200 and R. 201-378.
m.

On May 14, 2008 ("2008 MSJ Order"), the district court granted

Beneficiaries motions. See May 14, 2008 Order at R. 387-395.
n.

On July 10, 2009, the district court set aside the 2008 MSJ Order for

reasons not stated after a hearing on the matter. See July 10, 2009 Order at R. 2050:,I3.
o.

On May 13, 2013, Defendants filed their own motion for summary

judgment (MSJl) on the compensation and breach issues as well as whether Trustor' s
failure to prepare and deliver the LSAs was fatal to the Trust. See MSJl at R.5384-5393.

p.

Beneficiaries opposed MSJ 1 and provided multiple pieces of evidence. See

MSJI Opposition at R. 5465-5481, and 5482-5539.

q.

After a hearing on MSJ 1, the district court found there were genuine issues

of material fact that precluded summary judgment as to the compensation and breach
16

issues, but granted summary judgment on the other issue. See July 9, 2013 MSJl Order at

~

R. 5601-5603.

r.

On August 23, 2013, Defendants filed a second motion for summary

judgment ("MSJ2") on the two issues in MSJl that the district court had determined there
were genuine issues of material fact, namely the breach and compensation issues. See R.
at 5613-5617.
s.

On September 9, 2013, Beneficiaries filed a Motion to Strike Second

Motion for Summary Judgment. See R. 5669.

t.

On November 8, 2013, the district court ordered that the Motion to Strike

be set for a hearing. See Order, at R. 5717.
u.

On November 26, 2013, the district court held a pretrial conference at

which it asked to hear oral argument on the Motion to Strike and MSJ2. See Transcript at
R. 6291, p.2:15-18.
v.

At the hearing, the district court took Beneficiaries' Motion to Strike under

submission and granted Defendants' MSJ2 in its entirety. See Transcript at 6291, p.7:2324; and p.18:12-13; see also MSJ2 Order at 6026-6027.
w.

The district court's order on MSJ2 was entered on January 23, 2014. See R.

x.

Beneficiaries subsequently filed a Motion to Reconsider and two Rule

6026.

60(b) Motions. See R. 5750, 6074, and 6300. All these motions were denied. See July 18,
2014 Memorandom Decision and Order at R. 643 5-6441.

y.

The district court issued a final order on June 26, 2015. See R. 6552-6553.
17

z.

On July 23, 2015, Beneficiaries filed a Notice of Appeal. See R. 6557.

aa.

On August 5, 2015, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah issued an order

'->

transferring this matter to the Utah Court of Appeals (the "Court") pursuant to rule 42(a)
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
bb.

Beneficiaries now raises five main issues on appeal, requesting that

motions for summary judgment be reversed.

,,-,
(£ii'

VIIl.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Beneficiaries assert that Defendants who were the trustees of the Trust breached

their fiduciary duties to Beneficiaries in multiple ways and that Plaintiff Smith was not
entitled to compensation by the Trust for his actions as a trustee or Trust Manager.
Additionally, Beneficiaries assert that the Trust itself failed due to Trustor's failure to
prepare and deliver signed Lease and Stewardship Agreements ("LSAs") to the
Beneficiaries. Defendants have maintained that the Trust is valid, they did nothing

/,'

'tfi.j/

improper as trustees of the trust and that Smith is entitled to compensation as Trust
Manager in the amount of$252,749.
The district court improperly granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants
on several grounds that can be categorized into five main issues. First, there were genuine
issues of material fact that should have precluded summary judgment. Even if
Beneficiaries failed to oppose MSJ2, it was inappropriate to grant Defendants' motion
because Defendants' statement of facts were not properly supported by admissible or
relevant evidence. See Utah R.Civ.P. 7(c)(3)(A) and Rule 56(c) and (e) (2013). Thus,
18
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Beneficiaries Motion to Strike should have been granted and the MSJ2 dismissed.
r-.

~

Additionally, law of the case doctrine should have precluded Defendants from bringing
up the Breach Issue and Compensation Issue in summary judgment again. See IHC

Health Services, Inc. v. D & K MANAGEMENT, INC., 2008 UT 73, 196 P. 3d 588, 596.
Additionally, Defendants' Fact Section of MSJ2 showed that there were genuine
issues in dispute since it referenced the MSJl Order in which the district court found
there were genuine issues of material fact on the very issues Defendants were again
seeking summary judgment. See MSJ2 at R. 5614:iJ5. Any additional evidence
~

Defendants produced for MSJ2 would have just gone to the weight of Defendants'
evidence, but district courts are not to weigh the evidence on summary judgment. See

Utah Community Credit Union v. Robertson, 2013 UT App 66, iJ18, 298 P.3d 1283.
Second, Defendants should have been allowed the opportunity to oppose MSJ2.
Beneficiaries erroneously believed that their Motion to Strike stayed the need to file an
opposition at that time. Thus, Beneficiaries' Rule 54(b) and 60(b) Motions should have
been granted due to mistake or excusable neglect. Additionally, the district court had
previously granted Defendants latitude on such issues as deadlines for responding to
motions, including overturning its grant of summary judgment in 2008 to Beneficiaries
on the exact same issues that the court granted Defendants judgment on in MSJ2, because
Defendants had been late in opposing Beneficiaries' motions in 2008. Moreover, it was
an abuse of discretion for the district court not to have considered all the evidence
~

previously presented to the court by Beneficiaries that showed there were genuine ussies
of material fact.
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Third, the award of attorney fees to Defendants was improper. Defendants stated
they sought attorney fees under the bad faith statute. See UTA §78B-5-825(1). However,
the district court did not articulate a clear basis for awarding the fees and Defendants did
not present evidence of and the district court did not make findings of "bad faith" or
"without merit" as required by the statute. See UBDH v. Davis County Com 'n, 2005 UT
App 347, 17, 121 P. 3 d 39. Furthermore, since the district court had previously awarded
Beneficiaries summary judgment (2008 MSJ) on various issues, a bad faith or without
merit finding would go against the evidence.
Fourth, three claims of the Beneficiaries were not addressed in MSJ2: (a) the first
cause of action for a declaratory judgment as to who can be appointed a trustee and
successor trustee and how to do so; (b) the ninth cause of action for conversion; and (c)
the eleventh cause of action for waste. See Amended Complaint at R. 2132, 2138, and
2139-2140. At no time were these claims addressed by the court. Therefore, these claims
should be remanded to the trial court and Beneficiaries should have the opportunity to
present their claims at trial.
Fifth, the Trustor's failure to prepare and deliver Lease and Stewardship
Agreements ("LSAs") according to the Trust invalidated the Trust. Defendants argued in
MSJI that pursuant to UTA §75-7-415, the court could reform the Trust. See MSJI at R.
5391:,Il. However, there was no evidence presented that the Trustor was "affected by a
mistake of fact or law" when he dictated the terms of the Trust. Furthermore, the Trust
states that the Trustees do not have the authority to create or distribute the original LSAs.
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See Trust at R. 5498:,I7. Therefore, summary judgment should not have been granted in

favor of Defendants in MSJ 1 on the issue of whether the Trustor' s failure to prepare and
issue LSAs invalidated the Trust according to §75-7-415.
·le'

IX.

~

ARGUMENT
1. Issue 1: There were genuine issues of material fact that should have
precluded summary judgment.

"Summary judgment is appropriate only where there are no genuine issues of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Basic
Research, LLC v. Admiral Ins. Co., 2013 UT 6, ,I 5, 297 P. 3d 578, 579 (citing Utah

R.Civ.P. 56(c)). "The summary judgment standard recognizes that the nonmoving party
is entitled to all inferences arising from the facts of record." Uintah Basin Medical Center
v. Hardy, 2008 UT 15, ,I18, 179 P.3d 786, 790 (citing Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52,

,I 10, 48 P.3d 235). In the present case, Beneficiaries were the non-moving party on
summary judgment; therefore, they were entitled to the benefit of all inferences arising
from the facts of record "in the light most favorable to [them]." Morris v. Farnsworth
Motel, 123 Utah 289, 259 P.2d 297, 290-91 (1953).
A. Even if MSJ2 was unopposed, it was error to grant Defendants summary judgment.

Even if Defendants' MSJ2 is considered unopposed, summary judgment was still
inappropriate and should have been denied. See Utah R.Civ.P. 56(e) (2013). Summary
judgment shall be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue
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as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law." Id. Rule 56(c). Furthermore, as this Court recently explained:
[S]ummary judgment may not be entered against the nonmoving party
merely by virtue of a failure to oppose; the rules of civil procedure allow
entry of summary judgment against a defaulted party only " if appropriate."
Id. R. 56(e). Thus, while the nonmoving party's failure to oppose a motion
for summary judgment will often result in a determination that there are no
factual issues precluding a grant of summary judgment, the district court
must still determine whether the moving party's pleadings, discovery, and
affidavits demonstrate its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Id. R.
56(c); Basic Research, 2013 UT 6, ,I 5,297 P.3d 578.

Pepperwood Homeowners Assn. v. Mitchell, 2015 UT App. 137, ,I6, 351 P.3d 844. Here,
the evidence Defendants presented in MSJ2 did not entitle them to summary judgment.

i.

Breach Issue.
The two main issues Defendants sought summary judgment on in MSJ2 were (1)

whether or not Defendants breached their various duties to the Beneficiaries ("Breach
Issue"), and (2) how much compensation (if any) Plaintiff Smith was owed for his
services as trust manager ("Compensation Issue"). In regards to the Breach Issue,
Defendants provided five statements in their Facts section, paragraphs 10 through 14. See
MSJ2 at R.5615. Paragraphs 10-12, and 14 indicated that (1) Defendants had been
accused of breaching their fiduciary duties, (2) a board of arbitration had been convened
on February 13, 2007 1 ("2007 Board"), (3) who the 2007 Board members were, and (4)

1 Defendants

included a disputed conclusion oflaw in Fact # 11, namely that all disputes
were required to be submitted to a board of arbitration according to the Trust. However,
twice Defendants raised this issue throughout the litigation process and twice the district
court had determined that all disputes were not required to go to arbitration. See June 11,
2007 Order at R. 126-128 and See July 10, 2009 Order at R. 2050:,I3.

22

recommendations for paying Defendants' out of pocket expenses and legal Trust
expenses.
The only statement going to whether Defendants breached their fiduciary duties
was Paragraph 13: "After listening to arguments from Intervenors, the board concluded
that ' ...the Trustees have acted in the best interest of the Trust..."' See MSJ2 at R.
5615:,I13 (citing R.5661: ,I2 of the 2007 Board Findings). Then in Defendants' Argument
section on the Breach issue, Defendants provided two sentences: "All that need be cited

in this area is Exhibit VI [2007 Board Findings], attached hereto. An objective arbitration
~

board, composed of duly appointed members, found no breach of Trustee's duties to the
Beneficiaries or Intervenors. Further, Intervenors have no evidence of any breach of duty
in this case." See MSJ2 at R. 5616:,I3.
The above facts and argument do not support granting Defendants summary
judgment on the Breach Issue. First, the evidence Defendants reference in Paragraph 13,
the 2007 Board Findings, does not stand for the proposition Defendants claim it does.
The very first paragraph of the 2007 Board Findings states: "The Board Members all
concurred that in all matters not before the Washington County, Utah 5th District Court
the Trustees acted in the Trust's best interest." See R.556lat ,r1 2 (emphasis added). In
other words, the 2007 Board only dealt with matters that were not before the district
court. The matters before the district court on February 13, 2007 were outlined in
Beneficiaries' 2006 Complaint against Defendants: negligent breach of duties to

2

It is also Exhibit VI of Defendants' MSJ2. See R. 5661-5662.
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administer the trust per UCA §75-7-801 and § 7 5-7-101 et. seq, breach of duty of loyalty
per UCA §75-7-802, intentional breach of duties, and conversion of trust assets. See Nov.
14, 2006 Complaint at R. 928-935.

In support of these claims, Beneficiaries' Complaint contained numerous
allegations of specific instances of Defendants' bad conduct and how the conduct had
affected Beneficiaries. Id. at ,I,rI 1-48. In addition, Beneficiaries included a prayer for
relief, requesting damages and attorney fees. Id. at R. 934-935.Thus, none of the
instances or allegations of breach addressed in the 2006 Complaint were before the 2007
Board. The 2007 Board reiterates this in its Conclusions section:
Therefore, based upon the aforementioned Findings, the Board Concludes
that the Trustees have acted in the best interest of the Trust and that those
matters dealing with facts in controversy between the Trustees, the Trust
Manager, and the Trust Beneficiaries are being adjudicated by all parties in
the ... 5th District Court and final judgment of that controversy should be
left to that court.
See R.5662:,r2 (emphasis added).
Therefore, whatever acts Defendants did "in the best interests of the Trust" that the
2007 Board was referring to, had nothing to do with the allegations concerning the breach
of fiduciary duties contained in the 2006 Complaint that was before the district court at
that time. Furthermore, Beneficiaries amended their complaint in 2008 and included
additional allegations of misconduct and additional causes of action. Consequently,
whatever conclusions the 2007 Board may have reached in 2007 were not relevant at the
time of Defendants' MSJ2.
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Secondly, the 2007 Board Findings is an incomplete document that would not be
admissible evidence at trial; therefore, it should not have been considered on summary
judgment. See Rule 56(e). The 2007 Board Findings reference four exhibits: A, B, C, and
D. Yet none of the exhibits were attached to the 2007 Board Findings for MSJ2.
Furthermore, Defendants did not lay any foundation for the authentication of the 2007
Board Findings (with or without the exhibits). Nevertheless, Defendants make the
unsupported claim that the 2007 Board was "objective" and "composed of duly appointed
members." See MSJ2 at 5616:,I3. Nowhere in the 2007 Board Findings or in an affidavit
supporting MSJ2 is there evidence that the 2007 Board was objective. In fact, the 2007
Board Findings indicates that none of the Beneficiaries were even present. See 5661 :,r2.
Only board members and Defendants were present. Id. While it is true that Defendants
provided an affidavit from one of the 2007 Board members ("Member Affidavit") in
response to Beneficiaries' Motion to Strike, the Motion to Strike was never ruled upon.
See Member Affidavit at R. 5693-5694; see also transcript of November 26, 2013 hearing
at R. 6291, p.7:19-24). Regardless, the affidavit still does not provide any indication that
the 2007 Board was impartial or indicate that the 2007 Board did actually consider
matters that were before the district court. 3

3

viJ

Of course, if the Member Affidavit did state or suggest that the 2007 Board did actually
consider matters that were before the district court although the 2007 Board Findings
state they did not, then that would call into question the whole validity of the 2007 Board
Findings since it is saying one thing and a member of the 2007 Board is saying the
opposite occurred. That would be another issue of fact in dispute that Defendants
themselves raised.
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Therefore, the 2007 Board Findings were irrelevant to the Breach Issue before the
district court because the 2007 Board did not deal with any matter before the district
court, and their findings should not have been considered by the district court in ruling on
MSJ2. Most importantly, since the only evidence Defendants put forth in support of their
argument that Defendants did not breach their fiduciary duties, was the 2007 Board
Findings4, MSJ2 should have been denied. MSJ2 was unsupported by any relevant
evidence, making summary judgment "[in]appropriate" and Defendants were not
"entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." See Rule 56(c) and (e).

ii.

Compensation Issue: summary judgment should not have been granted on
the issue of Plaintiff Smith's compensation and his hourly rate of $50 per
hour.
The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants on the issues of

whether Plaintiff Smith should be compensated by the Trust, how much he should be
compensated, and whether $50 per hour was a reasonable rate. See MSJ2 Order at R.
6026:,rl-6027:,r3. Plaintiff Smith was awarded $252,749.00 at the rate of $50 per hour.

Id. at R. 6027:,r2 and ,r1 of Conclusions of Law. However, there were genuine issues of
material fact that should have precluded summary judgment on these issues.
a. Exhibit V and statement of fact #9 are inadmissible evidence that should not
have been considered.

Exhibit V to MSJ2 ("Ex V") should not have been considered by the district court

in ruling on whether Plaintiff Smith's $50/hour rate of pay was reasonable. See R. 5647-

4

See MSJ2 at R. 5616:if3 ("All that need be cited in this area is [2007 Board Findings],
attached hereto.").
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5648. Exhibit Vis the only evidence Defendants offered to show that Plaintiffs rate of
compensation was reasonable; and Defendants only statement regarding reasonable
compensation in their argument was: "The Plaintiff... has spent many hours in his
capacity as Trust manager. In doing so, at the rate of $50 an hour, which has been shown
to be more than reasonable by [Ex V], he has accrued the amount of $252,749 owed for
his services." See MSJ2 at R. 5616: ,IL However, as outlined in Beneficiaries' Motion to
Strike, Defendants offered the statements made in Ex V, an out-of-court statement, to
prove their assertion that $50 per hour was reasonable compensation for Plaintiff.
Therefore, Ex V is inadmissible hearsay that does not qualify for any exceptions found in
Rules 803-804 of Utah Rules of Evidence. See Motion to Strike at R. 5674:,I2.
Moreover, Ex V was an unauthenticated document per Utah R. Evid. 901. "To
satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the
proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the
proponent claims it is." Id. at 901(a). In the present case, Defendants laid no foundation
for what Ex V was, who created it, whether it was authentic, etc. Defendants simply
provide it as an exhibit with no explanation. Furthermore, Ex V does not qualify as a selfauthenticated document per Rule 902. Therefore, Ex V should have been stricken.
Similarly, Ex V and Defendants' statement of fact regarding reasonable
compensation did not comply with Rule 7 and 56 requirements. When supporting a
motion for summary judgment, an admissible affidavit must be "made on personal
lmowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein." See
27

Utah R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2013). Similarly, Rule 7 requires "[e]ach fact shall be separately
stated and numbered and supported by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or

~

discovery materials." Id. at 7(c)(3)(A) (2013). In their MSJ2 statement of facts,
Defendants state: "In researching other Trust managers in Southern Utah, it is purported
by [Defendants] that the amount of $50 an hour for Trust management is more than
reasonable." MSJ2 at R. 5615:,I9. Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines "purported" as
"said to be true or real but not definitely true or real." Merriam-Webster Dictionary,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/purported (2015). Black's Law Dictionary
defines "purported" as "reputed; rumored." Pg.1250 (7th Edition).

C;:·,

•

Thus, by its own terms, statement of fact #9 is not based on personal knowledge
but based on rumor, a rumor that may or may not be true. Since Beneficiaries were the
non-moving party they were entitled to the benefit of all inferences arising from the facts
of record "in the light most favorable to [them];" 5 and the reasonable inference here in
light most favorable to Beneficiaries is that statement of fact #9 is not true. Additionally,

GJ

statement of fact #9 was not supported by affidavit of Defendants or discovery material
or admissible evidence. Therefore, Ex V and statement of fact #9 should not have been
considered by the district court in ruling on summary judgment. Since this inadmissible
evidence was the only evidence Defendants brought forward in support of the
reasonableness of the $50/hour rate, summary judgment should not have been granted on
this issue.

5

Morris, 259 P.2d at 90-91.
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b. Plaintiff Smith's affidavit does not provide evidence of what compensation rate
is reasonable, how much compensation altogether he is owed, or whether he
should be compensated at all.

Defendants stated in their Facts section ofMSJ2: "Plaintiff was later appointed
manager of the Trust and the Trustees allowed him to be paid the amount of $50 an hour
for his services." See MSJ2 at R. 5614:,I7. Defendants cited Plaintiff Smith's affidavit in
support of this assertion. However, Smith's affidavit does not support this statement.
~

Smith's affidavit states he served as a manager of the Trust, but it never states how he
became a manager, i.e., whether he just decided to name himself manager or if he was
appointed by somebody, etc. Smith's affidavit also does not indicate how much he was
supposed to be paid, if any. Smith simply states: "During the aforementioned time I never
received any payment for my duties." See April 10, 2013 Affidavit at R. 5643:12. Smith
does not indicate that he was expecting payment or that he was promised payment.
Similarly, in support of Defendants' claim that Plaintiff Smith should be paid

~

$252,749, Defendants argued in MSJ2: "The Plaintiff... has spent many hours in his
capacity as Trust manager ... he has accrued the amount of$252,749 owed for his
services." See MSJ2 at R. 5616: ill. Citing an Exhibit IV in MSJ2 ("Ex IV''), Defendants
also stated: "During his tenure as Trust Manager, Mr. Smith spent many hours managing
the Trust and incurred the amount of $252,749 in fees as a result." Id. at 5614:,r8.

~

However, like Ex V addressed above, Ex IV is inadmissible evidence that does not
comply with Rule 56 or Utah R. Evid. 901. In the present case, Defendants laid no
foundation for what Ex IV was, who created it, or whether it was authentic.
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For example, Ex IV is not signed by anyone, is not attached to or referenced in an
affidavit, does not state who all of the calculations are for, and the last part of the
document indicates somebody is owed $255,354, not the $252,749 Defendants state in
MSJ2. Defendants simply provided Exhibit IV as an exhibit with no explanation and no
supporting affidavit. Furthermore, Exhibit IV does not qualify as a self-authenticated
document per Utah R. Evid. 902. Therefore, Exhibit IV should not have been considered
in ruling on MSJ2. The "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits" did not show that Defendants were
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c).

iii.

Beneficiaries' Motion to Strike MSJ2 should have been granted.
As addressed in part in the previous subsections, Beneficiaries Motion to Strike

Defendants' MSJ2 in its entirety should have been granted; or at the very least, the 2007
Board Findings and Ex V. See R. 5669-5677. Defendants did not support each fact with
"citation to relevant materials" as required by Rule 7(c)(3)(A) (2013). Additionally, the
law of the case doctrine should have precluded Defendants from reopening the same
issues in MSJ2 that the district court had ruled on 45 days prior. See IHC Health Services,
Inc. v. D & K MANAGEMENT, INC., 2008 UT 73, 196 P. 3d 588, 596.

"[T]he law of the case doctrine acts much like the doctrine of res judicata furthering the goals ofjudicial economy and finality-but within a single case." Id. at
,I26. Under the law of the case doctrine, "While a case remains pending before the district
court prior to any appeal, the parties are bound by the court's prior decision, but the court
remains free to reconsider that decision." Id. at ,I27. As in the present case, law of the
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case doctrine applies to denials of summary judgment motions. See AMS Salt Indus. v.
viJ

Magnesium Corp. ofAm., 942 P.2d315, 319 (Utah 1997) (courtrecognizesthatthelaw
of the case doctrine applies to subsequent motions for summary judgment on the same
issue, subject to exceptions); Sittner v. Big Horn Tar Sands & Oil, Inc., 692 P.2d 735,
736 (Utah 1984) (court finds that the law of the case doctrine applies to subsequent
motions for summary judgment, subject to exceptions); and Red Flame, Inc. v. Martinez,
2000 UT 22, ,I4, 996 P. 2d 540, 542 (affirming the holdings in AMS and Sittner).
There are three exceptional circumstances in which a court should not apply the
law of the case doctrine: "(l) when there has been an intervening change of controlling
authority; (2) when new evidence has become available; or (3) when the court is
convinced that its prior decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest
injustice." IHC, 2008 UT 73, 34. None of these exceptions applied in the present case.
The first exception did not apply as Defendants cited to no intervening changes in
controlling authority.
Exception two did not apply since all of Defendants' exhibits in their MSJ2 6
contained information that was produced in MSJl or was available at that time: Exhibit I
was an August 14, 2012 Order in this case, so it was available when Defendants filed
their MSJl in May of 2013; Defendants provided Exhibits II, III, and IV in their MSJl;

6

-..d

(I) Order of court regarding attorney fees, (II) Trust document, (III) Affidavit of
Plaintiff, (IV) Document listing the compensation sought by Plaintiff, (V) purported fee
schedule of a trustee company; and (VI) alleged findings of fact from a board of
arbitration. See MSJ2 at R. 5624-5662. Note: Exhibit I was not filed with Defendants'
MSJ2.
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as explained earlier, Exhibit V should have been inadmissible, but there was also no
indication that this information was new or was unavailable at the time Defendants filed
MSJl; and the 2007 Board Findings (Exhibit VI) was a document purported to be from
March of 2007, so it was also available to Defendants when they filed MSJ 1. See MSJI at

R. 5394-5434.
Lastly, the third exception does not apply as there was nothing to suggest that the
court's determination that there were material facts in dispute was clearly erroneous or
that it would work a manifest injustice for the issues to be heard at trial. Thus, like in IHC

Health Services, Defendants did not satisfy any of the exceptions to the law of the case
doctrine. Therefore, Defendants' MSJ2 should have been stricken. See IHC, 2008 UT 73,

,135.
B. Defendants' Fact Section in MSJ2 showed there were genuine issues of material
fact.

Another reason why summary judgment was inappropriate is that on its face, the
MSJ2 showed there were genuine issues of material fact. As part ofMSJ2's Facts section,
Defendants cited the MSJI Order and explained that previously, there was an award of
partial summary judgment in MSJl which "designated two remaining factual issues: (1)
how much compensation Plaintiff is owed for his services as trust manager, and (2)
whether or not the Trustees of the Trust have breached their various duties to the
Beneficiaries." See MSJ2 at R. 5614:,15. In regards to these two issues, MSJI Order
contains the following findings of fact by the district court:
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3. There are genuine issues of material fact regarding the amount, if any, to
which Penn Smith is entitled for his work as Manager of the
aforementioned Trust.
4. There are genuine issues of material fact such that the issues of whether
or not the [Defendants] have breached their various duties to the
Beneficiaries of the Trust and whether or not said [Defendants] should be
removed should be reserved for trial.
See MSJI Order at R. 5602:,r,r3-4.
The MSJ 1 Order is evidence which Defendants included by reference in MSJ2 that
contradicts Defendants' statement that there are no material facts in dispute. Put
differently, MSJ2 included evidence (i.e., the MSJl Order) that there were genuine issues
of material fact in dispute on the Breach Issue and Compensation Issue, which created a
genuine issue of material fact on the face ofMSJ2.
Additionally, in MSJ2, Defendants do not explain or argue how any new evidence
they produced in MSJ2 negates the findings in the MSJl Order that Defendants
referenced. Nothing changed between the time MSJ 1 was decided and Defendants filed
MSJ2. The 2007 Board Findings had been available to Defendants five years before they
filed their MSJl. Plus, just adding that one piece of evidence in MSJ2 does not mean you
ignore all the counter evidence Intervenors provided in MSJ 1 which showed the district
court there were genuine issues of material fact. The 2007 Board Findings may have gone
to the weight of Defendants' evidence, but it does not destroy or wipe out the fact that
Intervenors had previously shown there were genuine issues of fact.
Regardless, any new evidence produced in MSJ2 would simply go to the weight of
¥Jt)

the evidence, but it does not mean all the counter evidence Intervenors provided in MSJ 1
can be ignored. Furthermore, courts are not supposed to weigh evidence on summary
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judgment. See Utah Community Credit Union v. Robertson, 2013 UT App 66, ,I18, 298
P.3d 1283 ("It is inappropriate for courts to weigh disputed material facts in ruling on a
summary judgment,' regardless of whether 'the evidence on one side may appear to be
strong or even compelling.") (quoting Davis v. Sperry, 2012 UT App 278, ,r 22,288 P.3d
L.'1

"1:/iiJ

26). Thus, MSJ2 itself showed that there were genuine issues of material fact on these
two issues and summary judgment should not have been granted even if MSJ2 was
unopposed.
2. Issue 2: District court should have allowed Beneficiaries the chance to oppose
the MSJ2 and not granted Defendants' MSJ2 at the pretrial conference:

The district court held a pretrial conference ("Pretrial") on November 26, 2011. At
the Pretrial and without prior notice, the district court required the parties to present oral
arguments with respect to Defendants' MSJ2 and Beneficiaries' Motion to Strike the
MSJ2. See Hearing Transcript at R. 6291. Previously, on November 4, 2013,
Beneficiaries had filed a Request to Submit for Decision on their Motion to Strike; then
on November 8, 2013, the district court had ordered that a hearing be set for oral
arguments on the Motion to Strike. See Order, at R. 5717. However, a date for oral
arguments on the Motion to Strike was never set. Furthermore, at the time of the Pretrial,
neither party had filed a Request to Submit for Decision on Defendants' MSJ2. Yet, the
district court granted Defendants' MSJ2 at the Pretrial.
In cases where summary judgment was obtained through a procedurally unusual
manor or oversight, Utah courts have often remanded the cases to allow the non-moving
party to oppose summary judgment or respond to a motion to strike. See Crossland Sav.
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v. Hatch, 877 P. 2d 1241, 1244 fn5 (Utah 1994); and Gillmor v. Cummings, 806 P.2d
1205 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (case remanded on appeal because the district court granted
summary judgment before allowing the opposing party to respond to the other party's
motion to strike in the time allowed by the rules). In the present case, Beneficiaries had
been waiting for the Court to rule on their Motion to Strike Defendants' MSJ2 in its
entirety because the court had just ruled on the same issues a few weeks earlier in
Defendants' MSJ 1. As mentioned above, the district court had ordered a hearing set on
the Motion to Strike, but no hearing date had been set at the time of the Pretrial. See
~

Order, at R. 5717.
Furthermore, Beneficiaries believed that their need to file an opposition to the
MSJ2 was stayed until the district court ruled on Beneficiaries' Motion to Strike:
Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a
pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon
motion made by a party within twenty days after the service of the
pleading, the court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient
defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.

See Utah R.Civ.P. 12(f) (emphasis added). Counsel for the Beneficiaries erroneously
believed that the term "pleading" in Rule 12(f) also referenced "motions" (such as
summary judgment motions), because without the Rule applying to motions, parties are
required to argue at great lengths in alternatives, providing different arguments based on
whether the court agrees to strike or declines to strike certain evidence or arguments. See
Rule 54(b) Motion to Reconsider at R. 5756. On February 4, 2014, Beneficiaries filed a
Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside the Final Judgment ("60(b) Motion"), and included the
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argument that due to mistake and excusable neglect7 of Beneficiaries' counsel in failing
to oppose MSJ2, summary judgment should be set aside. See R. 6082:ifl. However,
Beneficiaries' 60(b) Motion w~s denied. See July 18, 2014 Memorandum Decision and
Order at R. 6435-6441.
A. District court's history of granting Defendants latitude on procedural issues or
mistakes after-the-fact should have been extended to Beneficiaries as well.

The district court's denial of Beneficiaries' 60(b) Motion and the granting of
summary judgment at the pretrial conference was an abuse of discretion. This Court
explained that "rule 60(b) enables 'a court to grant relief from a judgment in
circumstances in which the need for truth outweighs the value of finality in litigation."'

Robinson v. Baggett, 2011 UT App 250, if24, 263 P.3d 411 (citing 12 James Wm. Moore,
et al., Moore's Federal Practice§ 60.02 [2] (3d ed. 1999)). "Indeed, '[t]he allowance of a
vacation ofjudgment is a creature of equity designed to relieve against harshness of
enforcing a judgment, which may occur through procedural difficulties, the wrongs of the
opposing party, or misfortunes which prevent the presentation of a claim or defense."' Id.
(citing Boyce v. Boyce, 609 P.2d 928,931 (Utah 1980)).
In the present case, the district court had previously granted Beneficiaries
summary judgment ("2008 Summary Judgment") on their claims against Defendants,
finding that Defendants had breached their fiduciary duties and Plaintiff Smith was not

7

See 60(b)(l): "On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the
furtherance ofjustice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment,
order, or proceeding for the following reasons: ( 1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect."
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entitled to compensation. See May 14, 2008 Order at R. 387-395. The 2008 Summary
~

Judgment was unopposed by Defendants. However, Defendants filed a Motion to Set
Aside Default Order Removing Trustees and Voiding Transactions, arguing that they did
not respond in time due to extenuating circumstances. See R. 434-436. The district court
granted the motion. See July 10, 2009 Order at R. 2050:13.
Trial was later set to begin on June 3, 2013 and pursuant to the Case Management
Order, pretrial disclosures were due 30 days before trial. See May 22, 2013 Motion in
Limine at 5447:13. However, Defendants did not serve their pretrial disclosures, so

~

Beneficiaries filed a motion in limine to exclude the evidence of Defendants ("MIL"). Id.
The district court denied Beneficiaries MIL. See R. 5556-5559 (Declined to Sign Order).
Then on December 20, 2013, Beneficiaries filed a Motion to Reconsider MSJ2
ruling and the district court scheduled a hearing date. Defendants' opposition was due on
January 7, 2014. Defendants requested of Beneficiaries and were granted a one-day

~

extension to file an opposition. However, Defendants did not file an opposition the next
day. Then, 7 days after their opposition was due, Defendants filed an Ex Parte Motion to
Strike Intervenor's Motion to Reconsider, which the district court granted within a few
hours, not giving Beneficiaries a chance to respond. See February 20, 2014 Opposition to
Ex Parte Motion for More Time at R. 6200:115-11. Similarly, on February 1, 2014,
Beneficiaries filed a Rule 52(b) Motion to Request Additional Findings from the Court.

Id. at R. 6199:11. Defendants did not oppose the motion within the requisite period of
time. Six days after the opposition was due, Defendants filed an Ex Parte Motion for
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Extension of Time. Id. at R. 6200:,r4. The district court again granted Defendants ex parte
motion. See February 20, 2014 Order at R. 6192-6196.
Over and over the district court granted Defendants latitude on procedural issues
or mistakes after-the-fact. In the interests of fairness and justice, Beneficiaries should
have been provided the same latitude on such a crucial matter as MSJ2, especially when
Beneficiaries believed their Motion to Strike stayed the need to file an opposition and
Beneficiaries had filed the Motion to Strike within the proper response time for an
opposition. Conversely, each time the district court afforded Defendants latitude,
Defendants had not attempted to comply with the deadlines but were seeking relief afterthe-fact.
B. Evidence of genuine issues of material fact had previously been presented to the
district court, but the district court did not consider this evidence in granting MSJ2.

Further evidence that it was an abuse of discretion not to allow Beneficiaries a
chance to oppose MSJ2, is that ample evidence of genuine issues of material fact had
previously been put on record with the district court. As stated earlier, on May 14, 2008,
the district court made the opposite ruling on the exact same issues presented in MSJ2
("2008 MSJ Order"). See R. 387-395. The district court, made findings and concluded
that: (1) Defendants committed serious breaches of their fiduciary duties according to
Utah Code Ann. §75-7-706(2)(a), §75-7-809, and §75-7-802; and (2) Defendants' actions

in attempting to obtain compensation for themselves from the Trust were void. Id. at
R.388:iJ3 through R.395.
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Defendants' actions included: "failing and refusing to respond to or answer the
lawsuit filed by Smith against Cram as Executive Trustee of the Trust and by allowing a
default judgment to be taken against the Trust;" improperly giving themselves positions
within the Trust so that they could get compensated from the Trust, and "taking other
such actions in furtherance of their own best interests and against the best interests of the
Trust and its Beneficiaries." Id. at R. 388:ifl-R. 393:ifl0. Included as an exhibit to the
2008 MSJ was the 2006 Board of Arbitration Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
("2006 Board Findings"), in which the 2006 Board found that Defendants breached their
duties in multiple respects and were not entitled to all the compensation they claimed. See
2006 Board Findings at R. 1678-1685.
After reviewing Beneficiaries' 2008 MSJ and Beneficiaries' 2008 Motion to Void
Transactions, the district court ordered Defendants removed as trustees and ordered that
Defendants not be compensated by the Trust. See 2008 MSJ Order at R. 394-395.
Subsequently, the district court set aside the 2008 MSJ Order for reasons not stated after
a hearing on the matter. See July 10, 2009 Order at R. 2050:if3.
Later, on May 13, 2015, Defendants filed their own motion for summary judgment
(MSJl) on the Compensation Issue and Breach Issue. See MSJI at R.5384-5393. In
opposing MSJl, Beneficiaries provided multiple pieces of evidence. See Opp. To MSJl
at R. 5465-5481, and 5482-5539. Such evidence included excerpts from four depositions
of Defendants, minutes of trustees meetings, and the Trust document. For example,
.;;

Beneficiaries presented arguments that included exhibits referencing the Trust documents
as well as excerpts from Defendants' depositions, showing how Defendants' admitted
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actions did not entitle them to compensation under any Trust provision. Id. at R. 54785480.
Additionally, at oral arguments, Beneficiaries brought up the evidence of the 2006
Board Findings, which determined that Defendants had breached their fiduciary duties
and that a reasonable compensation rate for a trust manager was $19/hour. See Transcript
of June 3, 2013 Oral Arguments at R. 6581, p.22:11-19. The district court referenced the
2006 Board Findings, stating: "The other question is his fees as trust manager. We have a

GiJ

real justiciable issue of fact that arise from the board of arbitration, the hourly rate, and
we need to look at it." Id. at 31: 15-17. The district court then ruled that there were
genuine issues of material fact on the Breach and Compensation Issues and they should
be reserved for trial. See MSJI Order at R. 5602-5603.
Yet, just a few weeks after the MSJ 1 Order was issued, Defendants filed their

(.~'.
~

MSJ2 without new admissible or relevant evidence, without argument for why the district
court's MSJl Order on the Breach Issue and Compensation Issue should be ignored, or
without argument for why law of the case doctrine did not apply. Thus, there was ample
evidence of genuine issues of material fact in the record and known to the district court
when it granted Defendants' MSJ2 at the pretrial conference. It was an abuse of
discretion to grant Defendants' MSJ2 and not to consider this evidence already in the
G

record.

Ill
Ill

~
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3. Issue 3: Attorney fee award to Defendants was improper.
Defendants should not have been awarded attorney fees. Utah follows the
American Rule on attorney fees, awarding fees if they are allowed by contract or statute.

See Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 1998). In the present case, on January 23,
2014, the Honorable James L. Shumate issued an order called Final Summary Judgment
("FSJ Order"), in which the Beneficiaries were ordered to pay the Trust a sum equal to all
the attorney fees that the Trust had already paid in attorney fees. See FSJ Order at R.
6027:,I2 of Conclusions of Law. Judge Shumate subsequently retired and the Honorable
~

G. Michael Westfall was assigned to the case. A hearing was later held before Judge
Westfall on the attorney fees award in the FSJ Order, at which the district court asked
Defendants' counsel: "[W]hat is the legal theory on which Judge Shumate would have
awarded your clients attorney fees?" See Transcript of February 17, 2015 hearing at R.
6582, p.16:14-16. In response, Defendants' counsel explained his belief that attorney fees

i;)

were awarded based on the statute that allows for attorney fees when a claim is brought
without merit and in bad faith. Id. at 16:17-19:7. This statute states: "In civil actions, the
court shall award reasonable attorney fees to a prevailing party if the court determines
that the action or defense to the action was without merit and not brought or asserted in
good faith." See UTA §78B-5-825(1).
However, attorney fees should not have been awarded because the district court
did not make any findings that Beneficiaries' causes of action were without merit and

~

brought in bad faith. A claim is "without merit" if it is "frivolous, or of little weight or
importance having no basis in law or fact." Gallegos v. Lloyd, 2008 UT App 40, if 19, 178
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P.3d 922 (citing Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). In order to determine that a claim was not asserted in good faith:
The district court must find that one or more of the following factors
existed: (i) The party lacked an honest belief in the propriety of the
activities in question; (ii) the party intended to take unconscionable
advantage of others; or (iii) the party intended to or acted with the
knowledge that the activities in question would hinder, delay, or defraud
others.

Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305,316 (Utah 1998).
Here, the findings in the FSJ Order state that Defendants did not breach any
fiduciary duties, Plaintiff Smith has earned compensation for his time for which he has
not yet been compensated, and "[A] large amount of attorney fees, later to be ascertained
and totaled by this Court, have been billed by the parties in this case. Said trust stands in
need of replenishment of said moneys, as they were taken out of the corpus of the TKOG
trust." See R. 6026,Il- 6027:,I4 of Findings of Fact. Nothing in the findings mentions,
hints at, or discusses the issues of "without merit" or "bad faith." The findings in the
Order do not articulate a clear basis for the award of attorney fees as required. See UBDH

v. Davis County Com'n, 2005 UT App 347, ,I7, 121 P. 3d 39 ("Wedo, however, insist
that a district court's decision concerning a motion for the award of attorney fees be
supported by adequate findings."); see also Still Standing Stable, L.L. C. v. Allen, 2005
UT 46, ,JlO, 122 P.3d 556 (holding that when a court awards attorney fees pursuant to
§78B-5-825, the court must indicate "a clear basis" for its findings). In fact, the new
district court judge, in reviewing the FSJ Order stated: "Again, I'm not sure why [the
previous judge] ordered that they should be paid at that time. I suppose the Court of
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Appeals can sort through that and then let me know if they think I should take another
look at it. .. " See Transcript at R. 6582, p.20:3-6. Therefore, there was an insufficient
basis on which the district court ordered attorney fees.
A. The Evidence in the record does not support a fmding of without merit and bad
faith.

Even if the district court had made findings that Beneficiaries claims were without
~

merit and made in bad faith, the evidence in the record would not support such findings.
First of all, on May 14, 2008, the district court granted Beneficiaries summary judgment
on their claims against Defendants, finding and concluding that the Defendants
committed serious breaches of their fiduciary duties according to Utah Code Ann.§ 75-7706(2)(a), §75-7-809, and §75-7-802. See 2008 MSJ Order at R. 390:,r3 through 392:ifl 0.
Defendants' actions included: "failing and refusing to respond to or answer the lawsuit
filed by Smith against Cram as Executive Trustee of the Trust and by allowing a default

@

judgment to be taken against the Trust"; improperly giving themselves positions within
the Trust so that they could get compensated from the Trust; and "taking other such
actions in furtherance of their own best interests and against the best interests of the Trust
and its Beneficiaries." Id. at 388:11-392:if 10. The district court then ordered the
Defendants removed as trustees and ordered that Defendants not be compensated by the

~

Trust. Id. at R. 393-394. Later, the district court set aside this order for reasons not stated
in the order. But Defendants had filed a 60(b) Motion to set aside the order on July 15,
2008, arguing that counsel for Defendants was ill and was not able to oppose
Beneficiaries' summary judgment in time and the issues were already supposed to be
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scheduled for a four-day trial. See July 10, 2009 order at R. 2050:~3; and July 14, 2008
Motion to Set Aside Default Order Removing Trustees and Voiding Transactions at R.
434.
Secondly, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on May 13, 2013
("MSJl "), arguing that Defendants did not breach their fiduciary duties and Plaintiff
Smith was entitled to compensation as Trust Manager. See MSJI at R. 53 84.
Beneficiaries opposed MSJI, arguing that there were genuine issues of material fact on
these two issues. See Opposition to MSJl at R. 5465-5481. The district court denied
Defendants' MSJl on these two issues, finding: "There are genuine issues of material fact
regarding the amount, if any, to which Penn Smith is entitled for his work as Manager of
the aforementioned Trust" and "There are genuine issues of material fact such that the
issues of whether or not the Trustees ... have breached their various duties." See MSJI
Order at R. 5602:1~3-4 of Findings of Pact. The district court also ordered that these two
issues "should be reserved for trial." Id. Yet, 45 days after the MSJl Order, Defendants
filed their MSJ2 on these two same issues that the district court had just determined
should be reserved for trial due to genuine issues of material fact.
Thus, in 2008, the district court had determined that there was enough merit to
Beneficiaries' claims that the court granted them summary judgment. Then in MSJI, the
court determined that there were genuine issues of material fact that precluded summary
judgment for Defendants on Beneficiaries' claims. In the brief time between the MSJl
Order and Defendants' filing of MSJ2, there was no new evidence presented to the court
that would indicate Beneficiaries' claims were brought in bad faith or were without merit.
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Therefore, the district court's award of attorney fees pursuant to §78B-5-825(1) was
improper and should be vacated.
4. Issue 4: Beneficiaries' first, ninth, and eleventh claims were not before the
district court on summary judgment and should not have been dismissed at
that time.
Three claims of the Beneficiaries were not addressed in MSJ2: (a) the first cause
of action for a declaratory judgment as to who can be appointed a trustee and successor
trustee and how to do so; (b) the ninth cause of action for conversion; and (c) the eleventh
cause of action for waste. See Amended Complaint at R. 2132, 2138, and 2139-2140. At
no time were these claims addressed by the court. Therefore, these claims should be
remanded to the district court and Beneficiaries should have the opportunity to present
their claims at trial.
5. Issue 5: The failure of the Trustor in preparing and delivering the lease and
stewardship agreements invalidated the Trust.

Beneficiaries asserted that the Trustor' s failure to prepare and deliver Lease and
Stewardship Agreements ("LSAs") according to the Trust invalidated the Trust.
However, in the district court's July 9, 2013 Order on Partial Summary Judgment
("MSJI "), the court found that "Any lapse or failure of the Trustor to prepare or deliver
the Lease and Stewardship agreements to the beneficiaries of the Trust before his death
does not invalidate the Trust itself." See MSJI Order at R. 5601 :iJl. However, the
Trustor's failure to prepare and deliver the LSAs was fatal to the validity of the Trust and
the court had no grounds to reform the terms of the trust according to UCA §75-7-415.
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In their MSJl, Defendants cited to §75-7-415 for the proposition that the court can
simply reform the terms of the Trust to allow LSAs to be issued solely by Trustees. See
MSJl at R. 5391 :,IL However, the statute does not provide such authority:
The court may reform the terms of a trust, even if unambiguous, to conform
the terms to the settlor's intention if it is proved by clear and convincing
evidence that both the settlor's intent and the terms of the trust were
affected by a mistake of fact or law, whether in expression or inducement.
See UTA §75-7-415 (emphasis added). "A mistake of fact" is where a person understands

the facts to be other than they are; whereas a "mistake of law" is where a person knows
the facts as they really are, but has a mistaken belief as to the legal consequences of those
facts." People v. LaMarr, 20 Cal.2d 705, 128 P.2d 345, 348 (1942).
In MSJl, Defendants cited to no mistake of law or fact that affected the terms of
the trust. Essentially, all that Defendants argued is that they think the Testator would be
ok with the original LSAs being issued solely by Defendants. See MSJl at R. 5391:,Il.
However, Defendant's assertion did not provide the authority to a court under §75-7-415
to reform the Trust as there was no mistake of fact or law involved.
Furthermore, Defendants' suggestion that Defendants/Trustees be allowed to issue
the original LSAs contradicts the Testator's intensions as found in the Trust. The Trust
states that the Trustor shall prepare and then deliver LSAs to the Beneficiaries that are
signed by him and the Trustees. See Trust at R. 5498:,I,I5-6. The Trust is clear that it is
the Trustor's responsibility to prepare and deliver signed LSAs. Id. at ,I6. Lastly, to make
it abundantly clear that the Trustees did not have the power to issue the original LSAs,
the Trustor adds the following language: "the trustees shall not be authorized to issue any
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stewardship in addition to those originally specified except as replacements for other
Beneficiaries ... " Id. at if7. In other words, the Trustees are only authorized to issue LSAs
to the heirs of an original Beneficiary after the original Beneficiary, who had accepted a
Stewardship, has died.
There is no hint of a mistake of law or fact in the language of the Trust that would
give rise to a court's authority to reform the Trust through §75-7-415. The Trustor was
clear in his intention that only he would be allowed to prepare and deliver the original
LSAs. Therefore, summary judgment should not have been granted in favor of
~

Defendants on the issue of whether the Trustor's failure to prepare and issue LSAs
invalidated the Trust according to §7 5-7-415.

X.

CONCLUSION
There are genuine issues of material fact that should have precluded the District

@

Court from granting Defendants summary judgment. Based on the foregoing reasons,
Appellant/Beneficiaries respectfully request that the Court reverse the District Court's
grant of summary judgment to Appellees/Defendants.
DATED this 23th day ofNovember, 2015.
GALLIAN WELKER & BECKSTROM, L.C.

C . topher A. Lund
Attorneys for Intervenors/Appell
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con~$Y aff ·rlght, t~e-, and .l11t;-er-e.st· 1rf and -to .,anv stocks, bonds, .mortgqgE1s, notes·
r-ecefvable., ondJor oiher p.erJiOndl ptoperty \vhion T-RUSTOR grantB or may grant as
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lrravacqQ1e.~QlW-9VOfte.es fu f.hetRUS'f hereby created ond Whloh said TRUSTEES shall holql
~n. affod1CJmi

·

5: ·rhot th.eTrausTORcnd.11WST-EES$hcill [Qauei:$1.~WARDS.Ht?S:for onQ among dEas.l_gnam:d

BENtFtCIARlES-:w.lfli slgt.lad.lEAsg :on'd srewARDSH!P A$QEEMml"$tjraatrv-eJy qs roTI.ow~
lEASS &.ST-J:WARP.SH~ A$REEM.ENf
~e :~
#1
St~v.eb-t ~1t-k1cin~,
#.2~~ '.Rlilfh «1.rt.rar.d) Coqp_~f
1

~-

#"4.
#5
#o

#1

M;
¥9

#1:0

#.l ~

#12.
# l3.
1.·14
#~5

Stev~n E~ -lt-frkfond<U
.Bet\JpJtlln .Te.mP.1es· .Kfndat'!ld
ll~fon Co1&.irian-·1<ilrkfdnd

Hylaf.\--J:tan~ltn'.~~tilqpd

Jo.lm-;14udson-.Kit'Jd<in.d
!Oqv,lQI· -~Qungite-e :KtNrlond

i~~v.10 e~~~-i(Jrktt~r~t

~lch~. A~t~r.n-.l<fo~laiJd
~ltlcSG~ KMdcmd
Dc,n1eLBoff.on :Kir,klan~
JQmes. Hen¢lerson Ktrk1ond

Ephtaftri flortq.n KfM.o~d
Tarr-esfrla1 :Klngaom of God
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~ Thqt. th~TRU~T.OR'$hafl·pr$~re:¢n~de,lJyer ro such Bene.flclorles th~ STEWARPSHJPS

P.~~tto··the-:µ;ASE and-StEW~-l<PSHtP:AGR~~ENTS ·dUly l~r!.bed by hlm ~nd-als,o by

!l:$.?Rt1~~✓-ln91Jootthg the-P,tlltlet.llgtrST.EWA~PSHIPS to•e.q_ch_ Bepe,fl~~ry.--onti-st~~ng that

~~$T~~D~P:·Jsin P-e.lP&.iUtty. H()W~Y~kJt-lsJ~~ .lnt.eht-offfi~ J"~UST(?R thdfupon iti_e
q($.crl"h ·,of,any ofitta-eenr:>-flcl~i18.S, th9 STl;\fvARDSHlP~~haU.rev¢.Jo··th.a T:RU.STEES to ..be .held.
In trust for the·= to.foot ri'ri~l:e ¢r.4tdf$i 'jf tp$,t~ :~f$JS·'nO adult fOolS· chu,f (r-i ·the fd,mlly,
..... T'

.

7, Thot the TRUSTEES shalhnot ba,.-9:Ltt.no.rlzed to lssus·tiny .STEWARDSHIP 1n adrlltton io
~~ o11g1riclly·apeclfJe.d-•exOep"J:··ets: ~plqcamen~~- for:ofher: ~r=,;h~:fJ~1¢frl~s<its a~ttiorlzed_tn
tn1s·tNO-ENTU.Rl:r :$icept· when .others cho.o~e toJoln fuls TRUST W.lifl. th~lr prqped.ls.t These
stiqll ~- orlglnaltS,- l250 UNt-T~: -Of 8EN5Ft<Z4Af. INTERESI".co11verte,q.to,_$fEWARDSHJP$ -In. thls
T'RUst TRUSiEE$ :~JUj :b$ r$g~1teii t.9:IUqlntotrrto1d provfde for-the. -upkeep of the-set :asld~
prop.erfy,,. ~r:neterv. -ttnqFarJ(tfnttfq~-fiqt -~~en.alfocateci fot-_parflc.u1a-r $T.EWARbSHlfa

·

to'lfieluoe.-alf-•C(?~t,qr:,~xp.eAsm Jri¥-J~g:, th~ ®oye(e~p$ns.~~-:~ll! t,e :provided from the
tijb~s.-;QT~Q:.cl) $ts.WA®: pursuGr.tf· ~:=th~tt-=tE:A~l!:.:r~od :ata»tAWSf.UP AGR6EM.EN:r~. me
T.R~-~t~~t~~~•_f9:rr:n ·.pr-9_pi{i·
·:- :-~l't,Q~~fot- th~ ~ult ·ofnappfne.~.-tor_,~~$-'.:qr-td
~ve~ t\~~~~:tjf9.~g _:~1jiij. ~~----~. ~: 11~ ~d--{s~~~as1b1Utl~-s: =Qt· tn~r- 4~~erltgJ}tqet-Ji:\ ff1~lr
r.espadf.tv.e·.-~~D,~ -~~~- . __9:~!!4tfU-;aJW~~ r~-ciln: an lnVfGJat.a 1t;i~errtan:c~ for
t~se. J$.~P.$.blflve mmmes Inf tlaJl'-~~; .·~~e~.¢1:d.n~s: \1/.1ll be_ t:sspO.t'Jtlpje. ·for· 1na1r
Pf.Qr$>(tt~nafij' $"are .~f QBSls:Qtexpan~s::qn ·iha.Jr.=pl~:1~et ·A_rii;:· t?e:rieflqlq_ry.-willch doesn ·t
f-l:o\ie· 0)1V lrite$t fo -his Jt-lbef{f.qnctM:;in.dwho W'Jfl :not ao~t·t~popstblUty tor ff' ·shtdl have
f.lr.st..rlghfto leoS.s.·hJij thfie_t~foti¢~ :sb'. as t¢. pr:$cluq~:tlle· acdrudl. of""dafouJte.d costs to
p_q:f?.ri~ofheirs.. tA the·ev.~nt·of ·AA)(BensiJ.c,l~r:f-,·-n~gla_q.t tn~-1iU$f~s=:5half"·exercJse their
r-~§Fiqns~~_lty ._fb· t~qsa ~tiJr,herltcih~e to :e9ver- p~opor:tlon.afi3-costs.i- Any ·.new·_-male heir
wm. b.$._ f~spot,;~fP~Jt?.r •ft.~ t~~~rop.pp.q ~f. ~~Y defaulted costs or -expenses, when f:le
ocs.epts tn°'e\~A'RDSHJ?. Noti,::forb·ny t:o.$i:nbets: are. lnvlfeci ~rid encotirCfgJed to Cldd
the.J_r ·_(6-r~~~ qn.d·¢0tl~S-cr~fe thar:n +Q· fiitt t-RUSt ·
·
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~. Ihetf, th.e T-_R~ST-EeS.-shaU"'-a1Sb\:;lt$e: tbdf. poi:!J0~ 9f. t-h$ ·lric.rs:q$a.pf th.~s. ~~StfnaceSlgty
for f-h~ Sl.JppGirt -o.f Ste~n ·~ ¥i*-la.'Pltf ~l'.l~-S;llvJei Ktrl~li;md; -and to any :ttn1nb{benefldor.1es
t-o.r. "fhelr. .edueaflonql, religjeus.'d~qptnel'.'it and -g:enarar weffore at the °TRUSTEES

cflsor.etfon..

toosr££S

CJ, T:tiqt .the
shall.-. ·?..V Mtnut-e. :Pr9Pf?.tlY \mctlb.e,c;l lQ ths :omc].sl reo:orct make
~vt~~f,!S-_(2~_t,q._tt1¢ t.ur.ie: ~d-pl6toe i'orhaldlh§-re.gµlar meetings. of•·:the Bqcqd .onru-st~as..
A·mqlOr.Jfy._qf~~r~ ~~qfct~J1~lf·:~~reJ a:,-~tttm forjl:)e ·conduct_:o.f.irustbus!n~s-~-qny
-~egllJ~ :Cir ~pa.¢.l.dtlmeetlt.lttof_:t~qry. ~~·qr4. :$9l no· :de~cfslba· moll b~coma aff-e,ctwe --or
blndll)tl unJ~ss q-.-m¢lt}ot.1W -qt. qll -P-4itte!\f 'fRU$.~: -~oh~~ f.o tµ[.!>port It~ An srnergency
me$.fftlQ:tJt~f:ta:;goorcf mt1fbex:~Derfui;,Q.nti1erwdt-te.n -~~~µast0>f ·o_mdjotlty-of t.~esoar~
of !r.14¢-~s t0.· 1~ pk~tca-.;at· <:t tJ.me·. oho. :t!>looe;-•speetffad 'In-such. wfftt~n .reqµe.st or :qy-

confere;oo~ oau~

W~ In~ the J~USTEES· of in1a :T.RJJ$:T,.¢~-STtWA~~J- mqy. tfo_ qnihlng ooct p~rfbr!l) ~ny
-dct:, ir-i. cqjigtq~qo~ ~J~iffOhqpt.et:25. -of.LEv.mcu~·:sµl~Ject ion1v-+o the :Jcw·ot ttia ,:Jand_ -and
the-p.rov,tslql)s e:otifalheid 1ni ·-tnJs:-JNPl;t-WfVR~i-tinq thgf by. thelr-Mlnutes. spread-upon the
reco·r~ ·the 1-RttStEES" .11:,lJitY= s~t. i:t?r:tl1· rr.he.l_r :~WM :gafu~td.l' pov.✓$,rs:t:tlid 9U.th~rffy as confer.red
up.on. fh~ Jr:i th~s ·0~1.ARATION ·O-fT-RJ)ST.

~rnw-~~tlan. .t~:

n.~ Ulm -~~- Sl)<?t-il :9~ ·pet~·
:'.·ooy efflo.~s.,. or_ -Qtg~~ts, to. inc(.µde
con~··wt}lch snqll P'.t:f1~eq <:tn~,p~J~t.it:-~·~-tfilS$.f~qh· ◊.fJhe if-RUSTEES_- of thl~T.RUST,.
tacludlng :~1rnb;ur~em~ for. -~11,f··-of"_;p~c;'k~t ~~~1:1~;s)h$Ur~~ -by ·:th~ TRlJS¢EES-qn 1?,ehalf
o~ ·tf'f$ ·r@St and p_etfor~·ed, fO! .tt.\e ~ar-,effl eJ tnts: ~USf. T~\fS,;EfS· \VlU· s~tve -w.fth9µt
eornpen·&aflon. Any:-corn:pe.n-sotJo.rt prlfd·mtrera ls rob$. th¢ dsuaUy p¢11d·for $Uch· work,
12. ThQtany lncieo:se.,-a.cc:r;Ulltlg to_tlJ1s TRUSr-subJectto.~paragro.ph three (-3) .obpve, shall
b-e. ·for the .worsl:itp ,of A1r,nt,g{1fy ~o°'· ~har.11y· ·¢,·1.i1ra ~Pve of Christ) l'o mankind 01,d for
ptomotJng th~ gs.nerai weff-or.:e, the -t~liglous be11.afs qnd higher educdtlo1i, or icultural
p~bgre~s-ofthe. 'Benetlolcr1es.:and. the '.comA1uhUy-.of-niqn,

.lS J That tht~. tRUST0R-Qf any 0.lf)§)f. l17-q}vJq0armtrsr~- 9t atw ·f.lnle ,· durlng the-.durGiion of
thls TRVSt. odd ·-to,•. Cl-n91· :thqs lnor~os_e·,J_ts· ¢qr:piis PY- mgklnrJ Q1fra. thereto. sud, gifts. to

co.nrorm. fo -~xisf1ng law.

·

itf.;_ ThQt·the rRUSTEES-~aJI -hov.e·r:he:·rlgnl:qr.tcf p~we.r- qs

s~t tqrth :tn fhls· inde.nture. to

r.o~nage ·tf1~,~U_$r·pt~p$:rly·f~rtha-~e_nelftof·t.he:B~neftplorlas tn ct manner 1.PJ h~rrno.ny

wlth ·t~~ ~r.g®.rG Co.1,-&tlfqfltjn;;qp.¢j ~m:.p.t· R~~-~-:W Wt.it~h -~e.emsto: 'them most des.trab.le ar.ld
bern~flok:n .. ·

}5, tn~t ~~- J~$~E$-1nav--esr61?"fls.~=~s'?~r~t.e;J~on1t. <itC.99u_b~ fAr if'i$.1.~~$J}-l9 w~_c{f~.-1~
fund_SJOA0-b'.Ei (i_$]Sd$ft~dlt ohQ sndlh¢etetm1AS;·'fh.e ·gui;lt,}.ordty by .wntch•_¢µrt~rlt-:ptjyt.rj'~nts
may ·be dlsours~of qt· ·W.lth¢lrqw.als-a.i_o.d-e: ttom:fi.:fptj$ '-'-:~lon~n9. ro.the:TfWSt

_1~, ·Tf.lp-r tt)~··_!RV~!E~-sntitf :m=s1tit:G1t11-wan~k~Pfb$Q!<S~-:dc.¢~.¢i~~,:Pn_ct·l'?-C?.Qn:~-?t9D~- ~t1qtJ
PI~e~· pt:tjp~~f fl.'ll~~f9f"_~f _($~µ1¢fr-·.~~t!~~~·-:ct1;3d.i-rss·e.rd.~U~de.clslo.n~itl~t$In relqt-Jve

t.o .fhe,:must.At.t_ ~~9f1/~r<GIS.ffi.~JL!D$~gff~(¢.1?¢f p~prft~~t.Jy;be. ovo.Uable· to ·cur.tent
Of.ld:'S~~'Q$.~.sgr TRUSTEE($) and fue. B.en~fJofode.~,<;tl··\J(Ftl~~s...

-i-7~ That the: t-RUSTEtS-bff.his.iR.USf:S.hd{I o.rlQll'\ci.ily COQ$l$t·G>f.°:riottewer- thoA THREE or-AVE
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nalupaI- p.ers-ons who ·shraH. _oonslitute-!ha-Seordto:f +ruie:es;.:~µt tf.~mqy .consfs.f of 9s mcmy
gs_:~c;t~·:b'~--d~~m~cl lq.Jm b.)l ·a -~or.iimt,ijS: decis~q~-- ofs!J_C.h .-B~grd duly ~te!~d Jh th.a
r~unut~s.of.sdtld ~oarq,: .mqs.r,ees ~hall .sarvErfor,dm lnltrct1·par.tQd of tem-veara~ SUbseq1..1$!At
reE~cil :snQ!t-be'¢.Ji.tqrffdflc;; p.1;>h9'1:1g.:tirto~1tr-lPUS ttppro\1C;ll ot·the Bod-rd of Managers~
obs-ent-op.prov.affQr.ir.enew,af -cr:risw ciPP~lniiment .shci11 be.-made- at. "the discr-et1on of the
'trustee~.
0

lS. Th¢it !he JRUSfE$ ·Ofthls ~l;JSf :rna_y:-$le,cf9ne·~rtheJr-n~betas .EXEClJT{VE-TI?UStEE;
oRd ,appo.ln"t a TRJ:A~. Tn~- TRt.;$1~-$. mQ'f.'~1ec.r =_ope ,of .their -numl;>er :or ·onother-d_uly
quafffile.d :p:eraor.t .qs M.qnc@.tl wrn¢.·w~l ~s$\7~-:and~.ov-emee tha,-properf:f.es dftlila TRUSL.
thqt ¢tre.notit.i.:ST€WARDSH1P~ ,an:dfs.ceh1e· rads0Aaole.c_ompe.hsqitlon fdr such ,sfJivlc_e-as
defen.nine~•by fha ·B(::!drd.-of: T.r-iJste·es;

t9. Tb¢., shoulC, It b$~e-ob'.t/loos ·a.-t qny.'fJme.to th~ maJp.rliy of th'e Board of'Trustees
thc;tUhe--9q_nt.1nuonce in sucn -~"o"¢l1y Qf.-:cin.e of fu.~fnµIJ_1per wolitld_ be ln1mlcctl to this
t-RUST dt~d tts Beneftoror;iesl, such 'fRUSTE·E m-G.JY be .reF.Apvett:by the ·unanlmous c;.ledslor:i of
the -other ffltlST6ES,· for' sxttarrl°ef oouse,, ..af:1-er ·-on. independent :Board of. Ar-bltroifon hos
concurred wlt.htha decision· oUh:~
~ny TRUSTEE-may res]gn .at his-.elsorei1on,

-~us~J
Toot Q B~ord. ·df.Ar-~t.rcdl&.n:~n~l~b~ $llc>:mt~q: W:~:~n.>1:h~- r,R\).STE~S .ate; ~1::iA~~ to

20J
come to Q maJotlfy decision .or·knat~ .their dectston l?• ~ove::. _-Eqch TRVSfEE shclll
appolrrt on~ dls1µterested member <md the new~y .qp·pQlnte,d ~oar<;i :members wUl-se:le.ct
fyjo more d_lslo~rest~q- m.ei_np~rs.. 1he$e·. ·flve lndlv.J~9Js. w..m -comprJse t-he .·aoard 01
Arbitr-crtton. theJr majqr1ty V(?~ W,UI 11.iJ~_-o.nq._res.olve. '.qtLdfspUtes,
1
~

2:l , That ·1n toe .-avant: thaf arty T~~s.te~· -d1e.~, -b:e.qomes 1~cqpoclta.ted, r.esrgn_s, or -Js
retr.\ovsp., tn~'.!~-~~i~lpg flil·l?mbera o.Ube :1roau:d Qf Trust~es~-sha.U ·ctp point the first named
succ$ssoPIJ.ho $h~n fiqvs agr<;Seq to· .serveJn su.~ cap:oelty.
·

22. Thpf no Ben~fl.daiy.,_ -as ~~CO:~ -shdlJ· be. e·rnp~werecl to -control the musrEES In a.ny
way or dtctate man~gemenf p:Olfcles ;to,·tne TRJ)ST,. 6(de-~rmlne the disbursement of

TRUST· lnoreO$Ei,
21~ Tho_r D9. qredltqr o.f _-qny BeJ'lefic!aw -6.f -t~s TRUSJ shG1f be ellg•ible. to sue, .or obtatn
from, 'this TRUST any of.the dlstribl.:ltldf\$ made PY/Of auefr$'nt'l-, 1hls TRUBlto dny·Baheflclary
the.r$0f.

24. Tool:~ altho~g~ tha:_lRU$ll;ES· mqy nofba he1d- -re~ponsfbfe, Whfle .performll'"\g their
dtl~e.s.. a'ecording_·t.o. -~ 'rnc:irid9t~~ ~f ffi.fs ~ST., for any. Jgsses r.esultlng. from no fau1t or
their· ow.rh they we «cib.le. ip_Jetr:\~~Q)
J~tts fof p~r$p_ndf .:gomag~~ :ln1t!at~'d !:>Y. ooy
B"~ITf~~ry-- ~t ~ny losses w~teraal Qt :t~e .~Si be.c®se _of-ftau_¢ ~onve('.$lon qt T~V$T
RIQ~#Y ·to P~t~r-iql ~s$;J;,irQ~ -n~_~i .df .d~fv./Of _.brea~- ;p.f T.RUSr, Q.r\ thelr-,port.. Arlt

~no

b~n.sflpfi;fiyrt)gyJ~fflqt~~eh:~Qlj~\t~lJOO.(~t~$.C$,tit;>fAtbli'f:tafto11-to:~.e.·f.0rmed:py_
\wltfn:g ·to. the B?Grd= .Qf T~$.fe.e.sj~A.ol; $.t.ml fl$lo.b]st1ro~t OtRTPPt/fote$ the t~q.yol· of

ct culpable. r,riust~ om;;!~ m i:ut01t1011;-.eGmp.:eJ ~~ •.to,.mof<e.:-re.sfltutm fQ Jlie.~USfJot-dt1Y

fund:s.stofen,_conv~~:~. tg PffSOQAI use~.d.11 f~sM~sq,gU_s~: 0ft;;toss ne~}ect-of dufy,
0

-

~p. Tti<d '.it. OflY: .B~11~fldary-hereunder dles WlthQ\4t ;Q_:ndm~d "tielrt'liS STE.WARDSHIP ~hall
to· Jh'?- _·aoQ.r~I: ¢ ·rrusfeea~ Who jhaU.· fheraup.on r.,amt~r a :repiocement
BeneflGJaryJ.STI:WARD·, :pursua_nt ·ro. pdtngrap'h 6, an'd J$sue to htm or each of them a
r~1/~r.t
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STEWARDSHiP- bearlng dlfogefher fl'le ~etmaSTEW~ROSHlP as ,prevlously-belonged to Buch
decedent Beneficiary.

·

_lo._ r~at th~ ~sm~ Jlf·fl;)t~ -r~$! ~h~ hwe power·to ler1c! fT)Onev, ~ttt1out usu,y, to
tt:i-e i~nJ➔.f!C.lart.$8-_qr -~q:b.Q.f~,1µl}idS:; -~~~at,no:t1m;e.·ff-1oV T.RU5f real p~openy .asse't$·.be
usad -e;,s_ p~ame.TQ& :an¢fihQf..-!11$V :~Pol! tltmt-e no. outb€>rJiy to per.form an\' actions except
those set- forlh and pa1mli:tetil ~-t.1 ·inJs -tNPE1~~
·27_._, that the."T:R~STEES O.:f-thls iRD.~·sn.Gql oorrnctlly hlr.e no -9~~ on o -$dl~rl'?d .ba~1s_, no
seMo~s·snall be.pe.r.fotro~d·ror·fl111RUSi"";Lfnless on. a c:ontrqctudl bas1s;t .Unless. such an

arr.ang-ement.1.~--~n1awfu.J cf ~r.ripo,.stble,;

28., Thqt th1~. D$.clorat1Qt-l of trust· -crest.es oni-y cm '.-lrrev.o:cobia ~UST,. arld not a
corprncfloh-, ·portn.ershtp or· assoclatlor,.

29-,. That the TRUSTE6S of. 'tl;\ls..TR:lJST he:rel?V•-OQl'ee to accept "the· responslbllliy over~ and
the· wJse prese.ryaflor1 ot the :~~ts: 90nvey.1;lQ to th'l.s TRUST for the benefit qf the
Be~.fl¢19f~s, and lhef{: posterity} tnat-·'fti·~ :~xe,9qt1or, .oft-he .d4tles:pursuant thereto.,. by
w.n1qh ~~1/ .P,led.ge: th~lr .best efforts ,q1:.l¢I {nter~~ :·1f\. prot:ectlng:_ cind preseMn~ .the aS$ers
of thls· T.RUS~:- Q.t\¢1:. t.h¢t ·!his. .TR~Sf ~OEiiilTQ!~:e· 4hotr const-rtute. ~ ~ffi91ent ;Ql:i1d~.
suppte.m.e.nt.ed ntm" t1rhs ·toJkrie.-~wly ~nter-$d ~l'?ito the• .records at t11ts.lRUSt: such :rn'.ln-utes
td ·oonform:to fua. guict:alh)~Jf:~:f1~rttf~fi'fhls ·l~QEhJT{JRE~·rot the Board of Tr-usiees:-tn th:e
p$.r:r.ormonce Gf tnefr -duties,.. :4nd. sb,all t~e .ipltjdn1g· ~p~1t ~1~ porr.t-lss thereto. The
1noer1tan~a-.-w1U ·olwoys·be. matnto1h~d--ror tba :M~e tie.lrs.qt th~ erl§lrjpi 8eMeJJ¢.fary-. Scud
Bo~d:shall hove_~~n powa~·r.ae~ssc;.try._iq carry·ot.Jt ¢1'Jd";1:,e'i19rm. fne·dufl:e,s.-rndnd¢1red to,
-and/lnci.:ur:ibent ·µpcm:.: fu~m. ·as"- TR~Sn:ES.:oi thls. must.
30, ·That; s1r--ce. t~ls T:RUSn;~onfers l1Ml!EO .llAi3lU1Y L(pcn -the TRUSTl;ES., TRUSTOR. ond
~er.rE?fi91ode~ tharet~.. ·a ~tcifem.enf-d.eeiaiQ~JY. _of ~t;tch· Umfte_q µablllty- shail be -prtnted
de.¢.Jy p.n. a11 :qo.nto~s ·made by anel. -~etw·een the Y,RUSTE~ .of inis. TRUST -0r .:a
re¢fese.ntqtlv~ _the(eo;f d.pd qny. thtfd po.r.ty of parf.tes t-o .:such ·ooniract Furrhe.tmqr-a; fhls
1RU$hho1I ~~ respqnsJb1$.:~n1ff:or u-~·.own .091lQJaf·lon~:and never.for those of :onv TRUSTOR,
T:RUS:TEE, :or Bene.flcJarylS:fEWARD;

.indivkrual -by~·ttie T-RU$f.QR or -o;ny TRUSlEE Ot Bi~neflt;)Jdry/STEVi{ARD ··the.reot".

3_2\ Th.at the-·T.RUSTiEES·,of"ttiJs·TRUST shell sel\f.e wlthowt bond.,. ·and that, as lndlv1duals.,
n~n§,_of' fh.em ·shcill e~t' ba.-heldJ:~pot!:i~b.Je ·tor:-ar:iv.-·-debts or-obligations· Incur-red by the

·
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$1. Thptthe TRUST cre.qt.ep.he.r:~lhJs·ct·s$.pargte .and independent ~ntlty and, .as such,
·co~hol ;~s held: ·f~gq-lly re.sp~fb.le. f$.t -qfw debt 6r obUgatfon lnctirted per.soncdly as an

must

I

Gr/

-

~a..- V,fqf.~s !N.t;>.E.MJ:UREOf TkU.&'f sholfser:y~. '.~~-:oornp1at~--<:in.d ~ffJ.clqJ guJq~:.fQf th,e
T~USf.Et~)a. tt.e.J~~r~tJJf ;:c:tt-)~ p~qt~¢trtce offheJr.dut.Ie·s h~re.uryd~r; Q:n·d fb9Hney:~hall.:
~a~a-0rn1y,:Sucr.rauthority; -powe,i$~ ah¢l-dutJ~s:-o$.;·gre_ :0$nf~red:ner:e.-18 and hereunder.

3tl~- 1h~fth_e ~utte~---of·ff)e..T~'t:ilSI€ESofthis.·must shoil·be·._slrfyllqr:to fh9se-q1 a STEWARD
under tne lAW Qf. $fEW~D.Sfl}F~
3&,· That· ~o tfe.blslon· =bf tbs· TRUSTEES; o.r -any dfabtJrsefnenf of funds' :shoH be _effective
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c·.
Clhd-,blnd~ unl,ess ·1t ls· supp.anted and:_pqsse~-_by d.-tnaJortty of the Bo.ard ·of Trustees and
~s.pt-~~~i;ty ent~r~d-as. ~ MI.Aui:e:lr? 1he :P~rf.rj<21rn.eJ)t·r~d o'f'tha· $dk:!l'B·oord However~ the

TRU$r~~?--~~ ~nfer-upon-a-l:RUS:TManager;:ceJi'O.h1 .ttm1t-$d powers w make day~tp-day
neoe,S$pry _.q\spurss.m$,lits·=fi:l:1he·:qt~e~e-otortjln01Y~U~l~ess., such dspu~menis tobe
subJect to .subseq~trt rev.I~ dr,>d q~var=py::tna muST.EESf:

.3.6~ Tnqt :rielfher ihe,- death ~or lhs~lver:icy· or bankruPtPY of arw TRUST~~ or
Beneflcfar-yJSraNARD-is11cdf~:ln o.ny--wav affect tbe-~perat.loJi· or cionr.lii.l:ilty or. thEs JRUS-l

'37.. That-no-;tjlsburs~me.nt ·Or -0ffiar b~n$fit~h~U oocrue ·to· . ar1y BaneffcJary/SfEW.A~b or
,other ;fndlvldudL ex-capt as sat forth tn fhls iMD'EMW~B. .Qf·musr.
.
,3$.. lhcrtif1s. TRUST shaP oe ·-qothl¢Hed ·Ih,. -and.-:$ubJect to the.Jaws of the Utan.Re.pub.lie
that me C-OJ181~t-.u:tlonq!. Wh~rev$ ~~Ch,,QWS .ore p-ert1nent or opp(fca.ble tq th.~ :o,peratlon.

of th1s trust.

·

·

39. that this rRLlSl'":.~alLnot.h_e::consir.0~.d to:hav.e atW-cormecilon., .tmpJted or- actual,
~flY co.t-P,,o.to~, stqd:e· govemment or oorpo"rate federal
govemmer.lt. 1hlsT-RU~ J$. ·n0:rtirS:sJrJ~n\ :dJl~rfGnd f-Oretgn to dtl-. corporQte:. government.

as: to ·qny $UPP.o$:e~. r1$~,- with

40~ Th~ qbJ&ct of :fhls ··musr s1::io11 'b.e to--t~~1ve, cicqµlre., hqlo·_iaiid tr.lifnsfer 011 manner
of pr9-pecyf$t;, co.j.l$.9¢r-ated qod c..onvey.ect for...the _wor.shlp of.Alrnlgtr(y. ·God1 chorliy to
mqhk1btj
f9t :•it>tbn,o:tmg ifhe. general weff-are., the relJgl~~ _.ballets pnd--educaftoh of
its-~.e.neflc1arl~.s/S.!~A,~OS:tn':lcf the comml:.lnffy of man. LEVmcus·25·sholl be the p1ima.ry

and

gu)de OT- the TRlJ.STEES,.

i

4·:1, The;(fRUS!EES··and a.tfAgec'\t:·Ofr~C.E~S-d~lar~, ang_ (;lckl)9wledge thelr lnailenab1e
rights ·secured.~bY the. tJ.;$, Gohstrtuf.lon-cmd· Uta.h-C6r:lst~Mior;b .No .¢.resum..Ptlon fs to be
01.ad&_ fhat ·r-lglits: .r:et¢fri€J¢J ··¢fr:~. :1n: OAV W1!J._V.. c.11/!H dgnta P-1,J~Up_nt tq th.e .fo\rrte~~D
Amendment. of ::the.·.u .-p~. G.onstlh;ltlan, Afty:,qn:d-a11-compe,ll$.d-a~tlo.ns -of the·T.RUSJEES or
OFFlCERS by 'federal· -or -stqte· =government fs ~one w.flihout" pjreJudlce~ and·wHh -explicit
0

reservotlon of .f1ghts .
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TmRES~lA:l =JCtNGP.0'.M OF ;GO:D

.SOHetiUEE OFASS:ErS.
l,

Tro~ of· Jond.111 ·w~sblngfurl o.oun1y., ~~GPk· 163.1. f.Soge -404~ .Reference #16455:3~

d~scr.U)~:t,&~ $.J:(S~NU\lG'. l l9.~5'fij:S.t W~s~-~f1:ll~ l~qr:tt,aasH~omer·of lot-'Elght

{8);, a~,e~·.:fo~4!1re.e £4~#,r P.kW~~~; '$t~-:·$:ept~_$: ~(q.lW ~urvey., ~~---~~nnlng thence
sour-1:i :8'2.5:t~eh-thanoe-:East:~itfi:fe°t?rr th$n¢.$:;$0tith B.2-~5 ·feet:tnenoe West 204}5

fee.:trtr,t~n¢e 'Moffh i'B.S -~et the.f'~e.-fosf fatl-f~t ~to -~:he p:0tnf.qt b.-eg1hnrng;· :lsi~ihg
P~·.oflQiis 6~..7- o~e1·a--6! :Sald ·Bloo.k-43., 'f.OG:ErttER·wtth 011 :Jmprover-.nehts and
.ap,purfer.lo:nces, th~e,:o. befong((iw, INCWDING- lhr.~.e .(~)·-houi~s of'JrrJgarlon water
In flie St,. $.eor~e- Wesi• Oliy ~r1n.Qs:.

2.

Beglnolrlg cit·a.potAt .East 5 ch~l(is frQm. the NEcQmer of the SW 1/41 ·sec, 23, Tp.
42 Soutfu Rgng$ la West_ SLM.,, :and rwnntng tl1enc-e -South 2s~ East 4. 9.6 ·chotns;
th~h~South 4lt50~ E-ost5/2.7 c~aJns;thence·southw:~stef~y 1..24-rods, mqre or .~ess1
to- ~e- ~pi~t$flY- boWidi,fy Un~ of the..Coufl1Y •r0Qd;· the.nee folloWfng saJ¢ eas1srJy
Jina. of -sptd· 09~ntt ro:cd Irr ,a· t10.tthw~terly_ cUr.ectlon .. to a. point of• ffi§3 $outh
boundary· nne pUbe= NW 1/4 of sciklS~. ·23., Which po.t11t:lles. l 630.2. feet .eost o-f 1110
SW-comsr,.of sold NW 1/4; thenpe :.east of-sqld b9-t.mdary llhe l$39,B fe.e.t, more: or
less, to:polnt of b~glnnlng,.-ce>nt~hliig 30 qc:res) more· dr1e~s; w.l'lh 9:shcires· of waler
from Mfll Cree1<.Jrrtga.tiort C.ompcn:r;,and :a ,fifing on the·=
water ·nq~ used ·on
;sdfd. l~nti:. <:tl~ wli'h lmpr.~vaments and. oppµtfena.nc.es. A!so., il3 _of the .runoff·
\1/0fei ·froh') the.- .¢r:JY of Washtnglon .conscted In the east ditch of the M111 Creek

waste

lmgcitfon· Corapqny..
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-JN_ \~T.NE.$:S 'WHERE-0.P, the -sa1d TRUSfOR, Stev.ah. E. Klrkland, has ·hereunto and t.o a
d~IJcbte -hereof set hls_ hand .artd seat;-qnd the s¢d TERRESTRl-AL :[{fN-$00M OJ= GOD has

cq~$~:d ~his irr.s~urne~to ~a. ex~caj~-!n·:~\i_pU¢ot.~ -~~ !ts duf.y :authorized ·oFfiCERS and
TRUSTEES ,as- of the .atP-: dd\1"-ot ~tn"P« ., 19.98.

THE TRUSTOR .(Slgner:-and Seater)

~~

·stev-en: E Klr-kland.~ rrustor·

rae.es~IAt KINGDQM·O;F ~OD
. :;FORJ'f.H; 'i'RUST:(Slr;;("eis,qnd Sea_lers}

WffNESSEO. 8¥:

U.~an ~,epubiic
Counfy-·=~f:Wq~}:l-Jngt_cm

Qn lt!Jl~, d9')' o ~ ~ . l~9J; belpf~ [1'.'19 th1e1unders1gned, a Notary PubUc
ln,ond.for-s.~q--CO:t:f· 7nd.Stq1~-! perso.hq:Jly·~ppectre-ci St.even.--E~_erson Klrk1and~ Vafdeh
Or.Q'Jll,, -Pann:H-~--dhd. £-dwar<fQ•.:B$¢kwJth .proved to.-me on the ·bGJSls of-satisfactory
evidence to ptl ifi~ psrsons:\1Jh-¢s~ ·-names cre··subscrfbed to t-he.--wltt"iln -lnatrument and
qckAbWfeqg~c.1 itiaf tne1r exe9ut-ed. the same..
.

N6.rARV'-~Ei.\L
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ADDENDUM2
Smith v. Cram, et al
Appellate Case No. 20150637-CA
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MAY 1It 2008
GALLIAN, WILCOX,

[flfTH DtiSlP.r.CT OOtJRT

WELKER, OLSON & BECKSTROM, L.C.

~~~moo rotAm

Russell J. Gallian (1144)
Jeffrey C. Wilcox (4441)
John L. Collins (10790)
965 East 700 South, Suite 305
St. George, Utah 84790
Telephone: (435) 628-1682

Attorneys for Intervenors
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR

WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PENN SMITH,.
Plaintiff,

ORDER REMOVING TRUSTEES AND
VOIDING TRANSACTIONS

vs.
VALDEN CRAM, as Executive-Trustee

under the DECLARATION OF TRUST dated
11/26/93, operating under the name .of the
TERREST~ KINGDOM OF GOD,
Consolidated Civil No. 060501773

Defendant.
JOHN H. KIRKLAND, et al.,

Judge James L. Shumate

Intervenors.
This matter came before the Court pursuant to Intervenors' Motion to Remove Trustees,
filed on April 18, 2008, and Intervenors' Motion to Void Transactions, filed on April 18, 2008.
The time for responding and opposing each motion has expired, and each matter has been
submitted for the decision of the Court. Having reviewed the motions, memoranda, exhibits, and
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pertinent affidavits before it, the Court hereby grants Intervenors' Motio'n to Remove Trustees
and Intervenors' Motion to Void Transactions, as set forth more fully below. This Order is based

on the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Plaintiff Penn Smith ("Smith''), Defendant Val.den Cram ("Cram"), and John Miles
("Miles'') are currently Trustees of the Terrestrial Kingdom of God Trust ("Trust"), and Welton
Myers ("Myers") has executed documents on behalf of the Trust and in conjunction with Smith,

Q

Cram, and Miles, representing himself as "Trustee/Manager" of the Trust.
2. Even though the Declaration of Trust prohibits any Trustee from being compensated

for service in such office, Smith and Cram appointed themselves as "Managers" of the Trust on
or about February 15, 2006, and began charging the Trust $50 for each hour they allegedly spent
working on Trust matters as Trustees.
3. A Board of Arbitration appointed pursuant to the Declaration decided on or about

September 12, 2006, that by appointing themselves Managers and paying themselves, Smith and
Cram committed a breach of trust.
4. Shortly thereafter, Smith filed a lawsuit against Cram, as Executive Trustee of the
Trust, for compensation he allegedly "earned" as a Manager of the Trust. The suit was filed in
the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Washington County, Utah, Case No. 060501773.
5. Neither Smith nor Cram responded to the Complaint on behalf of the Trust but,
instead, allowed a Default Judgment in the amount of $25,498.00 to be entered against the Trust
on or about October 26, 2006.
2
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6. On or about October 30, 2006, Smith recorded a Notice of Lien, purporting to be
based on the default judgment, encumbering the Trust's real property.
7. Smith and Cram have resolved multiple times to borrow money from each other in
the name of the Trust and have executed promissory notes in favor of each other and against the
Trust, and such actions have been ratified by Miles and by Myers.
8. The Declaration does not authorize the Trustees to breach their fiduciary duties of
loyalty by entering into agreements or promissory notes with themselves or for their own benefit,
the self-serving agreements and notes were not authorized by the Court, the Beneficiaries did not
consent to the Trustees' conduct, ratify the transactions, or release the Trustees in any manner,
and the transaction did not involve any contract entered into or claim acquired by any Trustee
before such Tmstee became or contemplated becoming Trustee of the Trust.
9. The Beneficiaries requested that such self-serving transactions by the Trustees be
voided in their Complaint, which was filed in Case No. 060502132 in the Fifth Judicial District
Court in and for Washington County, Utah, on or about November 14, 2006.
10. The removal of Smith, Cram, Miles, and Myers best serves the interests of all of the
beneficiaries and is not inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust, and a suitable cotrustee
or successor trustee is available.
11. Each individual identified in the Declaration as a Beneficiary or Steward, still living,
has executed an Affidavit requesting that each Trustee be removed and that Hylan Franklin
Kirkland, David Rountree Kirkland, and Kevin Barton Kirkland, be appointed as successo_r
Trustees in order to prevent further waste of Trus! assets.
3
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12. Hylan Franklin Kirldand, David Rountree Kirkland, and Kevin Barton Kirkland are
each suitable cotru.stees or successor trustees and each are available for service in such
capacities.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The "qualified beneficiaries" of the Trust, as defined by Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-

103(1)(h), include only the following individuals: Sylvia Kirkland; Mary Ruth (Kirkland)
Cooper; Steven E. Kirkland II; Benjamin Temples Kirkland; Linton Coleman Krrkland; Hylan
Franklin Kirkland; John Hudson Kirkland; David Rountree Kirkland; Kevin Barton Kirkland;
Richard Abram Kirkland; Kirk Barton Kirkland; Daniel Barton Kirkland; James Henderson
Kirkland; and Ephraim Barton Kirkland.
2. All of the qualified beneficiaries of the Trust have requested that Smith, Cram, Miles,
and Myers be removed from their offices of Trustee for the Trust.
3. Irrespective of any breach of trust committed by the Trustees, the qualified
beneficiaries have a right to remove the Trustees because removal of the Trustees best serves the
interests of all of the beneficiaries and is not inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust, and
a suitable cotrustee or successor trustee is available, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 75-7706(2)(d).

4. By, without limitation, failing and refusing to respond to or answer the lawsuit filed
by Smith against Cram as Executive Trustee of the Trust and by allowing a default judgment to

be taken against the Trust, Smith and Cram each violated their duty to "take reasonable steps...
to defend cla~ against the trust," as required by Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-809, and such conduct
4
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constitutes a serious breach of trust by both Smith and Cram pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 75-7706(2)(a).
5. By, without limitation, appointing themselves as "Managers" of the Trust and
agreeing to accept compensation from the Trust, filing a lawsuit against the Trust to procure
payment for such alleged services, recording a lien against real property owned by the Trust,
resolving to borrow money from Trustees, executing promissory notes in favor of Trustees and
against the Trust, and taking other such actions in furtherance of their own best interests ·and
against the best interests of the Trust and its Beneficiaries, Smith and Cram have breached their
fiduciary duties of loyalty to the Trust and its Beneficiaries and have failed to "administer the
trust solely in the interests of the beneficiaries," as is required by Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-802.
Such conduct constitutes a serious breach of trust by both Smith and Cram pursuant to Utah
Code Ann.§ 75-7-706(2)(a).
6. By, without limitation, executing and passing resolutions and/or promissory notes in
favor of Smith and against the Trust, Smith, Cram, Miles, and Myers have each failed to
"administer the trust solely in the interests of the beneficiaries," as is required by Utah Code
Ann. § 75-7-802. Such conduct constitutes a serious breach of trust by Smith, Cram, Miles, _and
Myers pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-706(2)(a).
7. The conduct of Smith, Cram, 11:iles, and Myers, including the self-dealing and blatant
violations of their fiduciary duties of loyalty and to defend claims against the Trust, and the
longstanding and ongoing waste of Trust Property by Smith, Cram, Miles, and Myers indicates
II
5
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that said individuals are unfit for the office of Trustee or have failed to properly administer the

trust.
8. Because Smith, Cram, Miles, and Myers have failed to take reasonable steps to
protect Tmst property, have failed to administer the Trust as a prudent person would, by
considering the purposes, terms, distributional requirements, and other circumstances of the
Trust, and have failed to exercise reasonable care, sld.11, and caution in the exercise of their duties
as Trustees of the Trust, and because the services allegedly provided by Smith, Cram., Miles, and
Myers can be obtained for less money than is currently being spent by Trustees, and in order to
prevent further waste of Trust assets by the self-dealing of Smith and Cram, removal of the
current Trustees, including Smith, Cram, Miles, and Myers, serves the best interest of all of the
Beneficiaries of the Trust, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-706(2).
9. The resolutions and promissory notes passed and executed by Smith, Cram, Miles,
and/or Myers involve the investment or management of Trust property entered into by the
Trustee for the Trustee's own personal account or is otherwise affected by a conflict between the
Trustee's :fiduciary and personal interests, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-802(2).

G)

10. Because the Declaration does not specify an individual to act as successor Trustee in
the circumstances that present themselves in this case, and based on the w1animous consent of
the qualified beneficiaries, pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 75-7-704(3), the Court concludes that
Hylan Franklin Kirkland, David Rountree Kirkland, and Kevin Barton Kirkland are suitable
Trustees who have all agreed to accept appointment as Trustees of the Trust and to serve without
compensation.
6
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ORDER
For the reasons set forth above, and after consideration of all evidence and argument
received, the Court hereby grants Intervenors' Motion to Remove Trustees fil?.d Intervenors~
Motion to Void Transactions and ORDERS as follows:
A. Bach of the Trustees and Managers currently holding such offices on behalf of the

Terrestdal Kingdom of God Trust, including, without limitation, Plaintiff Penn Smith, Defendant
Valden Cram, John Miles, and Welton Myers, are hereby immediately removed from such office
on the following alternative grounds:
a. Each Trustee, by allowing the waste of Trust assets, by entering into
agreements serving the best interests of only other Trustees and not the
Beneficiaries, by failing and refusing to protect Trust assets .against claims,
and by breaching the fiduciazy duty of loyalty required by Utah law, has
co~tted a serious breach of trust, pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 75-7706(2)(a);
b. Each Trustee, because of the long-running, persistent, and continued selfserving and breaches of the fiduciary duty of loyalty, is unfit, is unwilling, or
has persistently failed to administer the Trust effectiv~ly and removal of each
Trustee best serves the interests of the Beneficiaries, pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 75-.7-706(2)(c); or
c. Each qualified beneficiary has requested removal of each Trustee, and the
Court has found that removal of the Trustees best serves the interests of all of
7
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the Beneficiaries and is not inconsistent with a material purpose of the Trust.,
and a suitable cotru.stee or successor trustee is available, pursuant to Utah
Code Ann.§ 75-7-706(2)(d).
B. Any and all transactions or resolutions entered into by the Trustees on behalf of the
Trust that involve the investment or management of Trust property entered into by the Trustees

for the Trustees' o-wn personal account, or which is otherwise affected by a conflict between the
Trustees' fiduciary and personal interests entered into at any time on or after May 14, 2006, are
hereby void~ Such transactions include, without limitation, the following: the Default Judgment
entered on or about October 26, 2006; the Notice of Lien recorded on or about October 30, 2006;
the Resolution to Hire Reed Braithwaite as Attorney to Represent Trust, including its resolution
to borrow $2,000 from Cram to pay attorney fees, dated November 17, 2006; the Resolution and
Promissory Note dated November 30, 2006; the Promissory Note dated December 11, 2006; the
Promissory Note dated January 8, 2007; the Promissory Note dated February 12, 2007; the
Promissory Note dated May 14, 2007; the Resolution and Promissory Note dated May 14, 2007;
the June 2007 Resolution to borrow money to pay Smith $2,160; the July 2007 Resolution to
borrow money to pay Smith $1,705; the Promissory Note dated September 4, 2007; the
Promissory Note dated October 24, 2007; the Promissory Note dated November 14, 2007; the
Resolution and Promissory Note dated December 3, 2007; the February 2008 Resolution
admitting that the Trust owes Smith $74,116.88, plus interest; and any and all other and further
resolutions entered into by Trustees purporting to create a debt or obligation of the Trust to any
Trustee or any insider of any Truste~.
8
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C. Hylan Franldin Kirkland, David Rountree Kirldand, and Kevin Barton Kirkland

·-~

(collectively as "Successor Trustees") ar~ hereby appointed to be cotrustees and successor
trustees of the Trust pursuant to the unanimous consent of the qualified beneficiaries.
D. Smith and Cram are hereby ordered to provide within two weeks from the entry of

this Order any and all records, minutes, resolutions, documents, records, bank accounts,
checkbooks, or other information related to the Trust to Counsel for Intervenors, who will, in
tum, provide such information to the Successor Trustees within two weeks of their receipt

thereof.
DATED this

__jL day of May, 2008.
BY THE COURT:

The Honorable James L. Shumate
Fifth Judicial District Court Judge

'\ii)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct, unsigned, copy of the above
and foregoing document, postage prepaid, on this ~
day of May, 2008, to the following:

Reed R. Braithwaite
REED R BRAITHWAITE, P.C.

50 East 100 South, Suite IO 1
St. George, UT 84770
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ADDENDUM3
Smith v. Cram, et al
Appellate Case No. 20150637-CA
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·submit ~eh-·J\tmiorandu1:1:1 in .Opp.0Sltl.on::t.~·Motion.-fu1~ Summary fudgmenfas follows:
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c~· C.elite.rs .qn .a Trust.-ore.$d bythe-d~ea:sed $~vei1. Kirkland it11e T1ustot") Bit the
(i) .
I

eJid:,Gf 1g93·..P-Iaitltrffand intei~:m:'1on.Defendants-(~llecti!s/e1y '\Defendants'') are· all trustees. -0f

I
I

the Ti'I:mt. Plah1tiff Fem-Smith .("Smitli'')tse.eb:pl!YJD.ent·of $251,:749.·.f.or ·serving as ~e TrU$~

Man~o-er; The benen.ciarles ·.ofthe· T-~st e~tet.¥eni.ctti'}1n'.~,~<~-intetv~hed to:_ (l }.stop SD;tjth .ft.om

1

obtafilfug .th~ ~~um he· ,seeks .as Trust.M~ager.,. (7). dis.s_olye the. trust, G>r (3) r-emove·.all

Def-end~ffroizj .:therr pqsitio;Q,S:~s b.:11s.t~. mefen.~tS·Qpp~e.--.di.ss.ohmon •-OC; removal :_an,d.

'

I

support Smhh1 s ea..nnings.

Defenii.a.nts· fil-ed a Motion.for.'&mmiary\.tud~ent('!'-Msii'). 21 day.s b.efore'triw is
seneck1le<t' to be~i)t fu-Ab_efr·MSJ· D~~nd~M·in:*-6:·~ ·m:·mn··;at~ments'· ~e~~g ~lf their tii-efu.e
that: :any fai1ures· ~ ~xe~uting the-trust .doeiltne~.-shol;lo he· ignored, the Pefendants/Trusteessho-uld not :P~ :remQved ·-~ecaru!e the Tr~sto:r. wantedtbem to. be u1:1stees and they have not
'!:>reached theirJi<lu.c~ary. •tiutjes; a.1:1d.: ti.1e:Trnst .aUn-ws .fur:-Def.endant S'mith to -rec.e1ve th~-p.ayment
be seeks as Trust:.i\4anag~r~ N~~eless~ suntmary:juq_ginen.tis only :&pp1~pruite_,,;hen '~ere.is

no ge.m:tifie lssrre:as ·to ab.;!)imatedal. @lcl't; ~t.nfqfu mov~-palfty.'::is,ent1d.ed to a ·judgi.n:e3:J.t -~s 8:matt~ of1a,,,/·,ut$:;E{.q_~,~~~ s~~c),

ill.•tl~-p~es~nr ca~; thei-eiat:~JnullipJ.~~~~~tm.a~~- faqt; Inteiy¢Q,1;~ ~ert~~t a
coriditio1a-pre~~-W.-·~e;T111st .fil:t'led :~.~~ f~.~-m pia,-c;~in-~~t the )A~~ aiiut$~~rdship
A~e~~ . ~:cli.wer~ :~~ w.iwle ~~r$.:<t-dftb.efTu•i S11ch:fh.aUhe 'trust is. inva1M:. liowe-v:er:~

.-even :1f·the'T~:,~:gs'1ra.1id> ti.etendants:naw.ht:eacbeli:·atlimst 11du~ ·.bw.ed:tc:t.futeI"{eliOtSr"BS
fiduciaties; 'tt1.elu~g.-1!ll~wili~-:Sntlth/to.nbtah.1: a d~ui~3u&-~1eht~samst the T1.ust ,vithout:even
notifyn\g:I.nterv.enqrs. oftho litigation. Therefo.1·e11 the cburt hair ample ·grounds to ~ove
2·
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D~:as ~~ ~ ~ ~ i , ; Snntli-'$.!Cl- f@t· '~.ensa'litm.,asTiust Msnagerave

Qutta~"US·i•inoonsist-ent :w~-1be tenu.-.:affhtf Tffls;. w
.

~.

thet $~ ag~inst 1he imerifnf fl:le TntSter.

DISPUTED·
FACTS.
...
·..

'

.

Inl'ffl!~~ors.~ ·r.e.sp_onse1·p:en~.. Ct:a.m1·s .sfutem;enf ~Qntvadicts·testimon.y he.provided
duci11g ms ·depqsititra. in.-whfoh ·he·staied ifut.the.=o.niyllad..ihdke.ct involvement in drafting the

trust:

tt~: -bid fail lmMe an~t·tt'f<I~ w.1$-;t-he:~ .~~:th:~:~ ... rtust~
k Prom$iy·iJ+au-~~(~m J :@~~f.'fhiti.;k dir-ectlji. Fr1'!!lfA~fd·n,is. !d:eas., a.nd It~.he._prpsemed

them w_.S~ and ~v.¢-p~~~. ,/f$:~,C....P.~I?:o~.YQlµ,n;wJ. at 13:l7-23j .attached

he1:eto as Exliihit,A.
"Q: .... can ·you tell me whatpatt .ot'tbe 'trust. that y.ou ·or.eate.d1A~ No,.t:ctUmot,

r~I-don.'Hmdkit·was aµytbing.qirectly.. Ithfu.ic-itwas inditec.t.. :.I don·'±

lffmtremb:~~¢1-ia~v~g-~~~ fufl\ieQ.~'gn·I1;Ji~1 'ftµstt' /.d.~· at21 !5;:;23';

A~t~ q.f'V~l~ e.!~ f~agr~m:dJ.~ ~ pai1fcip~te.tf).ij::fbe-pl~mg;and:~x~uti6n
of.~{J)e~si:·~nd~st~rp~jr:H~:At~etits li~fqr~Mr...·K.fr~~iand'.ts:li.~mh/~
fnt~~en..or~ r.e&f-10.n&e.1 .~ny.•. •Cra.n:i!:13_:statern:enf.cqutradfots-testimony he pr-ovided

durin:g hia/depGsitkm•.m·-wliifihhe. =stat-ed·.-fua:t :the t:mistees had:to: fi~;e:out $:o:tn .scratch .what the
Testatotw@ted~in th~--t~1tf:ait4 St¢W~~nip.:~gre~m:~4j;s:h:~~S¢·$~th~d-mj. dir.eclion;:n;tm1·
tJ.re·Te$tator.hefbre
.
..
.. .... :his.death~:
... . .. - ....
'

..:

"QC. •:•at~.1$.(say.m&that. Y.Pii~.-n~etle.4 dfreetion fr.qrir]fmi ~ftli~fr,o:u ¢id .riot?
3
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A~. I'm·,•g we wse.d ditectfon frmnbim. (ih~ Te,Stat{)t}:.-. Jit v.i~O.uld be.much :easier than to

I
i

strut from-gri0und zero- an-cl bui1d your awn. ~•.IrJ~ at .57~-9-1.S.

i

I

-Pai1~p"h 4>of1\fSJ: ''After said-cemr.ey.a:o.:ce; ·~~-T~f dintat:C,4:'tliat·'";.Ahe TR.l)STOR

~
i

and=TRVS'T.pES sp:aj.i :issu~ STEWARl)SF-D.P.S· .fot:a11d ~~)lg;rd·es~t¢:]?-E'.NBFICIARiES

I
I

w#l1 signed LEASE and.:SIBWA:R[J~_f[f:~'AOR;EE~NTS .. /' .Said ·a:greements were !Ssued as

Gi)

T
Ii

d~s~d.aho¥.e1_aoooamng tQ th~tesm.11:on:y:QfD.~naleneBr~dy, who 'helped. Mr~Kir-lcland

I
Ln.ter.Y.eno.rs··, Resp-onse: ·Deny~ lnre1,1enors dispute that Leasefand Stewardship
A.gt~ements were-ev~r tSsued·. Even if:D-0J1aj•~e· BradJr's tes~ony is-to.be believ.ecr and the

cir-culating, .distnbati0:g~ -or ~ubli&hing/~ "Issue.&' is~rle-fined :as. #To= be. . circuiated or.~ublislieii.'=:t
See F'AfU.EX, The Fre:e 'Diatio.nai"y (i:9~9), .http~/lW\\ilvlthefr.eadlctio11acy.ccnw'issued.

Patagi.~apli':;8· ofl\tsih ~'In,ad~ti6ti:to·t1le.-afore111-e11tione4 autb'britY. :gtiven to tJ:i~- Trustees

(see p~tagtaph.5~.-~upr~), the 1\i-istg~-vo~<fT.ros~<l?~tld ~n~·J;weepfu_g ,1,a'\3/ets•..

"I'·

/'·,

14::1

p~v,ef$. of-t4e:·tt.qs1~e.e.S.-.-~-~-1n10,a4l andJrwee~gP ·

'.P:at~~ph--·8(e) -~f MSJ! *'....there. -shall be _paid .con1p:e11eati.-0u to~-~.:.offloers, Ot

agents., •• whfoh shall. b-e ned. and paid at :flie d.iscr~tio.n of'1he: TRU'STBES•.• jhduding

reimbursement for ~mt 9f pock~t.~xpe~ses ihc~m.~~; ~y. ~~:' ~irS7'.EES ·~·,; {Paragtapl:11 i).,-,.
fi!ti~t,'#R-P~:'· Re.sp9~e.r-mtet1j~qr.~Jobj¢.~t t~t$.~. ~p~{l.~4 :~p~atjtjn 9f f-l\rati.~h .¢.lJ
of the Tri.i_st'.siriee.Jt -allischaracterJ,zes the.-.di~cietfonJ:1;J.1~·tnu~Ji{iv.~:;ip,'.p~~-oiieer$~
4-
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GO~~ns-aiion}J" mad .t~Any-:o.e.mpensatioo pailo.th-eriis:to b&-that:us.ttaUtpaid f.or .su.cli v.iTOrk. ' See
0

Trust ·at -,rl l-t attached-.hei=eto aa .&hihit B. .
Paragraph 1~ -0fl[S_J~·-Q1'i~ the 3'~ -0f~i?°eta~.n,g:~.e-1Jrµ~, ·1;rustee P~ Sinith.was.

~p~futed ri1:t¢gg~ 1~ythe.Baanl i>f'f•~~~~~d- ~~;p:erlmttoo. t9-.~epa.id_:$;S.-O ~ hour .fodtls
s.e1i~ries.;,,..,~dd,ifi~~Y:, l.Vl,t ~ithJi;i~µtr®.~)'-~ut"":0£-~o:cltet~e..n:s.es. fur hiswqrk>;pq~ .as a

Trostee··ancl.Manage.r.~.,Said wages, Wit:llmter-est, --totafti52;J.49 ..and said.out-of.;poeket~penses.
total .$6,S'OQ..

·H

"in-ter-,reno•ts•i Res).>~irs·e:- ·1\~~-'fute&-etio!$ d~ not den.i that D.efe~daut

&pith. ~~-seeltiog

reiml:iu.rs~.¢rrt for _oµt-.of~ocl~.:,~~~tis~ -oi~ ~4$.~~7,49 fu-wage~~ Inle~.·v~Qrs deny that. such

sums-are ow-ed tQ .iJefep.dant Smith.

1.

the Tras.t ·states that the Truston·aod .Trustees shall ''is.sue .s·trevlardships'~ -to the

Beneficiaries. when. the Beneficiaries have sig11ed·i.e.as-e BJ.id- Stew-ard.$hlp Agreements ~(''LS

t\gre~nerits1: that ~ere._:preptged:¢.ld ~v.et.e~. ~}ao~~~.with P:a;ra.gi:apli -6- ofthe Trust- See·

2..

+bl.i~i: ~t~f!i~t.tb~ T1viJo1:-~hall'.:pr~p2l:[e~~- deli.vet LS A~eem¢g,ts to .fhe
1

B.en.:efici,arl~s• .&_<!._-e ~- a{ ,to~
3..

trustor·ruitt the T-.mste~~- Id.
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(

l~

·Qt .Ama..did :~iu kna.w wh-e'ther ·or·not ·he nad·ts· AgreementS·plq,ared ·and:rea.dy?

A: t belie,~elie:did ·H:owever~."1 oi<i,n-o.t--mter :See th$1Jil..

Q: Okay.. Y:o-n -Qever ·sigµ~-- th~?
A:N.o.

5.

t

·tiier-e-is_.no evide11oe thatthe 'r~cr ,deliv.ered .LS. A~reemen:ts ttrthe

I
!

Reneficitlries.
6.

!

·tdsJuil~ted i.ssu-e,het\\"'e~n?tbeparties :as-tc(v.lhetlfer the T~tor ev.efeven

pr.epar«i LS ~~ts,.befnre ~s d.eath..
i

I
i

~

.. $ee Smiili.-Depo at 8.1 :5.-ll; a.$che<i:ht~J•e.tG as-E1e1i'ibit tt

·g.

!
!

Ctam -adinits tha.rh~ .dfd· not.fuforo1 J:arerve11or.s_ t11~::Sini.th had filed a lawsuit

Exhibit A a.t 17-5~9-1 S.

Q

mr,ca.ll•ai}~: $ere:Ex;hib,it:J3-:atw,$.~
fD.,

JJefendatn:S -did:.®t~1it1islul or-aft~f'.a-.LS:1\~-eement un:ti:f. at least :2{i0'4, y.~ .after

tlie-cieam.·iqttha~Ttj.i.s.lQ:i; Sfeve:tt'Kiiktand~ SetfMmutes:ufti1emeeling:6tb ~ gt\..and 9-tb 1neetmgs of
the Bo~4. qf"T~,.·~ohe~ h~~~-1i$. ~bits:E/L.?; a114 ·G:·.~p~6tively..

in mtmaiors~· Amended Complaint, Counterru.a:im., C:roBS-Cl~ .and Third-Party ·Complaint

6
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"•...

e'lntenreme-rs' ~m.plamt'~}- $-ee lnt-ervener~·! t!Qmpldnt.:at191Ctan.d Defendants' Answerto

~ended -~mpl~infetnm:t-er Clain.\ Cto.ss~Ctiilin, ,aru1 Third.-Part.y <)o~pl-amt {~~cram ·and

Sm.i:tli't Answer'') ·at 9:122~ •

2013,just.:1:lir.~~ weel.ai·b:~~re. the:tdm ~ -~cheduled tQ :001~enoe~ -~s_, instead :0f:i;~1:eparln:~ for

tiw~ Interveaors Me~forccil i:o:.addtess--·thi$ .MSland take time:away. fr.omw-~axati,Gn.

Compo:rmd:mg the trtal ·prep arafio.n issue. is:that Defendants..s:til1,hav-e not produced. pretrial
-disclosate,f(whioh wer-e.dueJm·.Mfey sj 2.:0l3). j®.lt1~g.Iutmv~n0rs in:

~:e: da1t:as te the e.ti~enc~.
1

and ~vitnesses D~feru:lams· fo:terid to-rise'. lttrid
•

,!

••

'

•• •

•••

•

.....

,,.

••

··-.,

";•.

•

••

Seaond1yJ there ar~ gentJitje is9*-es:-"?fmaterial fact· regar4m.g .eacli is~_e. raised in their

MSJ. See Utah R.Civ.P.-, 56{c). Def-epd~ :provide.~ix.main-ar~ments in-sup.Port oftb:eir MSJ;
(A} the. _court can-·refonn. a tiust and· ~or:e an-)'· ~ures to fulfi]I. -conditions ·o( the trust if it is

wh:al: the Ttusttfi.. w.ould want {aj•·fl·ie. Ttustor intended his trust to-continue after his .death:; -(C}

there is no-~ause tot -~etnov.a.i ◊f~~ tr~~~es, {P}:~~~ ar~ :t:ltre.e ~om ~-Ifl~ be-pres~~t.
f6r:ren10:v1i:i,f a~¢. »~r llCA-:§J.5..1~1.n~., ·bu;t thes~~~:er~ti~. ha~-~; b~ ~ {E).J;he
frus.teeS:sho.Jllih16.i:b~ ~.ay_ed ~ecaµS:e . the T-rusfur wantea·t}l~. fo )e trustees; and."(Fj..M(.
Smith'·s:wage c1aiin-is•vali4because,t.he-ti:u~t-alk)w~: the_p:aym.:ents.he·s:ee'ks-. As.the:&f10win_g

sectio_.ns. oottmei each.-of De!enclmrt.s~ ar~e.nt;S in favor-o.f summ~rt judgment. faiL
Ill.
Ill

ii;

Ill
1
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L

',;'

'·' -·

i

Tn:e.:eoin:~f may·i~fu.r-ill tli.e;term.s·.nf;a.tnits-t ·ONLY ifthere.wJts ·a mistake of
fact·orhl'1V.
··
·
· ··

D~fendants•clt~-rp UCA. f~:S~1·4,1~_~jqtt1i~Jjropo1;uipn -~_the c~rt c¥1-~p.iy ~fol;ID
the 'tetnts-•Offfi,e:'Ti¥:$t_i~·-.~t-ow L~e. ~~J~~~~t-4"c.eril.~11t~Jo ,b.e-~1ed- $Olelyby-T1ustees.

l

See MSJ at &4lf1 ~ However.; Derend-ants .m.-e,-ii.1.-cqrrect.in. t,hejr jntei:pretatfo11 of the -statute, which

s~tes:

i

~

The. :00ui1 may refoim the nm.ms of a· tr.11St ev-etrifunambiguorui~ t'O conform. the
fut1ns:to "the· -s.~l~.t's inten~on:jflt: tS.· pr-o,~ed.-.by c1ear- .ano oo.nvincing evidence that
boili the.;9.ettlor!s. fufent and -the.·t~rfu.s--0f-theJ1u-st \\'er-e -affe:ct{¥d by ·.a ·mis.take of
Qiet. o.r· l'aw, whetlrer in exp:fe~~11 or inducemin.t · · · · ·
§75-141 S {em.phasis :added}.·«1A mistake of fact' is:where .a.person understa.rids fue, facts-to be

other th.an they at~; whet~ a.in.istake of Jav/ is where.~ pen;on kttows :th~ f.acts .as they really
at(\ but has.a ·mistaken -beiiefas to theJe.g-al' :eonsequ~hees··_of tli~e fac~" 'People v.. Lali{arr) 20
C:~l.Ztl 1QS~ 12g·p.24 ~~:?°> 34$ (1·9_4f).

In-tl1ip.i~~~,.~~ pey.~n4_nt$~v.~ -cited to no,tuigtak.e·,o.f fow· or-:f.adt= th.at.ted.'•the,
t~!:$S-~t-the;itnlsl'ESS$tfaUy,.. all th~:n,~fe.udd-have.arglledii.that
~ytbmk
tlre. 'Festator
.
..

ir;sued. -selely by· D:~fetidants. -~-.MSJ at-$;,rl ..Hb'1{-ev.e;;~ .D~fendant' ~ -~ssei-tion _doe$ p.ot 1,ro:vid.~

th.e Juthof$ty:1o.: ~: eourt)iµ~r §15/(...4J::S tg -~~ 1:be Ti-:g~fas-tb.~re ·was::nq ·a;nistake ol':faQt·-o.r

Fi)tJi1~m191~,, ·wm.:¢ De£enaan.ta,are. sµg~e@n~ .contradfe.~··fhe. Testator! s-mtensions i!S

fo:unti-in .the Ttus't.":ll.1e·Tru.st: sta.t.es-.t.hat the Trustor.·.sfia:Irpr.epare.'and -then deiiver ts

·005472

(

(

Agreements "to ·'tite~beneifoiari'es: that.-are· .s"{gned ily\iin mid. the Trost.e~. See -Exhibit B at ~Yts-.5.

The Ttust is c1ear··lbm itis:the· TrnstGr.'s-~o~ibi~1fyfu.p.~are and· d~li:v.er _signed LS
Agi_e_em."~1:it:at;·~-· L~~-to roakeit~hundari:t!y-tjearth.a~fher~s;ees did~t-have_th_e
pPW.et re. issµ.e,ih~ ~rlgiha.tL.S A-greem.epts, ~:Trustor .~dds the following language.: ·"tbe
-tr,ugt~es •alt llQt l>e.·t\Uth~e4 to··issLJ,e ·any-stewardslµp.Jn addition-to ·flrose originally- specified:

ex~ep± as r.epla~en;ts fuv oth'er·l3.en.efici:anes.... ~- Jii:. at ·1]. Jn other words,- -the Trustees .are only

authorized to issue L$...A;greem-ents to ·tl1e-heits of .an..o~afB.enenc~ aftertbe on·girul].
Beneficiaryl 1'tlid bfld ii.O®p.ted·a S-.tevta~dsh:il?, ~P~ di'ed..

cl~ar. in his inten~~ that~n1y-J1e~w.cm:1t b.~ .alfoW¢4:tP.·p~~e ~.d .d~er th~ origin.Erl LS

Agre.ements. Furfuerm.-ore;. Defendant .Ptam.'s··eseruons in hl.s .affida,.,itr-egaraing wbat·tbe
Tiu..i;tor would hav-e·w:anted··at-enotlnn.g:.more fh:an sp.eeu1ation b.y an interested party.
~.

The Trotor's-des1.r.e~o:ha.ve. a tias.tendur.:e be\ ,0:ndhis death is'frr=elevant to the_.
1

que~~~ '.6£ lliieth,er ther-e•.is_·,a v:alid-~m;~

D:efen.daais ·esSe.ri1ia11y argµe:'.tb.at tms.eomt-sbould. ignore .,any failed 0011ditions __prec.e.dent

beeause-the'T~t littiiis:·ease.wantoo -'th:e·1n;ist.to::ne valid::and :oontfu.ue afh~i' his death..
If.q"~t.~

it-is im:tp~m.ita! ~1h¢'$.e.t or~.t:~ T.~Wt·Wanted"tP:etrust.~-cqntinµt}a~erhis de~l~i

A~ <i:o.es-n~t :b.e¢ome-~d.:in Uttila)S1t;bptfb~¢ .;tlii{trusijr" int~Bd?¥1 iU¢.'h~.\~µ.q. -A ~
in utali-is. \1alid .only when. th~ statnto1;y. requirem~n~··a~e m~_

In :th~ p~seut.:case, .h,.te,rvenon;,.asse.ii·tbat.a C®.ditfon :p:r;ecedent filited;,· 1n;~-th(}. :trust
m1;ralid.. Nmnely:, llit-erYenm-s ax-gue that itw.as.:a material p.r-0:vision?d.fthe T:r.ust that the TI.ustor .
.

.

1

•Get:taifuj}\ wlieli a ,pers.-cin atte.mpts-to -set:~p-,a,1fust-it is ·because.he wants his proP.ortyio .be mannged accordingfo

tne=·teJ3$:0ftbe;1rust

9.
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(

~-d··fl~ itllsi~S·-.issue.LS A:w.eem.eats tp: th:e~4~~ed. b-eu,.fidarJea..,, id~ ;Bl; 11,rs:..16.
F-u,rtl1.~0.r.~t ~-e :Trust siat;es ht the "'T1":Us.t<,t -sh.-at:pvepare an.tfd·eli~er1 ,··the LS ~eem·ents to

the benefidaiies- tnat. wer~ -si~d by toe· Thilslbf;aru.l ~tees_~.l,rl.. ~~-,t,4 Y~t, d~.pit~ these

requirements,iit isim:~i.sp:a~a th-st.; :(lltlle:'.ri11S~e.s-~~-sigµ_ed.L$,Agr~e#.1~ts ~h.!it.wei.-e

Agre~m,etits: to ilie-~~a,1,i~s. -~~r~it~.i,s-,:a.:di~:g:W.i$$n~ "t>-et.w~e1i. file parties. as to

whether &~ 1fi:us.to,r: e:v-er-e:v~n :pr~ared.'I.$ A:gree.ments. bdor:e-.bis death..
-C4 'tnta.wn'O.ts .have abun.dant -e-'rid~n.:ce diat,Defencbnits htve brea.choo their: .fidu-ciarv

d11:tles as ttusteei ·

Def-e~t~ nJ~e. the::'bald M'.S~rtl:on withmtt-.aay :explanatien or .support ±hat f<Jnterv.ei1ors.
hav:e no evidence" tliat. b~fendants b.i~-chal~aridia.ciar:1,-<luties. See MSJ at 9:,t2·. To the
contttaty, Interv.enots ha,~e abundant . evi:{!:ehce lha.t'o.er~Jidiw.~ b.t~1:ed :their-dutie-s~ .cteating
gehuilie imies of ~aterlai fa;~t.· Th~:-fo11o~iing_B:f~ ~-~.

few· ex~~ples: ·

Judgi~e11t to .~:e.- ?ntered ~~~t tbe· t-11l$t.fqr$2~;4~$-l)th~ ·or·.a'Qout0$tab..er .lo; ioot .See'

~nors·~ Co-mpiaint.at>1(:ii; . a.nd:CtlUUJ1ru.f'sw&~a..Answ« at ·9.:¢i:..

mUiaht :trusteesJaaw.e-~:duty.to.xlefanti:ff:wust:ag~taw ·$11its•. UCA §75~7..809. states:
S(A Ir-UStee,=sliaU ~e:reasonab1e,l3t~ps ~ii..~f~r~ :eJ~11n~ iof~ ttost, and ·10 -¢efelid claiib.$ a:gamst

~-trust/' S;ee ~Sp SNO~ CH_/{1$TJJJilS!J}f-4~lJii.. Lin.~et.W, ·ZO 13 ·\JT 15.ijf67 (a
special fi-dil@.al'Y. ha~=-8/'¢ontiµm1Ji:dµty ~:d~f(md tl1i tr$t i\gah.,1stlitigatiort")~ In.fue :Preser,:t
ca.se, l).~,xdants/ttus~es -admit.that :\Uey-cho~ not_t:o defend the Tolst agftfast a law :suit br0ught

by P.eni1 Smith fat $25!49.&'00~ ·there.fore. titey-ha.ve breach«l th~w dtitr to '4efend.
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Interv.enots elte~e:.that-De.fe11d-ts. b.re.ae'he.ci.ihmt -dmy ts- keep·-the.::i:teaeiidanes.·hlfo.rmed

h~ ~g:-othett!lin;gs, ~.to tell fhe,B:mefioiaries.::ihatPenn SmitbJiad file,lsoit.~~-the,

Trost.Ufitrl aft:er P-.enn Smnt~:~tainett .a de~~tjti~nt an~lpla~···a::J.ien. on -~~·Trnstpr.op:etf;y_
See·'I11ten1e1iers~ ~mpiaint atffl4"•.S5-8~. £?efeadan:t Penn ~-:idmits. that he :did not infonn

the .B~eijci~ tµaU1e:w.afgomt ttr~ tlle ~ . S.ee J⇒.~bft- D. ,at 8 f:5-12. Defendant Crail:l
a4Jnits,·that he -dld·not mfQnn ~e .$'ellefioiaties. that Smith had:Ghtafaed ·a defitult judgm~n± and

pfucecfir.li:en -01t the:T:rust l)topert,-. See-Exhibit A at 175.~9.-Ht
futervenots al·so.allegethat,Del&idants breached'-their duty to protect 1lust property per

Uc-A P>-:1:-&0:?t QA f:tJ1~~-shail)~ke_r~9jlal}le '.steps to take «)ll~O~ ,of-~d p#>fect ·the··trµst
property/'' In the pr~s-~t -~am(Dereqrf@is.~low~~ .a .d~aµJt j~dgQient against th~ Tr~t fqr
$25,49&00- ~d then De~~dant fenn ·smith :fil~ .a. li-en against the Tiust property for. tbe BPlOmit

Yet, .-th~ Trost expUcitly s~s!.- 'iilie·Tt.ustees o{tllis Trust shaU 1iaveJ,011i1er to. lend money
.

.

withoat:usury..•.-o:r·w b<ltto:w. funds/but--:.at-ll:o . ti:nie·mar Trost. real property-ass·ets be :used ·as

. eoiiate1~~"'- Ss-e .Exhibit- ·:a= •at ,iiK Th~se,~e j~t ,a-:(~,v-exanw.I~s-:of befen~nts" bteaohes ..
Itji~efy.eti9*~~ ~~.g~a,: ~ight Of#.:~~~$: ~f t¢o9n_'iel~g 't(>·f~¢f.¢n.d)l~-' 11t~aches .of~ir duti~
an.c1.n~\(e. t;~ijen9¢.~s.up1i~rf:'t;h~-~~~ Th~r¢.f~t~ this. ~~e ·is.-.nQt:iipe·~r-~umm~ jildg1iient.

D~ D·efoodattm:M·tb:-a.ddress a1tconditlons,.11nder ~,.hiclt Utah law· aUov. -s fol~ removal

of ·idnutee:,pe(m~1.~1U.6.r

1

..

. . . .. . .

.

Dtf¢n4:a$:~g~~t1ilii~.a·:~ateP.:.can: qn.ly pe~.r~mci~a..jfthe:three 90~-oitjoris fu1.µ1d -in
UCA ~:7S.-c7..7:Q~(2~dJ.~e:$_atf.sttimf:l1qw~vers: Uefe11.~tiu~pl~it1y fails t9, mentioq. that-§75-7~

10o:pmi1itles sev.ei.-at :Gfller·~tllls-fu.ritlte-..r-.errH,\t-ali),fi-tr.us.tee:

11
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(1) The-settler, a rob.ustee, .or a qualified. bencllciary may.request 1he. -e.o:urt u:;:
reiriove. a~$~~; -oc. ~ ira~te~ n·uty be temoved_ by the 100mt on its 0wn initia:tive.
(2) the:.eourt:may tem0~tea trustee.if
{~) th~ •tru~tee .has ,eo~d. a~~riGlfS br~p. oftnist;
{b) laclt.-of. ,po0per~·1i: f$m.Qng-~otmstC?~ .s~h~ti:ally. Ullpairs the
admmistniti.ou-of fue trust;
{-c) b.~.ause of~tness.;. $.Wil:{¾.~i:}$$~ qr persistent :fai'll:ti~•of $~_trustee
te ,adm:intstet the,trust ·eff-ectively~ the -c-oun.-;d:atermmes that remo-vatof.the. 11-ustee
best ·ser,iei 'the·'i:tit~ests-ofl:he beneijbiarles;-Qr ·
.
{-d} :there has been .a substaima'l° cha:itge. of·eir6tlmstances .bT;·femova:l 'is
requestel by all -pfthe qualified b~ficlmi-es,. fh.e t'Aurt. iiQ.ds thatrerooval .of tne
ttn~tt?8·b~t ·serv~s ilie. interests of:an oft1i.e b'.en·e~ciarl:e:$. a1:1a ~ ·not in~i.sfonl
with a.matmai- purpose of.the trust; .and a:suitab1~- ~oh:u:$.tee or :suueessor. tnlstee. as

.availabl~...
i.

·

Defendants have committed. serious: lbreaches offol:1.St and. have. persistently
failed to administer ~e ~sf -~ffectlv.el)C .

As pte?\ijously indi~~t~, lrit-<?IY·e1iors lj.a,,e.-.a,UegetFa~d p.ave· eviderice. t11at the. Defendants
have committ~ seriqus breaches. of trust.related· to -their fi4uc-ia:ry·d.uties. 3Also,, Defen.dants.have

persistentlyfailed to- adln.ini.st~r the trust ~ectiv~ly. For :example, fur the Trust to work there
must be LS Agreements meffect. See ·Exbfuit B at 3:15-6.. Yeti from. its creation hi 199'3 to May

t

22;_ i.001,.Defendants_fail~ to· b~in draftfalg LS_: A>W,~~meil~S. $ee,~o~t .B. T.hen fa Ocio.ber:of

2~2, D~fe~~ repoifthey ~e. -~t.ill:··edWirig ,tl dJ;afi~·.$¢.c{Exhiblt Ir~. Fi~UY,j_, ~ 2~04,,.-qver t¢n
y~.miei ~~)rust. d9~;11~t-~~:s-,igiJ~t1~e¢i.u:a'.t¢~ irJ,qj:c~~-~~tLS:Ag;ree~¢n~·. wet~· sentt?
th.e ·aeneficlzjes, to' ~}"}e)r/: 4

s~ ~,rnj'.b,ii {t

Ill
3This ·me~or~duin w~iild·~~ ~tteinetfieng~): if1:mer.Y-enors· wer.-e:to:-fuuiimcrate.·aii 'Im) e-v1dence. in. suppGtl pf

{°·'

their daiihs for:bf¢aokes .bf.liuI)(_. ..Hb"..,e~ier, ltiten1eb0.rs•~y~ alrt;atly:pfo\Plded. tlie co.urt:willf.son1e-eYid.eri~e
regartlin,g'l)efundants., breaolies-·of-theit duties tG-defe.il~ ,ulfollll, liiiii #0,teci·tli.e TlilSt pr6J)eay.
~ It.fa iti1_p~nt to note-that Intetvenors do nnl b'eHeve-.that1li-e.1:niste-et hati ·the_auf:hbdty m-.Jssue :orlginai tease snd
Ste'.\~~~ A;m-~memton 'lli:eitio:,,m. ~~puUhe·T.rtwtor, Howe~~~r-; fwthej;ake of1.hWOp_pdaiti0it lnte~i~ors
:\iay~-lu~g\t~ Defen<i3nts:' .fi.u!u~e to.:_dtaft ~- te~e-.ancl Ste'Warqship Agreement ih ·a-tim.ely· manneir as .evidence of
Oereudim.ist ftii'ure ttfadm.mister tlle -tt:us.t:effectively.;
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ii.

Cona.-aryto Defend~: obrutrt.all tbe..B.eneficiaties-.have;vequested tb-e~em:ova!l (lfthe
Tn;istees.·fu.lniervenorsf ~mpramttb.et:al1-ptay '1~lhat:.·s~th, :Cr.am, ~1i1es; M¥et$., and .any

Gther imiw.iJuai or.-en.ntt ·clam:iilig to-l>e.apPQµi~ by the 'Tmstee ~ se111e .as a Tmstee, or as a
Suoeessor·Trustee, be-r-ein:ovea.. 'n..!.0$ thep.ositiou·-ef'f:ruste~ oftl~:Tru~t:''·.Se.e Inte.rvenors'
Cornpl~t-a:t 19~,c'! Ifis hard to in;iagine how much. C.1earer l11e-Benefi.ciaries can be than .filing a

iii

Ren1:ev.a1 of Defendants: w@uid .best serve.the interests of the Beneficiaries. and 1s
not itroo11sistent with the mat-erfal pui:pose;of·the Trust .

au,rB·enefiefaries h~now had an,ad,1ersarial rela'tlonghi_p: for ·over. six years. Consequeiltly, it
·w:ould be very .difiicult., ifnot imvoss1b!e~ .for D.efertdrul'~ to continue to· :spend tl1eir free tune
managing_a Trost in the best.interests oftbeir~dversar-i.~,. L:Ucewise., it is. v:ery ~$cult-for the

Benenciaries to pla~ anyingr~e. or-~s.Jhey'ftiiay.have-fro.m the Tl1:!$t Property mthe. hands
oftlie D~endants· wh-:eij ¢.ey ·<jo µat -beii ev.~thafDefe~4an.ts are ·acting in their 'b.e.st m.t-etes.ts.

In. addTTilllla r~ev~ mfDe.fendan:h.1 would:not:be..-incomist-ent -w:ith ·a m.at.erial 12urpo-se o.ffhe

trust See §15..~1,,;706(2)(d}4 Tmstot cle.ariytmtlmeci'the matet.ial.pilip.pse of tbe Uitst as· f.otrovir.s·:
The objectofthls·TntSt :shall be·.tcftec¢iy~, ~~quire;_ li.~14 ·and-transfer all 'l:Uaru;ter
of,m.pp~iie.$, ·qons~a~tl'an,m ·aonveyed, fur ·Ul,e:··"rorship of the. Alnuighty God~clim:ily. to ~4~and faii_ pr/jn,t0.1;lng#i;e.-ge.~~a1 -w.~are,_ the 1~engio.us beliefs
and edu-caff.(:)n -0f its..Ben;~ffclaries/ STE°"~lA.RDS .amt-the. o.olnl1ii.l.mty o.fman.
See· ExhibifB at 7:f40 (em:phasis added). There is no -evidez,i_c.e whatsoever that:fJie materi:al

purpose bf fue:T:J:USt is it'> ·keep, tb.~ ori~a;l.T~t~es, ·iri theit pos1ti9µs fo;rlis .Jong as they waitt..

Additionally-> ~,e.nefici.ades· are. cori.fide.il.t :~t a suitalile .su~c~ssor trustee would ·be .a:vailableif

13:
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tbe-ccrurforde~er.hhat. op.~·be fouad ·Therefut~, there m:emultipie reasons for ..fhe .com to
r.~v.e Defe.adan:1:s.,as .:trustees per.§V-S~'!/;1-05~

Defen~ts:. mai¢ _the. :~r~~t that ""lz'e¢ova1 cf'$e current Trustees .go~s .against. the
.manifest u1tent. of:the 'Trustt l>~caus:e ~Mr~ IC,rldand str.m11i~y-de,sited'the.,curre.n.t Trustees to
waf.cl1 over his•,e;stafu." Se~. MSj .at ~li,14•. How.e'f\r.er~ Defendai1t'S .fail. to mention that -the "Trustor

added pr.ovisii:>ns..fot the;·r:em.tnmi :of.any trustee who ib:eca.tne.;(,1ui~ea1 -t-0 this ·Trost and its

Beneficiaries.'' See· abioitB ~t-1Jl9-;. In :acl4ifi~li, tµe T11:1st.pro-vi.des:
. ·...[Tn:Jstee~J a.re 1iabl~-~ rernqy.al ~d ~it~ f.ar·p~~pp:al:--:d~a.~es. iqitl~ted by. .any
B:e11eficl-ary-f6t atty ltrss.es $uffer.e.d.hy-1h:e 1\ust b.ecause:•offraru:l;. oon=v.ersion of
Titist property tp pens,on~ use~ mqss. ~~gte~ :ofd~ty~ :or b~aoh oft'rust Qn the.it
pm

.

Id. at2.4·.

t11e tnrst¢1:.made.:}1T-0~i:ons. b th~~.et t~m:Q.1i.aL. Thus:,1~em~iv.aL0fDefendants as the

-current Trustees--wo:citd:not be:~omg_aga.instthe.material or manifest:futent of tl1e Trust.
Furtlier.mwe;.,as .o.~~~µ

$fJ1~r~ the ''~~J;Tt'.'°~Qf.the tt~s~is n:ot tP-~'e D.efend~nts a.peqnaµent

posifto~ Qf'po~ret crv.f# ~ ~~C:?r!'~ w.iip,edy"~d f~l,y. $ee fd. at 7-;f~ CobJe~fives_ :include
'~rop;iali.ng-the .t=etal:·w.elfar~ ~i~:~ligt'Qµs}J:?eijd's:~Ad-aj.®a.iiGP' .of-its lle~e-fi:9iarlet')~

Ft. ~~~d;a!l~~S,:~labne.d.-:eontpens~~-b~ ls~~tr;ea~J9.,·.·noi:_•,~ticlp~~:by-th,e
T.ms{;:~n-th~if!~. wb~l~~dotte· fur.~~lifoli~~om.g,eii®atfo:tt.·.:sliott1~:no:H)e. giveL ·

not entitled to· oompe.nsation fi:om-=the Trust Deftmdants. essentially argue tliat S:nrit11 should be
_14:
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gfv.ea the sums,:!1~-.i~ askmg.:.as '.C.o.awensatio11 for:bi-s dti:ties.as Trost Man~er because the- Trust
allow.s _.a: Trust Manag~i:-~-be pai4, How-eVeJ;o even.if~ Ttlist-aliows a Trust Manager to he
paid~- fuere·.are multi~le·reasons .wlly Defendaat-S$1th s,~ul.d .not be _givm 1h,e ~.um:s 4e is
elaim.mg-. F.ttst of~- ~e Trust ~tes-·ta~ the_·~tees s1w~~ no.t .r,~cs:iv.e. =c.91npensatj~n for their

sen1-ce.s ..Id. at ·11 1 f T1~st'eeivwilf sei~1tf wltiiout o~~aj;f~n.'~l- lij.fuqu.gli Pef-e.:'ldapf Smitli
clajms -~at:he l¼ts. ~ot squght eo.mpens~on-foran,ydutles he-performed .as ·a ,ttll:Stee,:tbe iriroen·ce
shows o±ber~vis~. Aside fi.'Omatt:endi:ng_boar-d.m~tin:gs~ ·it.appears that all .other .duties. 0ftrustees

were-transf.-etted to 11,e Trost.Man~·g?t;·~eaufugtba:tthooe duti~, pteviouslypetform.ed·by
Ttus~ -without cost to fhe.·Tmst1 w~:nHc!':~~e~d,ep.et:fonned by Smith as_tlie Trust Ma.n~ger

for ·$5-0 p.e1: lioux.. Fo:r :example1,see· Exm~tit p~:at 1Q'l:~~10-{Smitb. ~s.e$..h.~ can delegate .any
trustee d.utYfu th& Ti:qst M'~j;l~ger-)fand see Jobl;l_.1\{U;es D~po at .6l tb,ro:µgh ~-,~- attached hereto .as·

Eihibjt I-I. Smit14 as a ,trn.st~e) would then. vote ·1o. approve his ,ovm T~t .rvfanager timesheets.
Seo.amt De-fe11dant Smith is :Claiming oompens.ation for time as Trust Manager for doing

things·thathe:wa-s not authorized te do. For·exmnple,. Smith.· would do :St3inething -aild then a~~
the Board of 1\iJStees ·tp 1jtify it~~pt, ,fJ.;i~- ~~t See: EJ;:Jil'l;.it.~-- H~-a~u~~s,.1,4~J..:3~·:an~ ~"bit

H
.;,6$; l1liit4> ·-011-e.-.~fitlie..i»~s,t~gt;~gi~t.¢='@.Ol.r;i-tie.s
Smith.~•~--as
. a.f29=~l1~l5;--~P.'A~=.6J
.
.
.
.
•"•

.·

Trµsffyfa~~i$ s~ the 'trus.t,·reCQr.d:~.ijeJ.J~ .madi.1~n. bill:d.ie-Tn;ist (Qr f$.;tiJ.ne.,dofug it See

ExhlniflJ at 8.1:5~2.s-~thl:ough 85·:1:-1°4.'?llf
Ill

:11qsµq;iri.singly,.Sj;Jiiµ., ~1aim~]1~ was·.ipuh~u~,i to do ili.is·tecause..th.e Trustees .(\i,;liich includes himself).mid him
te.-c-.elfectthe-:iilb.ney he wa-s owed. See. ExhibitD .m S:3':7-12.
5
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Fomth,.4esp:it:eth-r/T~' s~un1e.~n.ts. tbat.00311:pe.nsation be-~'tetsonable-i,· $d_·what-b.
it$WlilI)1 p.sd for siroli w01ik/'Smita:ref.i:rs~d :1:0· aohi:s. Tms.t:~tm~er 1Url.ess-1.ie ~ta.s p.al~· :$5:!l-G'O-

per 1iour.. SeiiExhlbit D :.at

40:l ~lS-; 41 -~a ..:it,.-42:21 ~.23~_!+3!·1
flus. .is his
.
. •7. S-tr.ufu .admits fhat
..
.

.

$5Q.:00 is-reasQ]}laGle-oo~eus9iti-011,f-or-wotk as ·1'rIJSt.Jv1anag~ .In faot, the-. Tnrst.M~ag~r had
been .ru.1;-unpai~. j)O_si.tioa ·len-·-rf\~er ten ye.ars., See.tBxln1:,i{D.. at4:S: 13~21·. Furthen~-0re, henefi.c.iary

J:olmlikland ·:actetft.a:s.the TtIM .Ma:n~r fur many yew,iS without -cornpensatiotfafte1··1le wasappointed:Ptesi.de.ttt :ruid ~"ec.ufive·M~~~r ~fthe T~t.- Se~..Minutes _of the ~11a fil¥eting of the
ttustees, a~cl~J1erets as Exhl.bit I; see ~so ~xhlbi t D- at 5'8:2-25; S:9: 1-9 (Smith adn1i ts John

Manag~r po,sitfo~.1n aodidon;J)efettdant=-Cr-run-..ad.mits.:that~e r.r.ustees did i:10htte.1npt to hire
some,:me witb pm,:en:y managerial skills bf·_p.lacini:afh; ·in t1l&·p111,.er:-01\byputting.-0ufbi<ls,.See

El&tlbit..A at-82:1+25-, 82;1 . J.(t.

Mo~t ~nun{iii.1g is t.hat,~n.jifh -~~l th~1~11i¢ruJtg_:~t~~~ _detetnµue4 ±bat $~Q~OO ·p·er

M;aµag~,. an9 th~:-$-2.5.-pe.rlmur w~ reas.o~le:~e:9m~~D:S~11on.- ~J~~Y .ru,:1Ats_sis.tant
secr.et~l~ut-e.r.. SeiMinut~s ·Qftbe. 29~b m¢e~~·of the tr.ustee~j attached, hereto ·:s.s· ~~bit J~
Y-&t; th~:Toust ,ws:·-genel;9tfi1g_:$.O _m.mcome·to .paythes-e t>wageo'us .fees. ,See 'Exhl-bit A ax-.'8-3-:23-~

is=,-. 84:l-l i. ·Thus~ it \V.M .sim;piy unre~on~~e-fof:ili~;Pefen~arits/- r~stees to· :agi~ee to start
paying ofn¢~s-{t..e.t: thciP-ls:~It~)-wheri..-.th¢t~-was, p:o mQn.ey:to .pay -them with.

r6·
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GALLIAN WELKER & BECKSTRO~L.C.

Isl Vttlliain P.. Rtttiunfor
VfJJ.lim.n P~ Rummler
Christ~p~ A. ~ilrid
At:t:omeJ>.sfiJJ~ bite111enors

CEI~TIFICATE OJtMAJLING

I I1ereby ·~r,qfy that @tie: 28:11 d:ay pf'May1 2Qll, l ,wlectronically fil:ed-ihe·

INTERV'ENORS.=.r-j\1JE1\filllA1'1DU-M ~-OPPOS:ITIQlfTCf1VIOTJ;ON· FOR SlJMl\IAl.lY
JODGlYIEl\JT' ~1h-.th~·,ci.eif.cfth~--&.utb.1sfugtbe-~MECF system,: W.hich·seJit--ri~tifica1;ion of
-suck filiAt -~ the f~llew~g:-.
··
·
]QlcllQl~ Ch$berla¼

42:?'W; i-00. s.
St. ·Georg~, ttr ·84770
/st R0xaru1e.1«wn:1n1er

.An ·empk>ye.e~~fGaUian Welker
& .Becksttom, L.C.
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Smith v. Cram, et al
Appellate Case No. 20150637-CA

NICHOLAS I. CHAMBERLAIN (Bar# 13045)
Chamberlain
Law 427 W. 100

s.

St. George, Utah 84770

Telephone: (435) 673-8858
Attorney for Vaiden Cram and Penn Smith as Individuals
AND The Trustees of the Terrestrial Kingdom of God Trust
IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT,
WASIDNGTON COUNTY STATE OF
UTAH
PENN SMITH,
Plaintiff,

v.
VALDEN CRAM, as ExecutiveTrustee under the DECLARATION OF TRUST
dated 11/26/93, operating under the
name of the TERRESTRIAL KINGDOM
OF GOD,

PARTIALSUMMARY JUDGMENT
Case No.: 060501773
Judge: James L. Shumate

Defendant,

JOHN H. KIRKLAND, et al.,
Intervenors.
The Court heard the Parties to this case on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on
June 3, 2013. Wherefore, THE COURT, for good cause appearing hereby makes the following
partial summary judgment on the case:

FINDINGS OF FACT

As a result of said hearing and the evidence presented therein and beforehand, the Court finds
that:
July 091 2013 04:23 PM
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I. Any lapse or failure of the Truster to prepare or deliver the Lease and Stewardship
agreements to the beneficiaries of the Trust before his death does not invalidate the Trust
itself.
2. Mr. Penn Smith is entitled to immediate reimbursement of out of pocket expenses he has
paid on behalf of the Trust, which expenses total $6,494. Said total is supported by the
submission of the list of the same expenses which was presented to the Court with
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. Further, Plaintiff should have the power to
withdraw said amount from the Trust bank account, located at State Bank of Southern Utah.
3. There are genuine issues of material fact regarding the amount, if any, to which Penn Smith
is entitled for his work as Manager of the aforementioned Trust.

4. There are genuine issues of material fact such that the issues of whether or not the Trustees
of the Trust, namely Valden Cram, Penn Smith, and/or Whelton Myers, have breached their
various duties to the Beneficiaries of the Trust and whether or not said Trustees should be
removed should be reserved for trial.

ORDERS
Wherefore, the Court hereby ORDERS that:
I. Mr. Penn Smith shall be reimbursed for out of pocket expenses he has paid on behalf of
the Trust, which expenses total $6,494. Further, Plaintiff should have the power to

withdraw said amount from the Trust bank account, located at State Bank of Southern
July 09, 2013 04:23 PM
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Utah.
2. The keepers of said bank accow1t, employed at State Bank of Southern Utah, shall enact
this withdrawal on presentation of this signed order by Mr. Smith. Since said bank
account

contains less than the aforementioned amount, the Court orders Mr. Smith to be enable to
withdraw the entire amount remaining in the account, as long as it is equal to or less than
the amount of $6,494.
3. The issue of how much, if any, compensation Mr. Smith is entitled to for his work as
Manager of the Trust is reserved for trial.
4. The issue of whether or not the Trustees of the Trust, namely Va]den Cram, Penn Smith,

and/ or Whelton Myers, have breached their various duties to the Beneficiaries of the Trust
is reserved for trial.
5. The issue of whether or not said Trustees will be removed is reserved for trial.
Signed this_day of June, 2013.

Approved as to form this 10th day of June, 2013

Isl William Rummler
Fifth District Court Judge
James L. Shumate

Attorney - Intervenors

005603
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Smith v. Cram, et al
Appellate Case No. 20150637-CA

NICHOLAS I. CHAMBERLAIN (Bar# 13045)
Chamberlain Law
427 W. 100 s.
St. George, Utah 84770
Telephone: (435) 673-8858
Attorney for Vaiden Cram and Penn Smith as Individuals AND
The Trustees of the Terrestrial Kingdom of God Trust
IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT, WASHINGTON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ENNSMITH,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

'.ALDEN CRAM, as Executive-Trustee under
e DECLARATION OF TRUST dated
Case No. 060501773
11/26/93, operating under the name of the
udge: James L. Shumate
RRESTRIAL KINGDOM OF GOD,

OHN H. KIRKLAND, et al.,
tervenors.
COME NOW the Plaintiff and the Trustees of the Terrestrial Kingdom of God Trust, by and
through counsel, and hereby submit this memorandum of points and authorities in support of

their Second Motion for Summary Judgment. With the Court having ruled in the aforementioned
Parties' favor regarding the validity of the Trust at issue in this case, Plaintiff and Trustees now
asks the Court to dispose of the remaining issues of fact, which the they now argue are no longer
materially disputed.

FACTS
I. On the date of August 14, 2012, this Court awarded $70,000 in attorney fees to the Intervenors
in this case. (See Exhibit I, Order)

005613

2. Said order stated that, while it was not subject to objection at the time of said entry, that, " ...
(i)f and when an ultimate ruling is made by the Court, said affidavit (of attorney fees) may be
subject to review by the Court and the parties for reasonableness ..." Id. at p. 4, first
paragraph).
3. On the date of July 9, 2013, this Court awarded Partial Summary Judgment to Plaintiff and the
Trustees of the Trust in this case. (See Docket)

4. Said Partial Summary Judgment affirmed the validity of the Trust at issue. (Id.)
5. However, said Judgment designated two remaining factual issues: I) how much compensation
Plaintiff is owed for his services as trust manager, and 2) whether or not the Trustees of the
Trust have breached their various duties to the Beneficiaries. Id

FACTS REGARDING COMPENSATION OF PENN SMITH AS TRUST MANAGER
6. As has been shown before, the Trust, which has been ruled valid by this Court, empowered the
Trustees to appoint one of their number to serve as " ...manager, who will conserve and oversee
the properties of the TRUST that are not in STEWARDSHIPS, and receive reasonable
compensation for such service as determined by the Board of Trustees ... " (See Exhibit Il
"Trust", Paragraph I 8)
7. Plaintiff was later appointed manager of the Trust and the Trustees allowed him to be paid the
amount of $50 an hour for his services. (See Exhibit m, Affidavit of Penn Smith)
8. During his tenure as Trust Manager, Mr. Smith spent many hours managing the Trust and
incurred the amount of $252,749 in fees as a result. (See Exhibit rv, Itemized Compensation
for Penn Smith)

005614

9. In researching other Trust managers in Southern Utah, it is purported by the Plaintiff and
Trustees that the amount of $50 an hour for Trust management is more than reasonable. See
Exhibit V, Example regarding Trust Management)
FACTS REGARDING PERFORMANCE OF TRUSTEES' FIDUCIARY DUTIES
10. Prior to 2007, Intervenors in this case accused Trustees ofbreaching their fiduciary duties.
11. In that the Trust in this case required that all disputes arising under the Trust be submitted to
a board of arbitration, said arbitration was convened on February 13, 2007. (See Exhibit VI,
"Findings of Facts and Conclusion of Law of the Board of Arbitration for the Terrestrial
Kingdom of God Trust")
12. The arbitration went before a board of arbitrators, namely Michael Barker, Lee Cox, St.
George Mayor Daniel McArthur, Sam Miles, and Ryan Rarick. (Id. at p. I, second paragraph)
13. After listening to arguments from Intervenors, the board concluded that " ... the Trustees have
acted in the best interest of the.Trust..." (Id. at p. 2, first full paragraph)
14. The arbitration board also recommended " ...that the Trustees send a letter to each steward

Beneficiary (Intervenors) offering a payment schedule ... to cover Trustees' out of pocket
expenses and any other legal Trust expenses ... " (Id. at p. 2, second full paragraph)
ARGUMENT
I. THE cotv.lPENSATION AMOUNT REQUESTED BY PLAINTIFF IS REASONABLE

AND SHOULD BE PAID BY INTBRVENORS OR OUT OF THE CORPUS OF THE
TRUST ITSELF

005615

The Plaintiff, Mr. Smith has spent many hours in his capacity as Trust manager. In doing so, at
the rate of $50 an hour, which has been shown to the be more than reasonable by the Exhibit
shown above, he has accrued the amount of $252,749 owed for his services.

Paragraph 18 of the Trust (see Exhibit II) allows for said appointment and compensation. In
light of the evidence, Mr. Smith deserves to finally be paid for the s~rvice he has freely rendered
all these years.
II. THE TRUSTEES HAVE ACTED WITHIN THEIR AUTHORITY AND HAVE NOT
BREACHED ANY OF THIER FIDUCIARY DUTIES
All that need be cited in this area is Exhibit VI, attached hereto. An objective arbitration board,
composed of duly appointed members, found no breach ofTrustee's duties to the Beneficiaries or
Intervenors. Further, Intervenors have no evidence of any breach of duty in this case.
III. INTERVENORS SHOULD BE PERSONALLY CHARGED FOR ALL THE
ATTORNEY FEES LEVIED IN nns CASE BECAUSE THE CAUSES OF ACTION
THEY HAVE BROUGHT WERE FRIVOLOUS, PREVIOUSLY ADJUDICATED AND
INIMICAL TO THE PURPOSES OF THE TRUST
As Exhibit I shows, this Court stated that the issue of attorney fees could be revisited upon the
final resolution of this case. To date, large swaths of the corpus of the Trust have been depleted
and blown away in the hunicane of frivolous litigation that has been perpetuated by the
Intervenors. Literally hundreds of thousands of dollars have been lost to attorneys :fighting over
meaningless causes of action.
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This case should have been over in 2007 after the aforementioned board of arbitration found
that the Trustees had been acting properly. However, Intervenors chose to continue their useless
fight against the intent of their father, Stephen Kirldand.
CONCLUSION
Wherefore, in that no material issues of fact remain, Plaintiff and Trustees ask the Court for
the following:

1. Ajudgment awarding Plaintiff the amount of$252,749 for his work as trust manager, and the
remaining amount he has yet to be paid for reimbursement of out of pocket expenses, to be
paid out of the corpus of the trust, as the trust allows.
2. A declaration that Trustees have not breached any fiduciary duty to the Intervenors.
3. The full amount of attorney fees billed to the Trust to be paid by Intervenors, out of their
personal assets, so that the Trust may be replenished from that which it has paid so dearly.
4. An order for a full accounting of the attorney fees billed by both sides of this case so that the
aforementioned fees can be paid by the Intervenors.
5. An order allowing the Trustees to have full banking privileges regarding the Trust
Signed this 23 day of August, 2013.

Isl Nie Chamberlain
Attorney for Valden Cram and Penn Smith as Individuals AND
The Trustees of the Terrestrial Kingdom of God Trust
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
A true and correct copy of the foregoing document was sent to William Rummler, attorney for
Intervenors, this 23rd day of August, 2013.

Isl Nie Chamberlain
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Smith v. Cram, et al
Appellate Case No. 20150637-CA

GALLIAN WELKER & BECKSTROM, L. C.
WilliamF. Rummler (13093)
Christopher A. Lund (14074)
965 East 700 .South, Suite 305
St. George, Utah 84790
Telephone: (435) 628-1-682
Facsimile: (435) 628 ..9561
wfrummler@utahcase.com
clund@utahcase.co1n

Attorneys for l1J.tervenors
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, UTAH

PENN SMTIH,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO STRIKE SECOND
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,

vs.
VALDEN CRAM, as Executive-Trustee
under the DECLARATION OF TRUST
dated 11/26/93, operating underthe name of
the TERRESTRIAL KINGDOM OF GOD,

Consolidated Civil No. 060501773
Judge: James L. Shumate

Defendant.

JOHN H. KIRKLAND, et al.,
Intervenors.
Intervenors, by and through the law offices of-Gallian Welker & Beckstrom, L.C., hereby
submit their Memorandwn in Support of Motion to Strike Defendants' Second Motion for
Summary Judgment as follows:
Ill
1
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I.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff and Defendants (collectively referred to as "Defendants") .are attempting to talce

a second bite at the apple on two issues with their Second Motion for Summary Judgment
("MSJ2), Yet, Defendants fail to present any evidence that was not already available to them

when they filed their First Motion for Summary Judgment ("MSJl "). Defendants' MSJ2
involves three issues with.the two main issues being: (1) whether Plaintiff Penn Smith.should be
paid the amount he is demanding; and (2) whether Defendants breached their fiduciary duties as
trustees. However, the court in its· Order on MSJl addressed these two issues, finding that there
were genuine issues of material fact in dispute and reserved the issues for trial. This is the law of
the case. Therefoi-e, Defendants' MSJ2 should be stricken.
Alternatively, if the court finds that Defendants' MSJ2 should not be stricken in its
entirety, the cou1i should strike Exhibits V and VI as inadmissible hearsay. Furthermore,
Defendants' third issue regarding allocating attoiney fees should also be dismissed in the event
that the court strikes issues one or two, since the court ordered that the issue should be addressed
"[i]f and when an ultimate ruling is made by the Court. See August 14, 2012 Order at 111, on file

with the court.

II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On May 6, 2013, Defendants filed their MSJl, which included the following two

issues: (a) Whether Plaintiff is entitled to :fue payment of wages ai1d expenses he is- claiming as
Manager of the Trust, and (b) whether Defendants as trustees breached their fiduciary duties, See
MSJl at 5, on file with the court.

2.

On June 3, 2013, a hearing was held on MSJl in which 1:he court made the
2
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following findings of fact:
a.

"There are genuille issues of material fact regarding the amount, if any, to which
[Plaintiff] is entitled for bis work as Manager/' See Court'.s July 9, 2013 Order,
attached hereto as Exhibit A at 2: if3.

b. "There are genuine issues of material fact such that the issues of whether or not
the Trustees of the Trust, name1yValden Cram, Penn Smith, and/or Whelton
Myers, have breached their various duties to the Beneficiaries of the Trust and
whether or not said Trustees should be removed should be reserved for trial." Id.
at,r4.

3. The court then ordered these two issues reserved for trial. See Exhibit A at 3: ~,r3-4.
4. On August 23, 2013, Defendants filed their MSJ2 in which they ask for summary

judgment on the same tw-0 issues previously ruled on by this court.
III.

ARGUMENT
A. The law of the case doctrine precludes Defendants from reopening the same issues
lnMSJ2.
In filing their MSJ2, Defendants are attempting a second bite at the apple on two issues

for which the court issued an order just 45 days prior. In MSJl, Defendants sought summary
judgment on (1) whether Plaintiff Penn Smith should be paid the amount he is demanding; and
(2) whether Defendants breached their fiduciary duties as trustees. See MSJl at 5. After a

hearing on the issues, the court found that there were genuine issues of material fact that
precluded summary judgment on the two issues and reserved the issues for trial. See Exhibit A at
2:mf3-4; 3: 113-4. Yet, Defe11dants are now seeking-summary judgment 011 these same two
3
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issues. Under the law of the case doctrine, Defendants should be precluded from raising these
same issues in summary judgment. See IHC Health Services, Inc. v. D & K MANAGEMENT,
INC., 2008 UT 73, 196 P. 3d 588, 596,

"[T]he law of the case doctrine acts much like the doctrine of res judicata-furthering
the goals of judicial economy and finality- but within .a single case.'' Id. at ,J26. Under the law
of the case doctrine, "While a case remains pending before the district court prior to any appeal,
the parties are bound by the court's prior decisio11, but the court remains free -to reconsider that
decision." Id. at ,21. However, there are three exceptional circumstances in which a court should
not apply the law of the case doctrine: "(l) when there has been an intervening change of
con1rolling authoricy; (2) when new evidence has become available; or (3) when the-court is
convinced that its plior decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice." Id.

at 34.
In IHC Health Services, the Utah Supreme Court upheld a district court, s refusal to

reopen a forfeiture issue that itnad previously ruled on, per the law of the case doctrine. Id. at
135. After addtessing the three exceptions to the Doctrine, the court held:
None of the exceptions required the district court to reopen the issue of forfeiture
:in this case. The first two exceptions did not apply because [defendant] did not
point to any new facts or law which might have excused it from arguing
substantial compliance whe11 the forfeiture claim was decided. First, [defendant]
has not pointed to any intervening change in law. We agree with the district court
that "[t]he defense [defendant] wa11ts to now argue is not new or novel, and
indeed the main cases it relies upon in its present motion were all issued before
[defendant] opposed [plaintifrs] initial Motion foi-Partial Judgment on the
Pieadings." Nor has [defendant] briefed this court on any intervening change of
law. Secoad, [defendant] has not pointed to any new evidence that it did nQt have
ru1 opportunity to present when the forfeiture claim was decided.
.
Id. Similarly, none of these eX:ceptions apply in the present case. The first exception does not
4
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apply as Defendants have cited to no intervening changes in controlling authority.
Exception two does not apply since all of Defendants -exhibits in their MSJ2 1 contain

information that was produced in MSJl or was available at that time: Exhibit I is an August 14,
2012 Order in this case, so it was available when Defendants filed their MSJl in May-of2013;
Defendants provided Exhibits II, III, and IV in their MSJl; Exhibit V appears to contain
infonnation about a company's fees for providing trustee Bervices, but there is no indication that
this information is new or was unavailable at the time of filing MSJl; .and Exhibit VI is a
document purported to be from March of 2007, so it was also available to Defendants when they

filed MSJl. 2
Lastly, the third exception does not apply as there is nothing .to suggest that the court's
determination that there are material facts in dispute was clead.y erroneous. or that it would work
a manifest injustice for the issues to be heard at trial. Thus, like in II-IC Health Services,

Defendants do not satisfy any of the exceptions to the law of the case doctrine. Therefore,
Defendants' MSJ2 should be stricken. See me Health Services, 2008 UT at 'if35.
B .. Defendants' Exhibits V and VI are inadmissible hearsay.

In a motion for summary judgment, evidence provided in suppo1t of the motion must be
admissible. See Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 794 P. 2d 482,487 (Utah Court App. 1990)
("Inadmissible evidence cannot be considered in ruling on a motion for summary judgment"); D
&L Supply v. Saurin-i, 775 P.2d-420, 421 (Utah 1989) ("It is true that inadmissible evidence
1

(I) Order of court regarding attorney fees 1, (II) Trust document, (III) Affidavit of Plain~ (IV) Document listing
the compensation ·sought by Plaintiff, (V) purported fee schedule of a trustee company; and (VI) alleged findings of

fact from a board of arbitration.
2
In addition, Exltibits V and VI are inadmissible hearsay and should be excluded, as is explained later in
Interveno1-s• Motion,

5
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cannot be considered in ruling on a motio11 for summary judgment''). Therefore, if the court
determines that Defendants' MSJ2 should not be stricken in its entirety, the court-should sttike
Exhibits V and VI as inadmissible hearsay. Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered ~'in
evidence to pr.eve the truth of.the matter asserted in the statement," Utah R. Bvid, 801(0).
Furthermore, ''Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law-or by these rules," Utah R
Evid. 802,
In the present case, Defendants have offered Exhibit V to prove Defendants' claim that

Plaintiff's compensation as Manager is reasonable. In fact, Exhibit Vis the only evidence
Defendants offer to try and prove :that Plamtiff's rate of compensation is reasonable. See MSJ2 at
3: 11 ("at the rate of$ 50 an hour, which has been shown to be more than reasonable by the
Exhibit shown above"). In other words, Defendants are offedng the statements made in Exhibit
V, an out-of-court document, to prove their assertion that $50 per hour is reasonable
compensation for Plaintiff. Therefore, Exhibit V is inadmissible hearsay that does not qualify for
any exceptions found it1 Rules 803-804.
In addition, Defendants have provided Exhibit VI, a document that purports to contain
findings of fact and conclusions oflaw of a board of arbi1ration that was allegedly convened by
the trustees of the Trust in 2007. Defendants are attempting to admit Exhibit VI into evidence to
prove that Defendants did not breach their fiduciary duties. However, Exhibit VI is a classic
example ofhearsay without an exception. Exhibit VI is not a witness's prior statement or
statement made by~ opposing party3, and does not qualify for any of the exceptions found in
Rules 803, 804.
3

See Rule 80l(d).

6

Likewise, Exhibit VI does not qualify under Rule 807's residual exception because
Defendants are able to obtain more probative evidence on the issue of Defendants' fulfillment of
their fiduciary duties through reasenable efforts than Exhibit VI. For example, Defendants or
other witnesses could testify, Defendants could provide excerpts from depositions, etc. In
addition, Exhibit VI does not have equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness as
there is no indication of how the board of arbitration was set up, the impartiality of the board

members, what evidence was considered, what witnesses wer-e heard, etc. Therefore, admitting
Exhibit VI would not forth er these rules or the interests of justice and it should be excluded as
inadmissible hearsay.
Furthennore, even if Exhibit VI was admissible under a hearsay exception, it should be
excluded under Rule 403 because its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice and wasting time. By submitting Exhibit VI, Defendants are suggesting that
because a board of arbitration allegedly found that Defendants did not breach their fiduciary
duties, this court.should take that at face value and rule the same way. However, in rebuttal
Intervenors could just as easily submit into evidence the September 12, 2006 findings of fact and
conclusions of law from a previous board of arbitration ("Board of Arbitration l "). Board of
Arbitration 1 concluded, among other things, that: (1) Plaintiffs compensation rate was
unreasonable; (2) Defendants improperly billed the Trust for time spent as Trustees; and (3)
Defendants breached their fiduciary duties on multiple occasions and aeted inimical to the Trust

In other words, these two boards of arbitration came to opposite conclusions on the same
issues, once again showing that there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary
judgment. Therefore, it would also be a waste of time and unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403 to
7
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present Exhibit VI, even if Exhfbit VI was not hearsay.
Exhibit V should be stricken as an unauthenticated document

i.

Exhibit V should also be stricken as an unauthenticated document per Utah R. Evid. 901.
"To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the pr~ponent
must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims
it ist Id. at 901(a). In the present case, Defendants lay no foundation for what Exhibit Vis, who
created it, whether it is authentic, etc. Defendants simply provide it as an exhibit with no
explanation. F:urthermore, Exhibit V does not appear to qualify as a selfMauthenticated document
per Rule 902. Therefor:e, Exhibit V should be stricken.
C. The isBue of .attorney fees 1s not ripe since there is no final resolution of th.is case.

In their MSJ2, Defendants address the issue of attorney fees as outlined in the court's

August 14, 2012 order. However, as Defendants point out, the court ordered that the issue of
-attorney fees should be revisited upon the final resolution of the case. Id. at 11 1. Therefore, if
Intervenors' Motion t0 Strike is· gr.anted on any of the two main issues addressed above, the issue
of.attorney fees will not be ripe for adjudication and should also be stricken.
IV.

CONCLUSION
--.,

For the foregoing reasons, Intervenors respectfully request that the court grant its Motion
to S1rike Second Motion for Summary Judgment. In the alternative, if the court does not strike
Defendants' MSJ2 in its entirety, In.tervenors respectfully request -that Exhibits V and VII be
stricken.
!ti

Ill
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DATED this

i_ day of.September, 2013.
GALLIANt WELKER & BECK.STROM, L.C.

~A~

William F. Rummler
Christopher A. Lund
Attorneys for Intervenors

CERTIFlCATE -OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the1__ day of September, 2013, I served a copy of the
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE SECOND MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT via the United States Postal Service first~class postage prepaid and
electronically filed same with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which sent
notification of such filing to the following:

Nicholas Chamberlain .
421W. 100 S.
St. George, UT '84770

~gfJLJWit~~u

An employee of Gallian Welker
& Becks1mm, L.C.
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ADDENDUM7
Smith v. Cram, et al
Appellate Case No. 20150637-CA

NICHOLAS I. CHAMBERLAIN (Bar# 13045)
Chamberlain Law
427 w. 100 s.
St. George, Utah 84770
Telephone: (435)6738858
Attorney for Vaiden Cram and Penn Smith as Individuals
AND The Trustees of the Terrestrial Kingdom of God
Trust
IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT, WASHINGTON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

PENN SMITH,
Plaintiff,
V.

FINAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

VALDEN CRAM, as ExecutiveM
Trustee under the DECLARATION
OF TRUST dated 11/26/93,
operating under the name of the
TERRESTRIAL KINGDOM OF GOD,

CASE NO. 060501773

Defendant,

Judge: James L. Shumate

JOHN H. KIRKLAND, et al.,
lntervenors.
THE COURT, for good cause appearing, hereby orders, pursuant to the Second Motion
for Summary Judgment, made In this case on the date of August 23, 2013, as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. That, based on the evidence presented, the Trustees in this case, namely Vaiden
Cram and Penn Smith, or any other Trustee which has been accused of any
wrongdoing herein, are declared to be not in breach of any fiduciary duty they
now owe, or have owed, to the Terrestrial Kingdom of God Trust (TKOG).
January 23, 2014 10:02 AM
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2. That Plaintiff, Penn Smith, through his duties as Trust Manager of TKOG, has earned
the amount of $252,749.00 for compensation, at the rate of $50 an hour.

3. That said amount has not been paid to him.
4. That a large amount of attorney fees, later to be ascertained and totaled by this

Court, have been billed by the parties in this case. Said trust stands in need of
replenishment of said moneys, as they were taken out of the corpus of the TKOG trust.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. That Plaintiff, Penn Smith, is hereby awarded the amount of $252,749.00 for his work
as trust manager, to be paid out of the corpus of the TKOG trust, as the trust allows.
2. That the attorney fees mentioned above, which have been taken out of the TKOG

trust corpus, later to be accounted for and totaled by this Court, are to be paid back to
the Trust by the lntervenors. Said amount shall be paid out of the personal assets of the
Intervenors.

3. That all parties to this case are herby ordered to fully account for all attorney
fees billed in this case. Said amounts will be totaled at a hearing, later to be set
by the Court.
4. That the current Trustees of the TKOG trust are hereby allowed full banking
privileges regarding the Trust, without the necessity of seeking court orders to
engage in banking transactions.

END OF ORDER

0060~7
January 23, 2014 10:02 AM
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"

TERRESTPJAL JGNG.DOM of GOD TR11ST
StcWi.L rds/f.·knefi ci uri t::S

)
)

)

v.

)
)

'T'ERR.ESTRIAL KINGDOM of GOD TRUST

)

TIU JSTEES

)

Cuse nun:...
1h___e__
1· .....
J_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

The Board of Arbitration for the TERRESTRIAL KINGDOM OF GOD TRUST met a1 7:00 pm
on l Se_ptember 2006 at 545 N. 400 W. St. George, Utah to hear testimony of al] parties, and again at 7:00
pm on 6 September 2006 ·at 2000.E. St. Georget Utah with the TRUSTEES and Jolm Kirkland. After
having rcvfowed the provisions oftbe Terrestrial Kingdom of God TRUST, after l1av1ng read tile minutes,
after haying looked at written evidence, and after having heard all testimony of the above parties the
Board of Arbitl'ation makes the following:

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of L~1vr

1.
TI1at the Board of Arbitration for the TERRESTRIAL KlNGDOl\1 OF GOD TRUST :finds that it
has jurisdiction to hear all matters relative to TRUSTEES' alleged 11eg]ect of duty or breach of TRUST
shlce the Board Arbi1ratio11 ,\ as properJy constituted pursuant to the provisions contained in the
TERRESTRIAL KINGDOM OF GOD TRUST, hereinafter referred to as the TRUST=- and the mhrntcs of
the meetings of the Board of Arbitrators.
1

2.
Thatthc Bonrd of Al'bjtrators) oncejurisdic.tion was detcnnine.d at the 1 September 2006 henring~
resolved to sei aside formal procedures to hear testimon)' from all parties sine~ none ,vere represented by
attorneys and almost all parLies were not familiar v.rjtl1 correct procedures of Im,,. At the second hearing at
7:00 pm on 6 Septcmber2006 the TRUSTEES and John Kirldandpresented more testimony ~md evidence

and no o~jections to jurisdiction were made.

·

3.
TI1n1 there was no e,~dencc presented in support of the TRUSTEES 11cvc1· l1aving done anything
beneficial for the T'RUST and in fact a letter from the Stc.':wards/Bencficiarks dated 24 June 2006
concluded ,vitl1 a statement thanking the TRUSTEES for hnving served '\vithout pay"' and give tl1£!nks for
what ~-mliy have done".
4.
That 1J,crt'. a!'c missing mhmte~ of TRUSTEES meetings> howc-:vcr=- that said mjssing mcords ,~,L~rc
Jus~ ut the death ofthL~ TR'USTEF writer ofthc TRUST nnd ,vcrc not recovcruhk thro11gh no fimlt of the
curnmt TRUSTEES. J'>rnsent TRtJSTEES lrnvc: kept cum=n1 thL" rninut.~s nf th1,;.ir mut.!lings nncJ Hwy ha\'c
b~c11 at all timl!s m·ailah.lc for insp<.:ction hy the Stl!Wurds 1Beneficfr1rit.:~.

5.
Tbai 1l1ere \,·as 110 evide.m;l! prc~~e1,1ed th~t the 'l1ZT.J8TT:ES mi~mtes me t111inkl!it?hk tmd void of
i h1.:. Tf~l iSTEES intent.

(,.

Tlml TRU8TEE8 haw tbc n:sponsibility to appoinl JX>t<;ntiul Stt'\r,irds '!3t.:neficiurirn, 011fy if a

St::·ward/Bcncficiury dit$ without naming an heir.

EXHIBIT

JV1)0167E

.- ,· · Tlrndhl:·Sft:~wn.rd u.nc.1 ~rRus:f:E-ES wcrc.-appi..;inted•by-btt~:i.:e,n ..B.. .J·:.irl~lcmd...thc .C1:<:!nlor oft.ht!.. .··- .
TRUST: and !ilrlh~!": tha1 ;; Swward ,md TRUSTEE is nol in thL' cfau;s of SLc\.\.-a.rd!.;lfkmc.:ficiarh.::;. 11~,r '"''ti:i
h th:.: inkn! Clf the TRlJS'J' for Steward~ 1Ber~cfic.:iadcs 10 dect) vntt or approvt• ofth<: Board of
TRl!STEES.

8.
That TRUST provjsfrms pursuant to TRUST pngc 5, paragraph 18~ alJow TIUJSTEGS to dee! 01w
ofth<.:il' number or other h1djvidual, t1s a Manager of the TRUST propc;rtit=t, nDt v,·itbin stc\,van.lship~~ wh~,
mny receive rl!u3onabk compensation. The TRUST ]ms nc'> provision for appointmr.m1 c,f othur p::rid
individuals 01· offices.
That the TRUSTEES ignored the SJ)~cific TRUST prc.rvision and legal advice J)ert,tining, to the
swnc, that only one pa.id TRUST Manager be elected to manage non-Stewards/Beneficiaries prop~rty. m:
9.

evidenced by a Jetter from retired attorney John L. MjJes dated 3 July 2006'1 a TRUSTEES meeting
Jvfinutc dated 16 November 2005, she-wing that TRUSTEES elected themselves to positions of TRUST
Manager, Assistant Manager, and Secretary/Treasurer, at the rate of $50.00, $50.00, and $25.00 per hour
respectively., m1d an itemized claim for money that was maintained as valid at the .arbitration heating by
the TRUSTEES.
10.
That !RUST page 4, paragraph 11, states that t&Any compensation paid others is to be that usual1y
pmd for sucb work..,, The annuaJ national salary for a full time real estate propcrt~, ma11ager is
approximately $40,000 do_l]ars per year,
PR9PER11' MANAGEMENT- Property manngcrucnt in"oh•cs maximizing net revenues or productivity of
property bnsL-d on mnnuging rental flows, tenant r.etenUon, managing mid contracting propurty operation. Property
c.>p~.rntion includes cleaning, maintemrncc .and repairs, paying utilities, property insumnc:e, property tnxes JJnd so o:n)J
reporting to owners und oversceb1g rcsldcnt or on-site mm1u.gcrs. Propt:rl)' managers an.: usm1lty inyoh cd io lensing
and facility management decisions. Those. that manage se,1eral properties and arc luvolvecJ in .acquisition, disposition,
finnncing a11d portfolio management decisions are known ns ".asset mnnngers." Most property managers star( 2$ on-site
mnrrngcrsJ m•rking closcl)' witl1 tcnanf:s. Example firms: Lincolll Propcrcy• Company, TrnmmclJ Cmw Compnn~· 1
A,•erngc Salary! '$40,000 per ycur.
1

That an imputed hourly rate of $19.00 per hour is reasonable for part time duties in the St. Georgc:,
Utah area.
11.

12.

-.,

That the TRUST Manager, Assistant 1'1anagers, and Managers Secretary, biiled the TRUST for

various 'ffiUSTEE mecth1gs 01· time said Manager and Assistant Managers spent with City of
1
\,\ ushington~ Utc~1 officials and others as to the routing of a road that would intctfer~ ,vith
Stewards/Bcncficia1ies wllO have entered into leasc/stewardsl1ip agreements, including the farmiur.
ac..~tivity and by doing so have allo·wed a gross neglect of duty or breach of TRUST which is inimical to
th<.: TRllST to take plac.e.
J3.
The TRI lST prigL' 6~ paragrap]1 27~ says: 'The TRUSTEES ofthh~ 'DUJST shall normally hire n~,
om.~ on u salaried basis; 110 service!-: s1111]] be performed by this TRUST unks.s on a contn1ctt1al b,l!~is:,
111 t1 <.:ss ~ucl1 an arrungL:m(.~nt is unlawful or impossible.!:)

1~·1.
ThAt no TRl JSTEE has proffor-t:d evjdcncc of a co1itmc: a::; 1\.:quirctl by '1·.Rus·i· puge 6: JJ:t~ngr~1pl!
'27., hu1 even ifth~v had TRU8TEES arc limited in .the Minute changl:!s madl: to tlie TRl 1ST by P[lr,e {,~
parngraph 33, that.~mys: "That this Ll\IDENTLIRE OF TRUST shull ~t:rve a:{ tlw complctt' aud offici aJ
gnitfo for tbe TRUSTEES in the pursuit and performance of t1,ei.r duties herem'll1~r; nnd th:i:. th::y slwlJ
hm'l! only such outhnri1y, powers, c111cl dutil!~ l:lH m·c con:forrud herniu und hctl!~mdcr. ,:-

,,
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L::. -· .. :.::h~Uli!:.:r:PJ.:ST.sta(~~.tl1r1L.1h·:~ TRl IST_MarnHwr.c,umol ~o!;t:r~)~ prop~rlv ,,f
S!c:,\·,n-ds'Bi.:11~riciarit.:s bul CaJ! control and ovcrsct· on.ly properly witr~-fs 11riun'ticr-·c:c;i1t1·c>°J ·a( - ... .. . .. . . ..
~.wward::i/1-h:!n~ficirdt.:;~ anci nH!)' t~ccivc: limited power to muh. nt.!c.:e.ssG1J'y day to d,1y dispc.~r:::e111cn~ ir. Lk·
du:.· cnur~~c ofbusin~::s sui~jcc1 le, the rcvh.:w am] appro,·aI of TRUSTEES.
·

]1mt if is not illc.: function of the TRUST Manager, or Assistant Manager, nnd Secre1i:ff}','Truasun..:r,
c,·cn if thl! lattur two dectcd posjtions wm·e authorized, 10 negotiate prnpC!ri)' eminent domain matlcrs that
would a-:-foct the ubHity of Stcwarcls/Bcncficinrics continuing in their skvmrds.hips; :md tha1 time cha1·g~~d
to the TRUST for said nc;gotiations is not auib01faed by provisions of th~ TRUST.
: 6.

17.
That TRUST provisfons preclude P~nn Smitl1 as Manager and others as Assistant Managers und u
Secretary/Treasurer in dealing with eminent domain matters that re-routed thc: road through prope11ies of
Stewnrds/Benc.ficiuries ·who have entered into property ste,vardships agwcmcnts therefore i1 fo1lr1ws that
time charged doing so is not authorized.
J8.

That thl! TRUSTEES may exercise oversight aud control of the Stewards/Bcm:..ficiaries who have

entered into property stewardship agreements in the instant matter of eminent domaill proceedings cmJy to
tJ1e eh1:ent that both TRUSTEES and Stewards/Beneficiariesjoh1tly 21!:,TTee, for if the 1'RUSTEES wero to
exercise exclusive contr.oJ it would violate that portion of TRUST page 3, paragraph 7., that says: uThe
TRUSTOR parcels su.id farm property to provide for the pursuit of happiness t'br each and cvc:ry
Belleficiary along v.dth the rights and responsibi1ities of their inheritances in tbere respective
STE\V ARDSHIPS. These Jots shall ~ways remain an inviolate inheritance for _these respective families
in perpetuity.''
~

9.

Thal the Stc,vards/Beneficiaties testified that the intent of the TRUST ,,,as to preserve the

farm.lm1d parceled to the St.cwards/.Beneficiaries so that in future hard times e:011templated~ the
Stewards/Beneficiaries ,,~ould have a place to gather and even farm to survive. The farmland tax status
has been maintained!! taxes paid: m1d the irrigation pond kept intact so that irrigation '111ater can be

a,1ailable to the tilJablc ac-reage i11cludh1g the river meander ]and, by the several Stewards.'Bcneficiar.ies
since the TRUST was fanned.

20.
That the TRUSTEES testified that the commercializ.ation of the TRUST properties for the benefit
of all Stcwnrds/Bcneficiarles was the prudent course to pursue.

...,\

\{II

21.

The TRUST page 4, paragraph 11, says: "TRUSTEES wiIJ serve without con~pensation.'~ The

sarr,e parngrapb says that TRUSTEES may be paid "out of pocket CXJ.1Cnscs". Definjtion -Expendi11lrl$
usuully paid with cash.

,,,.,
That tht! Mi1~ulL~s of the second meeting of the BOARD OF TRUSTEES dated 30 December l ~>93
rdl:.!ct the foci ihnt. tJu: T'RVSTEES dcctcd John J-ludsnn Kirk.Janel as Exer.L1~h1e l\fanagcr of the TRUST.
That hY :.:1t.:c1i1w John Hudson Kirkland as Manager or the TR i JST no provision::; of tile TRlJST
Wl!l't.: \'iol,1tcd ~incc m~~aging uon-SlcvYltrds.'Beuc.ficbdes _propt!rly was und~.r 11'1t~ direction r:nd e~m1ro1 ()'..
J'J{USTEES and m~ money \Wlf: charged by Jolm Hucl::ion Kirkland as Manager of the 'fR.lJST.
~~-;.

Tlrnt by cleeti11p. John Hud~nn Kirkland as Munagur of the Tl~ UST·1w pro,·jsiom; uflhL' TRUST
·c Yiolated sin~a' u 8tL~ward/Hencficiu.ry can elected by thL· TRUSTEES as thL: nonS1ewards/Bc11cucim·ies pmpG1ty Mmiagcr. A Manager of nnn-Stewnrd 'Bc!1c11ciury pwp~rty W:ltdd J,u \\.!
t(J 11cbnini~tcr sDid 11ropertic:s under the dir0c.ticm of the. BOARD or TR{ l~TEES i.lnd could no1 cxerd:w
uny fonctio11 over sufrl propurLi~s without the approval ofthc BOARD OF TR.l JSTE!~S, :;upporlec.l hy
:.-1.

WG 1

i
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·.\Tiu~:n TJa:STEE Minu1~~~·.-·,i1e;:,;by Jwcping th<: TRUSTEE burd~n Jlgl--1~ gi\'hl·L:··i1i·t;·,c)11: ..... ••···· . .
,:;i1.•ward.-'B,:n~ficiary properly Munagcr the option. su~jl!ct 10 the apprond of lh<.: TRUSTEES, tc, kt:~p 1!,1.
~c,.::[ o.r said Mm10gcmon1 to L! minimum for the bem:fit of all ~tewards/Bencfidmfos and poiuntial
Stcwarc.L:'Bcneficia.ril!!i. Such i:!rrangcmcnt ,,vott1d also ser\'c ·10 c.Jiminate any 1hrca~ of an ulh.:gc.d s!!lJ'~
~:L!rdng en~mpt on the purl.of P~rm Smith tCJ receive remuncr;;rt:ion for t11c· .function of the ~~tid nun-

Slt'Wilrd-'Bcncflciary propt:rly M' m1ug(;J' at the cxpt:nsu of Stewards.'Benefiujarics.
2S.
That the 20 Ju)y 20[)6 letter from the TRUSTEES to the::. Bcneficiarit!s r,hdng t.I job descdptim~ for
~ Bo~u·d ofManagers, Executive Manager, and Secrctary/freasurel':- comprised of the Beneficiaries, to
m,mugc ull Stcwal'd~/Beneficiarics property and day to day business activity is confusing.
First of all, there is no provision fo the TRUST for Managers or a Board of Jvfanagcrs to manag~
Stewards/Beneiicimfos properties ,vho have entered .iuto lease stewardship ab'Teements. The TRUST foa~e
and ste-wardship agreement on page 3 paragraph 4 {c) states that Stewurds/Bencficiaries who have:. entered
into said agreement nre "To manage, control, maintaill and operate tl1e Suqjcct Properly on a full-time
basis and to be solely responsible for a11 activities tlmreon or therewith.'\
Secondly, the Stewards/Benc:ffoiaries have alleged that 'file Executive 11anagcr for 1.ha1 function is
an attempt on tl1e part of the TRUSTEES to change the TRUST Manager status away from John Hudson
K.il'klnnd as granted in the second meeting of the BOARD OF TRUSTEES, dated 3-0 December J993.
Thirdly,. the Stewards/Beneficiaries are una11imous in their allegation that by removing John
Hudson Kirkland TRUST Manager status that the TRUSTEES have sci tl1cmselves up as a Managcr.t
Assistant Manager, and Secretary/Treasurer to recdve pay for managing tl1e TRUST which is a gross
neglect or breach of TRUST and ,,,hich is also inimical to the TRUST.

26.

'?hut the TRlJST wording in paragraph 17 on page 5 ,,.,,as changed from the ''Board of Managers''

10 the ~'Board of Arbitrators'\

That th!! TRUS't wo:rcling correction in paragraph 17 on page 5 in no way dissolved or changed
the .responsibility fol' the Stewards/Btmeficiarics 11t1ho l1avc entered into property ste,,lnrdslup agrtmm.mti.:
27.

to perfonn the day to day management of their individual stewardships.
28.

By changing the TRUST \?i1orcling to "Board of ArbitTators" a unanimous approval by said Board

be

of Arbitrators wou]d required to reinstate the TRUSTEES who did not unanimously automatically
reinstate tl1emsclves ,,•hich is not consistent with TRUST pmdsions on page 5, par11::,arapl1 20 which states
that "Tlwir mt~ority vote will ruJe nnd resolve all disputes," Moreover=- it is not the function of the BCJard
()f Arbitrators to determine who will be or not be a TRUSTEE absent n charge of wrongdoing.
29.
If. nftcr foilurt: of lht: TRUSTEES to w1animously vote to autom~ticclly reinstate thcmsulvcs aJh!r
t.;n year:-: and if, Ftb~t~nt a unanimous vote by the Board of Arbitrutors to do Hkt'Wisc~ th<.~ TRUSTEES arc
di,·t~ctt~d by the TRUST to muk<.: a nc,v TRUSTEE npp:..1inLmc~1t: mul~ing unn~~c:essnry fl Board of'
1\r~1it:'!ltOr:-i 10 ht.· t·o11v~n~d in l11c first place. The only timt: c:1 Bcmrd nf Arbi tn.tl or~ may fal_i ud ie~lL' rJ
ni11tll:r pursu,mt to thu TRUST fa the following:
When. purs11a11t to TRUST p~tge, 5.. pumgraph 19, N B~l~1tn of /\rbim1tioll cLmeurs Ll\ l:1c unanim:,u!'Vi..)lt: of LhL' ot.lmr TJHJ~T.EES to remove n TRUSTEE for e~:tr<:tnl' eau::ie.
\\'hen the TRt:ST'EES an:. unabi~ tl: CL11"'.1c 1.o u m~jodly ue,~i~ion~ fbr ex:impk . .if for :1r Pde!
:t!imhc:· ofTIUJ::r:·EE!.S) 1hc:·<.: wc;re absh~!1tions nml n volt: wm: tied, or if. for n11 t'\'cn numhi;r ui'
'i'JH!STEI:S~ th~n.~ ,,·as ti tk vote.
When there is a ri:qt1l~s1 of u BL·mdfoiary in muUei·s Ll t:il ol leg~ los~t!~ l.o !hi: TR 1 !ST b~!e:i.JSC ,, f"
:hllld. conversion rlf TRl !ST prop:.:rty 10 persona! use, gm.~:::: :1egluel uf duty .. or hrettch of TRUST or
ac:.lions which are iltimicnJ lo 1hc TRUST.
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"30: ... :n1~: 'i"'f u~1:.·,~:,;·;:cni:1r• ji-ic>"u"fo" fin,;e l,eci~ cfaing-t:a··a, tfa; ··HCV\'RD lll•"'f'Jtl"!S'J'Jrns~ •in ord~.r tr hr ..
c:l1wi:ncr:t with f.ht: TH UST.. pagLi 5~ p:mJpraph J9 dutit:s nflht: TR USTEES ,vbic;h i., fhL· su!·'.hx:t or I h::
I

1

1

Jli.i:·i1g:--a;1~ nr,d "'lliCh b a!:m t:on:ii~t.ent with prnvi!-don.~ of the: TRUST. wJu~~rL'in the ·i~R1 lSTEES tl::.:~::

rt:piilt:t:m:.mt.~ m,d
b~.

~t::w:1rd~ 1JJc;Jl.!'ffoimfos

nor Arbjtratcm" are 1101 to determine.:

\4'")W

tht TH1 lS'J'[:ES ,:vi.Ii

Thtm~fo re, the Bonf'd of Arbitration conchules thnt:

31.

That Board of A rbitra:Litm _has jurisdiction to adjudicate this matt.1.1r.

:c. That at this point in time there has been 110 conversion of pro_pcrty il1im icru to the.: ']1{UST by ai1y ·
c'.i'Lh1: parties and tht.!r!! has been no evidence in supper( of fraud allegations against Penn Smith.
33.
The Board of Arbitration finds that Penn Smith and the other TRUSTEES have mistakenly gone
outside of the TRUST provis1ons by attempting to deal with eminent domain matters that affect
Stcwards/Beneficfarjes property i.11.hedtance agreements and cho.tging for the ti.me spent doing so. whkh
was grossly negligent and an inimicaJ breach of TRUST.

34.
As to the TRUSTEES having elected themselves Assjstant Manager.:; a11d appointing .a Manager
Secretary~ the Board of Arbitration finds a gross neglect of duty m· breach of TRUST on the part of the
TRUSTEES. Besjdes the specific TRUST prohibition of the same on page 5, paragraph 19 th3t says:
'\ .. The TRUSTEES may elect one of their number or another du]y guulificd pci·son as Mimagl.!1\ who win
conserve and oversee properties ofthe. JRUST, that are not in STEWARDSHIPS, and receive reasonable
compensation for such stjrvice as determined by fue Board of Trustees.'\ electing iliernselves As~istant
Managers and appointing a Jvfanager Secretary places morn:.ta!T claim on the Steward:s'Bencficiuries tbat
is bi11densome and inimicn1 to the JRUST.
35.
That TRUSTEES have so.le authority to act on hehalf-ofTRUST which cannot be. contw11ed by
Stewards/Beneficiaries unJess there is evidence of wrong doing that is inimical to the TRlJST.
36.
That Penn Smith did not elect himself as TRUST Manager but rather said appointment ·was done
by majority vott! of the TRUSTEES: bo,7\rever, the hourly rate voted upon was excessive and di<l not tal\c
into cm1sideration standard fee.s for 1be same type of service.

iii

<ii)

~

~

37.
Thu1 nn imputed hot1rly rate of $19.00 p::r hour fa reas'1nablc for part time pmperly management
tkttics in th~ St. George, Utah ar~a.
38.
That r<lutiug of the rottd further to thc. 110:th rnth~r than ilie originully proposed south r.iYcr
rm.'-andcr hind rouk would atfoc1 ,:vatcr rights from n spring, i.h~ fltrming opewticm, a p~1i-miblc.; ch~m1!.L' nf
:-:n:~:nbdl ta:: 8la1m: du!.! 1ci pt1~~iblc zoning changes that ,i.·::n11d nfft:cf. th~ tlb.ility orsrnm:
~,t~\,·;wd.=i/B..:ncfa·.iurit.$ wl'w h~1v<.: entl!rcd in1l' m1 in.l1L·rituncL·- ugrl~em~~,t tn continue in the.fr skh·;ml:.;hip
tlj.'l'!":1fiJn as prescnt:y cnn.c.:(il.uh:d.
·;{;.
Tli~11 tile: l)!"!f~irndly p.,·opMed snnth rh·t;r m~am.ler Jm1,! ro~ik. i r,·t..~!) sJ}f!ht"ly r\.~nrnkd n:;:l:- l he c:·1~:1
t·::ri. woukl ~lkm ftw pr:,pns!.'d L',c.nmnercinl ckvdopment whik 110; a,:h·ur!.;dy affr:cti:-1~: t.l1L'.
~:.:•words.'[kn~·fid:1rics whr h:!\'l' entl'rctl 11110 inhc,ritance ngrc:!mc11Ls. By lwnorinr tht' riglir.s. as
!::~1:1d:.J1cd by thi.: TRl:ST. c1.f ~wid SleWtll'Js-'Bc11c.~ficiarh!~ !.l1u:·c ·would Jike1y bt· 110 f'ulure ki1 :d dabn 1h:.11
wt,~lc! prevuil from ntlicr Slewmcls 1Bi..:nc:!iciaries ag;ainst" the 'fRlJSTEES.

001682

' '•·.
. ..
: : ..
... ' .. .:
;,

-

..

. .

............

. ·-· -····· .. ·-•-· ·- ... ..... - . ·-- ········- ··-..··-·-······--- .... -. -·· ..................... .
..1r1.
TJmi 1bc: TRU~Tl~ES ~n·f• tr, hL~ n:.imlmrscd for out or po.;b! cxpml:-:1~;;;. Le ...
~~=P~l1d..!d out of p0cb:.L
.

.. ·-·

••·•··

............................. .

l

~

i.du:.:d cwTi:11ry

tiJ.
Thal TRUSTEES h:J\'~' mistakenly intc1prctud provisions oftht~ 'J"'RUST li_y ull<. wint ~miHL!~·Jt
t.bn11dn matters to he cm,ch1ctcd by tht TRUST Manager t.o tl1t· extent tha1 S1.c,,..1ai·ds/ffo1w£icimfos
rr~,p~i'Lics are affected.
·
1

42.
That TRUSTEES huvl! kept currl.!:nt intclligibJe minutes of their mct!tings, subsequent w the death
nf01.c TRUSTEE and write!' of1hc TR.l.JST, and have kept said nllilule:s 1:1vailabJc for inspection by
St.t·wards/Bcncficiuries arid 1hat TRUSTEES are not negHgcnt for not being ah1E- to obtain records lost a(

the d~nth of the TRUSTEE and

\1'1riter

of the TRUST.

43.

Tbn1 a 'JRUST Manager election ·was within the provisions of the TRUST.

44.

That Stewards/Bene:ficiaries do n.ot control the TRUSTEES.

45.

That a TRUST manager does not coutrol TRUSTEES.

46.
That the TRUST wording in paragraph 17 on page 5 should 1101' have be,~n changed from ibc
"Board of Ma11agors" to the 4'Bt1ard of A.rbi1ratol's't', but rather should have been changed 10 the ''Boa.rd of

TRUSTEES

1
' •

47.
When TRUSTEES appointed themscJvcs as Assistant Managers and another persoJ1 a~ Secretary
1\fanager ii wns gross negJect and a breacl1 of TRUST and wa~ inimical to said TRUST.
48.
That the TRUSTEES cannot be members of the Board ofMnnugcrs nor was it TRUSTEES int~ut
to eliminate the Swwards/Bencficiaries Board of Managers; n~r did TRUSTEES intend to set thcmsc]ves
up as Stewards/Bent!ficiades but confusion resulted from Steward.s/Bene:ficfaries mistakc!Jly interpreting
the words of tbc TRUST Manager letter as said letter related to the TROST wording.
4 9.

TI1at the TRUST wording in paragrapl1 17 on page 5 should not l1a"e been changed from the
"Board of Managers" to the "Boord of Arbitrators'>, but rather sl10u)d have been changed to the -'Board of
TRUSTEES'' in order lo be consistent with the meaning of duties of the TRUSTEES which is tl1e sul~icct
of the paragroph and which 'is also consistent v,•ith provisions of the TRUST' v,.1hcrdn the
Stcwords/Bene:fichu-ic~; nor a 'Board of A.rbitrators arc not to determine ,vl10 the TRUSTEES will be.
Moreover, if the wording were chtmgcd to "Board of Arbiirntors" a unanimous approval by said Board of
Aibi1ralors ,-,..,c,uld be required to reinstate; tbc TRUSTEES wh.icl1 ii;; 1101 cm1sistent ,\>ith TRUST pnwisfonr.
n:~ page St paragrnp11 20 that ·'Tltt!:ir mr,jority vote will rufo and resolve all dispt11C!s."

50.
Thar ~iaid wordin~ s.hc,ultJ nnf· have lwcn chanr.ed to Board of Arbiu·n1ors is furtfo.~r cl:1rifo:.d by thL'
f(1!i.,win~:: ]fthl' Bt>ard ~fTRUSTEES did not unauimcrnRJy J'dnsl.at.c 1be11istdvt\t: rrnL~r ten yt!:-trs and a
1b:!l'ci r.f .A thit:-lli or~ diu H01 rcnch a ummiuwus decision 'lei so r0iust~11e. then the TJ-u.. :sTJJ~S wn1 d rl liH·r;
\\•k 1:, rt;r,lacc: tt TRUST.EE, whid1 tJ1c TRUSTEES could Jm\::.• aone j11iliHl1y~ rnakiu~ t!1t: t:(1;~wning_ nJ' u
1bnrd of Arbilraltm, m~1ut.
lJ :1 Bunni rd' /\rbilrntt>r:.~ \.Vt·n· 1t.l un:mimnusly C\'~rrult: 1l1e TR1.:STI.m~ · 1mdnd1y vnt<: 1c 1 1101
r..·;ns:111: nil nf the TRl '8TEY.:$ the: Hnmd of Arbjtmlc.u·g w0uld bt.: mcdtHiri[. in nn a~e,: not p~·<widt!d fai hy

THlJST. lf j{ WLJ~ the- inle111 of 1hc.: 'J'RU8TOR n.lkrw thc;Jb:!rd 0Ll\r~,ilr:rtc1.rs to c:-m;o;c· Z:i ·r;~ t 1STEE Lt,
lk renrnved without caw:;c:- that intent ,v011ld lluvc been clearly ~t:1kd jn TRUST provisions.
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!)U!'~Mm: lo ·;·.Rus·r pn2.e. 5. pm-ug.rapb 19 a Board or 1-.. ~·hitratio11 i:: to udj~.1dk:t1h: t!ll' m1aniJ11c11 I!-:
v:,lt' of L'.1c.. TJUJST.EES tCl rcawvc. a T.Rl.lST.EE for cxlrenw cr.m~;c,
I

.52.
AJso. pur3uant lo TRUST pag~.. 5. paragruph 20~ £1 Board of Arhjtr:iticm i~ 10 makl! n (:n:.1J
d~Lc:-mi!latiOJJ '"-'J1en the TRUS'I1~E~ are :.mnbJc to come to a majority de~-ision.
53.
That 11UJSTEES did ignore suggestium: from Slewards/Bcnuficfades bu! tJ1at confusion and
misundcrstundh-1g of both parties resulted from the Steward.s/Bcneifojru:fos not l1Uving u clear
understanding oftbe words oftht: TRUST and words ofletters from the Executive TR.US'11~E thereby
en.using a breakdown of understanding and a non-reply to written Jetters from TRUSTEES.
Likewise, TRUSTEES gave rise 1o the mistmderstanding by TRUSTEES ]1mrjng misunderstood
the words of the 11<.UST evidenced by a n011-intentionaJ mi.staJ,en change of TRUST verbiage of "Board
of Managers" to ''Board of Arbitrators".

54.

That the TRUST Manager canno1 control property of Stewards/Beneficiaries but can onJy control

nnd oversee onJy property ,,·i1h is not under control of Stewards/Beneficiaries and may receive limited
power to make necessaJ)' day to day dispersements in the due course of business suqject to tl1c rcviev. 1 and
app1·0,1al of TRUSTEES.

55.
That routing of the City of~Tasbington road right of way further to the north rather than t11e
orjginal1y proposed south river meander ]and route would result in the loss of an irrigation pond. ,1i atcr
rights from a sprb1g~ the forming operatic~ the loss of Greenbelt tax status, and an in.crease of taxes on
land that would have remained in a Greenbelt status which would then ,give ds~ to zoning changes further
affoct the ability of Stewards/Beneficiaries continue i.n tlu:ir stewardships ,:vhile simuhaneousJy placing
the TRUST properties in debt which could result in the loss of TRUST p:·op~rtit·!-:.
1

That it is was gross negligence for the TRUSTEES to vote themselves as Assistant Manager,
Secretary/Treasurer, and Assistant s~crd:ary /Treasurer thereby forming a Board of Managers. Said ~c;ti<.m

56.

was a clear violation oftbe bask intent of the TRUST. The TRUST states on page 5 Paragraph 24 that
TRUSTEES may be removed for neglect of duty or breach of 1RUST. When TRUSTEES appointed
themselves as Assistant Manager, Secretary/Treasm·er. and Assistant Secretary /Treasurer is was a clear
violation of TRUST page 5~ pnragraph 19 that says ,.:Tbe TRUSTEES may elect one of their number or
another du]y qualified person as Mallager, who '"'ill conserve and oversee properties of the TRUST=- that
nn. not in STEWARDSHIPS~ nnd receive reasonable compcnsatio11 for snc11 service as dt:termincd by the
Bl,a?'d of TRLiSTE.ES.
That it is not tlH.' 1.i.mc.tion of the TRUST Jvfanag,cr to 1mr,Nic.11e pro_µc11y eminent domain matters
lha1 would affoct the !lbility of Stewards/Beneficiaries continuing in th~b- stcw~-irdship agrce1m.~ni!~ nnd t-h;.1!
t im<.: clrnrgcd f'o the TRUST for said ncgotiaticms is not authoriz..~d hy pro\·i~i om:: of the TRVST,
1i.)!Wjths!1mclh1g~ thL· 'J'RVS~~~~F.~ a!·c to he.rcimhursr.~c.l for ont ofpoekl!1 l~x1x~n:,t.·~:- i.e.: ac.tuul cnrrenc.r
L~.,~p.:nd ..d.
57.

5f-;.
·~h~;l the rin1L' J1cnn Smitl. !;pen! tbuling with e.n::in~-n'. domain rna:l~t~ ~bat ·c-:·;1u(n! {lw r\>:1d
1.!,ro11gl: ~rope~tic.:s of'S;,ewarc:s.rJendiciarie~: whD havi.· enl1.~?·1·d intn propcr~y ~tc.:wan.isJ1ip~ ,·111:c.·c~nh.'JJ!1'
' ..rR t !~
.· ;,..1 or SteWi.ll'i.
·
1:-;•1k11L·
,,
j- · ·
·r·}""' .. ,,.,.
• •
l'.:lJlr:t'l Ix~ c~har.~•.ed to t11e
l{'IUrtt.::-:. rurnuant l(l
\,l .......
JJ?'C)\'i!{I('~ :~.
1

I

5lJ.
That u1 thi!-: pt,inl jn tin-IL' t1JLTt' h:!s been nc, conversirn1 Clf pr~,pl~r!y inimk~t!
o: tlw pm1il.!s.

l(\

the '!'Rl.'ST hy :i:~y

I

L

.. (t(h •-• . •NTirnt nn1.with:;trn1dlng. wha1.nHmy.pc.~rce;vt to ht:.ttn PVCJ'buaring_and ofTiciom: manrn.!r that w(1uld
SL~l!rn 1n !;uppor: ,1lkl',Ll tfoIH tliat Penri Smith is altempling to dt:fraud the S(C\,\',U..ds 'B~iii."~ffcTa-ricS:·un~·
Board of Arbi1rmfo1~ finds tha! Perm .Smith was actinf! (.'lil the advfot.! of u rctirc:d atl!micy :md bnd ::: forn:n:
intent. ulheil misr.~1i ded. 1.C'l foirJy curry out Wi duties as TRllS'I:EE an<l tJJso TR CST Mrnrngur. and
ther~forc~ absent any evkle11cL· in support of fraud a1J~go1iour~ a3uins1 Penn Smilh ,ve. cont:.1u:k· thcr<.! i~ r,r1
fniud.
0

MOO

••••••

That the TRUSTEES 1 \1..1or1:ing ,vith the StcwardslBcncficiarit~.Ci who lunrc c:nt:::ted into property
stm:\'ardship agrec;mcnts, LUJd not the TRUST 1,1anngcr shall reevaluate th1.:. plriccmcn1 ofthc Cily of
Vlashington road., keeping in mind that the intent of the TRUST Creator ,:i..,as to try secure to
Stewarcls/Bent:fi~iarics v.rho have: entered into property stm"·ardship., rights that would he :;ect!T'ccl by
t:,llodia1 freehold stu1.us .. and to preclude. the TRUST from being encumbered by debi including excessive
·rR.t;ST Managir foes and an increased tax burd~u which would rcsu]t from the-. loss of Gr~cnb1:;lt tax
status. Absent the parties working to resolve the differences, the Board of Arbitration, upon petition by
any of the affect parties, wi11 as soon as is possible give a written decision as io the road placement
61.

62.
That the aUegation that TRUSTEES having igoorod Bll)' and a1l counsel or suggestions from
Stewards/Beneficiaries resulted from the Stewards/Bencficiarjes not replying to written letters from
TRUSTEES and is the rcsu11 of misunderstanding on 1.he patt of both the Stowards/Beneficiru·jes and the
TRUSTEES stemming in part from the change of TRUST vcrpfage of'·:Board of Managers,, to nBoard of
A..l'bitrators'\
_,./
·/'
I

Dated l 2 September 2006

/'
I

,· ~it' ..•
L..,•• •' I
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ADDENDUM9
®

®

Smith v. Cram, et al
Appellate Case No. 20150637,.CA

FINDINGS OF FACTS AND CONCLUSION OF LA\\' OF THE BOARD OF
ARBITRATION FOR THE TERRESTRIAL KINGDOM OF GOD TRl"ST

On February 13. 2007 at 8: 15 p.m. the Board of Arbitration, (herein after referred lo as the
Board). for the Terrestrial Kingdom of God trust. (herein after referred to as the Trust), met at the
City of St. George, Vtah, Recreation Division Building at 285 S. 400 E. for the purpose of
adjudication of allegations brought by the Beneficiaries of said Trust against the Trustees and the
Manager of said Trust. The Board members all concurred that in all matters not before the
Washington County, Utah 5 th District Court the Trustees acted in the Trust's best interest.
Arbitration Board members present were Michael Barker, Lee Cox, Daniel McArthur, Sam
Miles, and Ryan Rarick. Trustees present were Val Cram and Penn Smith. No others were
present.

FINDINGS
The Board members viewed allegations in letters from the Trust Beneficiaries.

-~

The Board finds the Trust minutes have been as accurate as the situation allowed, with the
exception of the minutes that were lost when a trustee died, which was an extenuating
circumstance beyond the control of the Trustees.
The Board finds that exhibit A contained no valid allegations, therefore the Board finds the
Trustees acted within the provisions of the Trust.

The Board finds that exhibit B contained no valid allegations; therefore, the Board finds the
Trustees acted within the provisions of the Trust
Exhibit C alleges that any claim for compensation other than out of pocket expenses should be
denied. The Board finds that out of pocket expenses of Trustees should be paid. As far as facts
in controversy between Trustees and Trust Beneficiaries relative to the Trust Manager's
compensation; the Board finds the matter is being adjudicated by both parties in the Washington
County, Utah 5th District Court and therefore leaves judgment to that court.
Exhibit D alleges the Trustees have forced the Beneficiaries to pay tithes. The Board fmds this
allegation to be invalid due to the fact the dollar amount is an assessment for the out of pocket
expenses which is allowed in paragraph 7 of the Trust docwnent.
Exhibit D alleges the specific request of time spent as a Trustee as opposed to the time spent as a
Manager is not cJear. Since facts in controversl relative to that matter are being adjudicated by
both parties.in the Washington County, Utah 5 District court the Board finds that judgment
should be left to that court.

The Board finds the Trustees are not encroaching on ~he stewardship property of the
Beneficiaries relative to the placement of the road. The Board finds that the city is making the
dctennination of which properties will be condemned and that the Trustees are attempting to
mitigate any adverse effect the placement of the road would have to the Beneficiaries; properties
by offering consideration to Beneficiaries in the form of money or additional land.
The Board recommends that the Trustees send a letter to each steward Beneficiary olTcring a

paymcnl schedule to pay the $3,032 to cover the default contracts.

001773

The Board strongly encourngcs the Beneficiaries take possession of their stewardships and pay
all back out of pocket expenses the Trustl.!es have lent the tlust so as to preclude the loss of
inheri lance.
CONCLt..;SIONS

Therefore, based upon the aforementioned Findings, the Board Concludes that the Trustees ha\'e
acted in the best interest of the Trust and that those matters dealing with facts in controversy
between the Trustees, the Trust Manager, and the Trust Beneficiaries are being adjudicated by all
parties in the Washington County, Utah 5th District Court and final judgment of that controversy
should be left to that court.
Additionally, the Board recommends that the Trustees send a letter to each steward Beneficiary
offering a payment schedule to pay the $3,032 to cover Trustees' out of pocket expenses and any
other legal Trust expenses.
Further, the Board strongly encourages the Beneficiaries take possession of their stewardships
and pay all back expenses the Trustees have lent the trust and any other legaJ Trust expenses so
as to preclude the loss of inheritance.
The Board adjourned at 9:50 pm on February 13, 2007
.

Dated March, 2007

.·
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Dated March, 2007

Dated March, 2007

Ql-0 JD, iv, ';;(tic

Dairiel McArthur, Board member

l

Dated March, 2007

Dat~d March, 2007

Ry Rarick. Board member
21 l W. 100S. Washington, UT 84780
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ADDENDUM JO
Smith v. Cram, et al
Appellate Case No. 20150637-CA

..

-1IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
)
)
)
}
)

PENN SMITH, et al,
Plaintiff,

) Case No. 060501773 MS

vs.

VALDEN CRAM, et al,

________________
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)

Hearing
Electronically Recorded on
November 26, 2013
BEFORE: THE HONORABLE JAMES L. SHUMATE
Fifth District Court Judge
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Nicholas I. Chamberlain
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i301

St. George, UT 84770
Telephone: (435) 673-8858
For the Intervenor:

Christopher A. Lund
William F. Rummler
PO Box 2318

St. George, UT 84771
Telephone:

(435) 628-5405

Jeffrey N. Starkey
192 E. 200 N. 3~ Floor
St. George, Utah 84770
Telephone: (435) 674-0400
Transcribed by: Natalie Lake, CCT
152 E. Katresha St.
Grantsville, UT 84029
Telephone: (435) 590-5575
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P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded on November 26, 2013)

3

THE COURT:

Now let's get to the case that has everybody

4

in the courtroom and give it some time.

5

Cram and the companion, Washington City Terrestrial Kingdom

6

case, and we'll invite everyone up to Counsel table.

7

we have a number of Kirklands here as well.

8

Mr. Chamberlain, Mr. Smith and Mr. Cram still hav~ individual

9

capacities that they're appearing in, or are you representing

10

them on all capacities?

11

hats, can you, Counsel?

12

MR. CHAMBERLAIN:

We've got Smith vs.

We do.

I hope
All right.

I'm not sure you can wear all those

There.-- it's a complicated hat

13

wearing situation, and I -- I'll take what I can get today as

14

far who I'm appearing on behalf of.

15

THE COURT:

First off all, before we start in the pre-

16

trial conference, are there any pending motions that need to be

17

disposed of by the Court?

18

and your motions, Mr. Chamberlain?

19

MR. CHAMBERLAIN:

20

It was my understanding that we did,

We have a pending motion for summary

judgment.

21

THE COURT:

All right.

Counsel, let me hear you on

22

that motion.

23

awhile.

24

have something that we should probably handle sooner?

25

As you know, I have lived with this case for quite

Mr. Lund, what do you want to say about that?

MR. LUND:

Yes, your Honor.

Do you

We have a motion to strike

~-·

~i

,1

I
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that motion for summary judgment.

2

THE COURT:

Okay.

Then maybe we ought to deal with that

3

one first.

4

and Mr. Lund are here side by side, and Mr. Starkey, you're

5

coming into this case for which parties?

The other record I should make is Mr. Rummler,

6

MR.

7

THE COURT:

8

STARKEY:

Washington City.
F.or Washington City, and you' re here on the

condemnation case --

9

MR. STARKEY:

10

THE COURT:

Right.
-- that has been so long, and maybe I

to address that one first.

12

more in the condemnation case?

13

in these fights?

14

MR. LUND:

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. STARKEY:

20

Has Washington City got any dog

I'll let Washington City address that.
What do you think, Mr. Starkey?
I've got to be in front of the mic to

catch that.

18

19

ought

Counsel, do we need to do anything

11

17

you

THE COURT:
anyway.

I think we better have him close to one

Sorry, John.
MR. STARKEY:

I apologize, John.

From Washington City's

21

standpoint, your Honor, I think that the case was initiated, the

22

funds were deposited.

23

for the last five or six years.

24

I think we need to know who is going to be representing the

25

defendant or any claims for just compensation, for example.

The road had been built and had been used
So from the City's standpoint,

I

-4l

think really nothing went much further because the companion

2

lawsuit joined the condemnation lawsuit.

3

So the City is happy to wrap that up anytime, but I

4

think it

5

may make a difference in what that defense is depending on who's

6

the representing party.

7
8

9
10

based on the other lawsuit, my understanding is it

THE COURT:

The City might still find itself in

litigation over fair market value?
MR. STARKEY:
THE COURT:

That's my understanding, your Honor,
All right.

yes.

If that's a circumsta~ce, then I

11

don't see any reason to make you hang around for today's matters

12

in a companion lawsuit.

13

later, Mr. Starkey, and I'd just as soon let you go, unless

14

Washington City really wants to pay you for another hour or so.

15

MR. STARKEY:

You~ interests are going to be covered

No,

I would enjoy sitting and soaking it

16

all in, however, yeah, if that's the case -- the question may be,

17

your Honor, is that there's been -- the cases have been joined,

18

although it appeared that we still have -- we're running with two

19

case matters.

20

the initial case to continue to either have to send notices or

21

for that matter for the City to have to appear because a motion

22

is pending.

23

I just don't necessarily want all of Counsel in

THE COURT:

Counsel, I'm going to relieve you from any

24

responsibility -- both of you -- from copying Mr. Starkey on any_

25

of these matters until the case filed in 060501773 is finally

i

\

I
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disposed of, and then the City's interest can be later

2

adjudicated.

3

client the time of having to review what he gets.

4

point the City can come back into it.

That will save trees, save Mr. Starkey and his

5

MR. CHAMBERLAIN:

6

MR. STARKEY:

7

THE COURT:

Then at that

Make sense to everyone?

Yes, your Honor.

Thanks, you guys.
Thank you, Mr. Starkey.

We'll let you go.

B

Gentlemen, let's go back to your motion to strike,

9

let's hear you on that motion.

Mr. Lund,

Why shouldn't the Court consider

10

a summary judgment at this date knowing of course that I've

11

already looked at it once?

12

MR. LUND:

That is the argument, your Honor, is that a

13

few months before the second motion for summary judgment was

14

filed there was a first one in which the Court made an order

15

ruled that there are genuine issues of material fact as to

16

whether or not the trustees have breached their duties.

17

that, there is an order in place.

18

judgment on the same issue a few months afterwards, it's a law of

19

the case that there are genuine issues of material fact.

20

THE COURT:

So with

So having a motion for summary

Well, Counsel, this is an odd circumstance

21

to say the least, and that's why it takes my computer nearly 10

22

minutes to bring everything up --

23

MR. LUND:

24

THE COURT:

25

case.

Yes, it does.
-- over the many years that we have had this

Just for the record, we are now on page 55 of just the

-61

minute entries in the matter.

2

reasoning through this process.

3

Mr. Smith, and of the initial litigation is that those

4

individuals that I'll classify as the Kirkland parties have

5

never complied with the requirements of the· trust in becoming

6

signatories to the agreements that were extended under the terms

7

of the trust, and that the failure to do so is a threshold of any

8

rights in the trust, and would be a threshold to any -- in any

9

standing that the dispute that r~ve already ruled on saying that

I want to help

get your help in

The position of the plaintiff,

10

.there's justiciable issues that these potential beneficiaries

11

would have to make claims against the trustees.

12

Now if the summary judgment that is being urged upon

13

the Court revisits that issue after all the discovery, after

14

everything that's taken place, after we'va got a full record,

15

and indicates that I must follow the language of the trust as

16

Mr. Smith and Mr. Cram have urged upon me from the get go on

17

this -- and just for the fun of it, we'll go back to the first

18

minute entry in this case took place back in September of 2006

19

when it was filed.

20

Since 2006 if I -- now• that discovery has taken place,

21

if I adopt their interpretation of the trust and their operation

22

of law argument that these individuals -- the Kirkland parties

23

that we've referred to -- do not have standing because they did

24

not show any evidence of having signed the agreements mandated by

25

the trust, then at that point they don't have standing to contest

-7l

the activities of the trustees.

2

have a good law of the case argument because back when we heard

3

that a long time ago, all that was still up in the air.

4

think that I

5

be brought back?

6

I can see your point because you

Do you

am so bound by the law of the case that it can never

MR. LUND:

Your Honor, in their second motion for

7

summary judgment they make no argument that my clients do not

8

have standing to assert their -- these rights.

9

THE COURT:

Well, and standing would be an operation of

10

law issue at that point.

11

made, but the Court is bound to work under the laws as I know

12

them, and that might be an issue.

13

now.

I understand the argument hasn't been

That's why I put it out there

Let me bear you on it, Mr. Lund.

14

MR. LUND:

Well, as far as standing, the trust document

15

itself lists who the beneficiaries are,

16

names each one of my clients.

17

shows that as beneficiaries they have standing to contest the

18

activities of the trustees.

19

THE COURT:

Okay.

and by name lists and

So right there the trust document

Thank you, Mr. Lund.

Your argument

20

is well taken.

21

my mind, just because this is such an unusual setting, but you've

22

told me exactly why it is that you think we can't hear a summary

23

judgment.

24

Mr. Chamberlain to see what he has to say.

25

It's something that I'm still rolling around in

I ' l l take your motion under submission while I hear

MR. LUND:

All right.

May I add one more thing on

l
-8-

l

that --

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. LUND:

Certainly, Counsel.
their second summary judgment.

In support

4

of it, all they did is add two pieces of evidence from what was

5

filed a few months prior in their first motion.

6

argue that it's inadmissible hearsay.

7

not contest that it's inadmissible hearsay.

8

evidence, there's no reason to entertain the new motion.

9
10

THE COURT:

Okay,

In our motion we

1n their objection they do
Since there's no new

I've got you on it,

Mr. Chamberlain,

let's hear your side on your motion for summary judgment.

11

MR. CHAMBERLAIN:

Thank you, your Honor.

First of all,

12

the law of the case doctrine I think is what I'd like to address

13

first.

14

law of the case -- and as I've submitted in my reply memorandum

15

to the Court -- states that the law of the case only applies to

16

decisions that have actually been made within a case rather than

17

a Court deciding not to decide on a decision.

The case law, as I've read it, that has to do with the

18

For example, our summary judgment motion decided on one

19

issue -- or excuse me, there's been a summary judgment partially

20

on one issue, and that is whether or not the trust is valid, and

21

the Court decided that it was.

22

issues that the Court said, you know, "At this time we're not

23

going -- I see"

24

do i t incorrectly, but the Court essentially said that it saw

25

justiciable issues of fact in two remaining areas, and that would

However, there were two remaining

I'm paraphrasing you.

Please forgive me if I

~

-9-

1

be first whether or not the trustees have breached their

2

fiduciary duty, and second, wbether or not Mr. Smith is entitled

3

to any compensation, and if so, what that amount would be.

4

we have those two remaining issues.

5

judicially vacuum up the rest of the issues in the case, I made a

6

second motion for summary judgment, which Courts entertain all

7

the time.

8
1..$)

9

So

So to -- in an attempt_ to

Within that second motion I hava tried to bring more
evidence to the Court's attention regarding the fiduciary duties

10

of the trustees and whether or not they have breached those

11

duties.

12

arbitration that took place, and I think the Court might have

13

already seen that where the trustees were held within that

14

arbitration not to have been in breach of their duties.

15

The document that we brought forth was a former

In response, the intervenors stated that that document

16

itself was inadmissible hearsay.

17

that document in response we filed an affidavit of Mr. Ryan

18

Rerrick who was one of the trustees on that board stating that

19

it indeed was his board of arbitration that he presided over and

20

that he was there in order to be able to solve the hearsay issue.

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. CHAMBERLAIN:

So in order to authenticate

All right.
So we have an affidavit to

23

authenticate that.

24

doesn't apply in this situation because the Court simply decided

25

to leave some of the issues open rather than deciding on them.

So as far as the law of the case goes, it

-10-

1

If the Court had decided on those issues, then the law of the

2

case doctrine would apply, but the Court simply decided at that

3

time to allow them to go forward to trial.

4

So we're simply trying to achieve some judicial economy

5

by finishing up as much of this case as we can through summary

6

judgment so that if we have to go to trial over any issue at all~

7

which we argue in our summary judgment motion that we don't, but

8

if we have to go to trial, then those issues are honed and they

9

are cut down to absolutely what cannot be decided through a

10

summary judgment motion.

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. CHAMBERLAIN:

All right.
As far as the trust document itself,

13

one of the assertions that the intervenors have made is ·that

14

the trust document lists who the beneficiaries are, and this

15

goes to standing, the argument that you brought up previously,

16

your Honor, in that there's a possibility that the trustees

17

themselves -- or excuse me, the intervenors may not have standing

18

to bring these arguments at all now that the trust has been

19

declared valid.

,--

20

Our response to that is the trust actually doesn't

21

designate beneficiaries.

22

qualify as stewards, certain documents have to be signed before

23

they can even be listed as any sort of a beneficiary.

24

their names are listed in the trust, that doesn't mean for legal

25

purposes that they are beneficiaries because they have to --

It designates stewards.

In order to

While

·'
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THE COURT:

2

MR. CHAMBERLAIN:

3

THE COURT:

Counsel -Yes.

-- let me -- let me look at that.

I'm

4

trying to read the trust as a whole, as I'm required to do, but

5

it at least seems to me conceivable a reasonable look to read the

6

trust as a whole, to say that the naming of the individuals ·who

7

are now intervenors as stewards or naming them gives them

8

qualification to be potential stewards under the way that you

9

read the trust because the truster -- I prefer that over the

10

French (inaudible) trust, but I should like the French because

11

that's one language I do know a little bit about, but the trustor

1_2

designated this class of people named in the trust as those with

13

potential rights of signing stewardship agreements.

14

way that looking at the entire document the Court could reason it

15

out.

16

That's the

Is that what you're urging upon me?

MR. CHAMBERLAIN:

Yes, and I can see how that would be

17

a rebuttable presumption, and so we would choose to rebut that

18

presumption with this, and that is not only were their names

19

listed, but in order to be considered actual stewards under the

20

trust they had to sign lease and s~ewardahip agreements, which·

21

they have not done.

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. CHAMBERLAIN:

Uh-hub.

So since there is that presumption

24

because they are named in the trust, we would then say yes,

25

that's true, but Mr. Kirkland, the truster, added a requirement
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that not only are they to be named in the trust -- it's not

2

enough to be just named.

3

requirements which they have not done.

4

standing they have to do those requirements as he dictated.

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. CHAMBERLAIN:

They also have to fulfill certain
So in order to have

All right.
One more argument that I would make,

7

your Honor, is in my summary j u·dgment motion I simply am as king

8

both sides to lay down their cards.

9

thing I'll say today, at least in this portion of the

10

11

I think this is the last

proceedings.
We simply have said okay, if you think that the trustees

12

have breached their fiduciary duties, then show us evidence.

13

summary judgment motion simply said fine, give us what you have

14

on these three men.

15

can at least see what you have.

16

summary judgment motion with any sort of evidence, they moved to

17

strike it, to which they are within their rights to do.

18

that to me is telling because they -- instead of actually showing

19

us what they have, instead of laying their cards on the table,

20

they have decided still to keep them close to the breast and to

21

tell us we shouldn't even be playing this card game as it is.

22

we simply asked them to show what the trustees have done wrong,

23

and they have not done so.

24
25

THE COURT:

Our

Show us the wrong they have done so that we
Instead of responding to our

Thank you, Counsel.

However,

Mr. Lund, let me give

you a chance to respond to the motion for summary judgment,

So
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1

knowing that I'm still keeping the motion to strike under

2

advisement.

3

MR. LUND:

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. LUND:

May I respond to his arguments?
Absolutely, Counsel.
All right.

First of all, his arguments on

6

law of the case where he argues that in summary judgment purposes

7

the law of the case does not apply.

8

that directly contradicts that, which I mentioned in my reply

9

memo, first one AMC Salt Industry vs. Magnesium,

However, there is Utah law

942 P.2d 315.

10

The Court explicitly recognizes the that law of the case doctrine

11

applies to subsequent motions of summary judgment on a same issue

12

subject to exceptions, and there are several cases after that

13

that cite to these holdings for that same proposition.

14

that unless there -- you can show three things, the law of the

15

case doctrine applies.

16

They say

One is when there has been an intervening change of

17

controlling authority.

18

new evidence has become available.

19

present for their second motion for summary judgment has been

20

available for many, many years.

21

through discovery.

22

Court is convinced that its prior decision was clearly erroneous

23

and work a manifest in justice, there's -- he's -- they've made

24

no showing that your ruling that there are genuine issues of

25

material fact is erroneous or it would be injust -- unjust to

Nothing has happened in this case.

When

The evidence they attempt to

lt~s been passed back and forth

There's nothing new there.

Three,.when th~

-14-

1
2

hear it.

So clearly the law of the case doctrine does apply.
Furthermore, as far as laying cards down, I think it's

3

disingenuous to suggest that my clients have not made any

4

arguments to support their positions.

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. LUND:

First of all --

I ordered it for years, Counsel.
In their complaint they allege 11 causes of

7 - action having to do with breach of fiduciary duty.

In 2008

8

they filed a motion to remove the trustees and laid out several

9

reasons why and evidence for it, No. ~ being that one of the

10

trustees sued the trust, obtained a default judgment against the

11

trust without even telling the beneficiaries about the lawsuit.

12

That's per se breach of fiduciary duty.

13

that's just one of the -- one of the reasons that my clients have

14

been showing for years why there is a breach of fiduciary duty.

15

So to suggest that they've been waiting to -- for us to lay down

16

our cards is simply not true.

17

we've raised that.

18

n

It's been time and time again

We also provided evidence in the motion for summary

19

judgment, one, as to why

20

fiduciary duties.

21

are genuine issues of material fact.

22

I mean that's huge, and

THE COURT:

that the trustees breached their

Based on that, the Court ruled that there
That hasn't changed.

Counsel, how do you deal with

23

Mr. Chamberlain's argument that says that those issues have

24

been resolved by the results of the arbitration which would have

25

been hearsay save the declaration of the arbitrator?
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MR. LUND:

The declaration of the arbitrator only

2

shows that there was a~ alleged arbitration that took place.

3

It doesn't change the fact that it's hearsay.

4

someone come in and testify that they made a statement and that

5

verifies that someone made an out-of-court statement.

6

doesn't· change the fact that it's inadmissible hearsay.

7

THE COURT:

You could have

It still

Well, if the arbitrator comes in and says,

8

"I conducted an arbitration, and as a result of the arbitration

9

I ruled A, B,

c,

D and E," that's no longer hearsay.

That is

10

asserting the truth of what the arbitrator did because the

11

arbitrator is on the stand subject to cross examination.

12

that .what the affidavit that we have before the Court now

13

basically does, Counsel?

14

MR. LUND:

Isn't

It's stating that one took place, and yes.

15

However, in response to that I would argue there is also a 2006

16

arbitration in which the arbitrators found the opposite, found

17

that in multiple ways the trustees breached their fiduciary

18

duties.

19

So even if that evidence was before you, that arbitration 2007,

20

it doesn't change the fact that there are genuine issues of

21

material fact because two arbitrations found the exact opposite.

22

That has also been produced in discovery back and forth.

THE COURT:

All right.

Is the 2006 arbitration before

23

the Court with an affidavit or a declaration that's part of this

24

record that the Court can consider?

25

Counsel, I'm focusing on the requirements of Rule 7 to make sure

As you can probably tell,
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that the information is in the record.

2

MR. LUND:

ls it before the court?

It is not be£ore the Court at this time.

3

However, it is in the records of the trustees, so when they make

4

their notes of the trustees' meeting it is in the record there.

5

Also, for the motion to strike, that is not in the record.

6

have yet to respond to the motion for summary judgment.

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. LUND:

9

10

We

All right.
Then lastly as far as the standing issues

goes, there are some beneficiaries that have signed stewardships,
so --

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. LUND:

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. LUND:

~re they parties of the lawsuit?
Yes, they are.
Okay.
Furthermore, the truster, Steven Kirkland,

15

after the trust was created while he was still alive, he had the

16

ben -- some of the beneficiaries at meetings.

17

were part of a manager group.

18

recognized the beneficiaries to be legitimate under the trust.

19
20

THE COURT:

So the -- Steven Kirkland himself

Who signed the stewardship agreements,

Counsel?• Do we have those intervenor's name?

21
22

The beneficiaries

MR. LUND:

The names I do not know off the top of my

head.

0-

23

UNIDENTIFIED MALE:

Oh, yeah, we did -- I did.

24

UNIDENTIFIED MALE:

And I did.

25

THE COURT:

Okay.

You've got three people.
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MR. LUND:

2

UNIDENTIFIED .MALE:

3

correctly.

4

5

So we've got --

It's eight or nine.

THE COURT:
Okay.

I think there was nine, if I recall

Okay, eight or nine signed the agreements.

Anything else?

6

MR. LUND:

7

THE COURT:

No, your Honor.
Thank you, Counsel.

All right.

8

Mr. Chamberlain, with eight or nine signing the stewardship

9

agreements, does your motion have any wings?

10

MR. CHAMBERLAIN:

It does, because even if they do have

11

standing, even if the intervenors still have standing, they

12

haven't responded to the evidentiary issues that I have brought

13

up in my motion for summary judgment.

14

exists a 2006 arbitration that rules opposite to the arbitration

15

that we've already authenticated to the Court

16
17

18

THE COURT:

Simply saying that there

Doesn't it put it before the Court under

Rule 7.
MR. CHAMBERLAIN.:

And the same thing could be said for

19

any of the other documents that they've spoken of, which were

20

allegedly signed.

21

only argument here is that we've asked for them to bring facts to-

22

the Court; they haven't brought them here.

23

standing, which they allege and it hasn't been confirmed yet, we

24

haven't seen the facts.

25

THE COURT:

They haven't responded with any facts.

So our

Even if they have

There's nothing.

Counsel, let's step back from this careful
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examination of this particular bunch of trees in the forest and

2

look at everything.

3

does that resolve this litigation?

4

MR. CHAMBERLAIN:

5

THE COURT:

If I grant your motion for summary judgment,

As I see it, yes.

All right.

Then who is i t that represents

6

the interest of the trust in the Washington City condemnation?

7

Would that be the three trustees that you have now?

8

MR, CHAMBERLAIN:

9

THE COURT:

10
11

12
13

Okay.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN:

THE COURT:

Okay.

15

THE COURT:

Thank you.

anything else to do today?

MR. CHAMBERLAIN:

18

THE COURT:

21

All right.

Now that order being prepared, is there

17

20

So that's where we stand.

Your motion is granted, Counsel.
MR. CHAMBERLAIN:

19

Undex the terms of the trust, which

the Court has considered valid.

14

16

Yes.

Not that I could see,

Strike it from the trial calendar, circulate

the order and that will take care of it.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN:

Thank you4

(Hearing concluded)

.

(

REPORTER' .S CEM'IFICATE
ST~T'E ,eF

P~AH

J
) S:S ..

C0.11.NTY. o:ii' ·-rrooELE
I,

"J

.

.N;at.ali-e LaiCie-, a· Notary. Piu'b.li c in a:p.d
her-eby .c~-r.tif·y::.
.

Btat·e·, o.f Utah;,: cfo

fo7; the

.

1hat this· ~o.:c;;:eed.1:ng -w.a-s t.taq:scri:bed tinder :my
d.1-,re.cti~n frbl.U t'li$. tran·smitt·~r- reco.rds mad.e of thes.e
·me.etinw.s·.

That l have b'een authorized by Beve-rly Lowe to.
pr-epare ·said t~ans-~ipt. ; as an indepentj.en:t;: oontracto.r.
work.in_g un.der her- co~ r.epor-ter·1·s li.censei appropriately
a.ut:horiz·ed arider .Utah statutes-.
Tb.at. this trans·cript is fu_l~-1 t.:rlle·, co.rrect, and

.cont-ains all of the evidence and all matte:r.s to which the
-sanre· t/e1a·ted which we:r.e a-udi:ble· through :said re.cording.

... ·

~

~-

I furthe;r c.e.rti:fy ,that: I am not interes·ted in the
.outcome th.er-.eof.
That -pe-rtain -p,arties ·were 11:at i.cienti.f-i,e.d- in th~
r:ecord.-, antj th:~:t:e·t~-re., the.- name a.ssoc.i'ated :With the
sta:tement may not b.e ~e co:rr~~t. name -c;s to the speaker..

·2·01t .•

WITNESS ~X £AMP AND S~~ t)lis_ ~ da_y o.f Mar-oh

MY comtni.ss.iq~ ~~ires:
.January 9 7 2·.016

•:

..

Natali;e Lake·
.NOT.ll..RY PUBLIC
Ms:idfng in· Tooel-e County

~.
-,-·-:·.-·~
·
. -/.

"'-.

·· .. ·.
.

,.

:

'

aeiier-ly t=cwe,

·,•·

:

•,

RSR.,

CCR

Keyword Index
0
060501773 [1]4:25 .

1
1 [1] 14:9
10 [1] 5:21
11 [1] 14:6

2
2006 [5] 6:18,20 15:15,22
17:14
2007 [1] 15:19
2008 [1] 14:7
2014 [1] 19:21
2016 [1] 19:23

3
315 [1113:9
31st 11119:21

5
55 11] 5:25

7
7 [2] 15:25 17:17

9
9 [1J19:23
942 [1] 13:9

A

ago l1l7:3
agreements

6:6,2411:
13,2016:1917:4,9
air r117:3
alive r1116:15
allege 12114:6 17:23
alleged r1115:2
allegedly r1111:20
allow r1110:3
already [4J 5:11 6:9 9:13
17!15
although r114:18
amc 11113:9
amount c11 9:3
another 1114:14
anytime r114:3
anyway c11 3: 19
apologize (113:20
appear r114:21
appeared [1J 4:18
applies [318:1513:11,15
apply t419:24 10:2 13:7 14:
1
appropriately r1119:11
arbitration (1219:12,14,19
14:24 15:2,8,8, 16, 19,22 17:
14,14
arbitrations r1115:21
arbitrator rs114:2515:1,7,
10,11
arbitrators r1115:16
areas 1118:25
argue £31S:610:715:15
argues [1J 13:6
argument 11015:126:22 7:
[7]

authenticate c219;16 123
authenticated [1117:15
authority c1J 13:17
authorized c2119:9, 11
available c2113:18,20

B
back [915~4,8 6:17,18 7:2,
5 13:20 15:18 17:25

based r214:414:20
bas,caJly c1115:13
become c1113:18
becoming c11 6:5
ben r1116:16
beneficiarjes 11116:10 7:

causes [1114:6
ccr r1119:27
certain [3J 10:2212:219:
18

certainly [118:2
certificate 11119:1
certify r2119:6,16
chamberlain [19J 5:5 7:
24 8:9,11 9:2210:1211:2,
16.2312:617:8,10,1818:4,
8,10,14,17,20
chamberlain's 11114:23
chance 11112:25
change 14113:1615:3,6,

20
15,1710:14,21,2514:1116: changed 111 14:21
9,16,16,18
·
choose 111 11 :17

beneficiary 11110:23
better r113:18
beverly r2119:9,27
bit£1J 11:11
board l2J9:18,19
both r214:24 12:8
bound £217:4, 11
breach 1419:14 14:7, 12, 14
breached !Bl 5:16 9:1,10
12:1214:1915:17
breast r1112:20
bring [415:22 9:8 10:1817:
21

circulate r1118:18
circumstance r214~10 s:
20

cite r1J 13:13
city 11013:6,7,12,14 4:3,7,
14,21 5:4 18:~

city's [3J 3:20,23 5:1
claims 1213:25 6:11
class 11111 :12
classify 1116:4
clearly c2113:22 14:1
client 111 5:3
clients £417:7, 1614:3, 13

brought I5J 7:5 9:1110:15 close 1213:1812:20
17:12,22
absolutely 12110:913:4
come [2] 5:4 15:4
built
111 3:22
achieve 11110:4
comes c1115:7
bunch 11118:1
action 11114:7
coming 1113:5
activities 121 7: 1, 18
commission 11119:22
C
actual r1111:19
2,7,10,1910:1512:614:23
companion 1214:1,12
calendar 11118:18
actually £318:1610:2012: 17:21
compensation c213:25 9:
cannot (1110:9
18
arguments [4110:18 13:3,
3
card 111 12:21
add I2l 7:25 8:4
514:4
complaint 11114:6
cards 14112:8, 19 14:2, 16
added 111 11 :25
around [214:11 1:20
complied 111 6:5
care [1118:19
address .£313:11,14 8:12
assert [11 7:8
computer 1115:21
careful r1117:25
adjudicated 111 5:2
asserting r1115:10
conceivable 11111 :5
case c2s1a:s,a,12,21 4:16,
adopt 1116:21
assertions r1110:13
concluded 11118:21
19,20,25 5:19,25 6:18 7:2,4
advisement 11113:2
associated 11119:19
condemnation [413:8,12
8:12,13,14,15,16 9:5,2310:
affidavit £419~17,22 15:12, attempt 1219:4 13:18
4:218:6
2,513:6,7,10,15,1714:1
23
attention r11 9:9
conducted r1115:8
cases l214:1713:12
afterwards r11 5: 1s
audible c1119:15
confirmed r1117:23
catch l1J 3: 17

ab le 111 9:20

www .pretext.com
Sheet 1

I

"

Keyword Index
even [7] 10:23 12:21 14:11
1,23
15:1917!10, 11,22
declared r1110:19
everyone
c11 5:4
default r1114:10
11
everything [3J 5:22 6:14
contains [1J 19:13
defendant 1113:25
18:2
contest 1316:25 7:17 8:7 defense 111 4:5
evidence 11216:24 8:4,8 9:
depending r114:5
continue r114:20
deposited [11 3:22
9 12:12,.16 13:18, 18 14:9,
contractor 11119:10
1815:19 19:14
contradicts r1113:8
designate c1110:21
evidentiary c1117:12
controlling r1113:17
designated c1111:12
convinced r1113:22
exact c1i 15:21
designates r1110:21
copying r114:24
dictated r11 12:4
exactly c117:22
correct 12119:13,20
difference r114:5
examination 12115:1118:
correctly t1117:3
direction r1119:7
1
counsel [1613:11 4:19,23 directly t1113:8
example r213:25 8:18
discovery l4J 6:13,20 13: exceptions r1113:12
5:20 8:211:112:2413:4
14:5,2215:13,25 16:20 17: 2115:18
excuse c218:19 10:17
7,2518:13
disingenuous r1114:3
exists t1117:14
county r2119:4,26
expires r1119:22
disposed 1115:1
course r115:10
dispute 111 6:9
explicitly r1113:10
court rss13:2,7, 1o, 15,184: doctrine [SJ 8:12 10:2 13: extended 111 6:6
consider r215:915:24
considered [2111:1918:

7, 10,23 5:7,9, 14,20,24 6:13

10,1514:1

7:9,11,19 8:2,9,15,17,21,22, document rs17:14,16 9:
24 9:12,21,24 10:1,2, 11 11: 11, 15, 17 10:12, 1411 :14
1,3,14,2212:5,2413:4,10, documents r2110:22 17:

F
fact rs15:15,19 8:25 13:25

forth rsJ 9:1113:20 15:18
forward 11110:3
found £3115:16,16,21
french r2111:10,10
front r11-a:1a
fulfill 111 12:2
full 1216:14 19:13
fun 1116:17
funds r11 3:22
further 1214:119:16
furthermore r2114:2 16:
14

G
game r1112:21
gentlemen (11 5:8
genuine (5) 5:15,1913:24
14:2115:20

gets r115:3
give r2112:13,24
gives 11111 :7
got [613:12,16 6:14 8:916:
2517:1

grant r1118:2
14:2115:3,6,20,21
granted t1118:13
facts
[31
17:20,21,24
2214:5,20,2215:7,12,22,
19
group
r1116:17
failure
t116:7
23,2416:1,2,7,11,13,19,25 dog 1113:12
guys
r115:6
fair
l114:8
17:4,7,15,16,16,22,2518:5, done l5J 11:2112:3,14,22,
far [517:14 9:23 10:12 14:2
9,11,12,15,1819:11
23
H
courts 1119:6
down [4110:9 12:8 14:2, 15 16:8
hand 11119:21
few rs15:13,18 8:5
court's 1119:9
duties [7] 5:16 9:9,11,14
hang [114:11
fiduciary [BJ 9:2,9 12:12
covered 1114:12
12:12 14:20 15:18
happened t1113:17
14:7, 12, 14,20 15:17
cram r116:16
duty l4J 9:214:7,12,14
happy r114:3
fights r113:13
created 111 16: 15
E
head
c11 16:22
filed 1e14:25 5:14 6:19 8:5
cross 11115:11
hear
rsJ
5:9 7:13,22,23 8:
each r117:16
9:1714:8
cut 11110:9
10 14:1
economy r1110:4
finally c114:25
D
heard
r117:2
find c114:7
eight ca117:3,4,8
hearing
r1118:21
date c115:10
either 1114:20
fine r1112:13
hearsay
[BJ 8:6,7 9:16,20
day [1119:21
finishing r1110:s ·
enjoy r114:15
enough 11] 12:2
deal r213:2 14:22
first (1113:3,11 5:14 6:17 a: 14:25 15:3,6,9
held c119:13
decide c118:17
entertain r21 8:8 9:6
5,11,13 9:113:5,914:4
help £216:1, 1
decided [7) 8:18,21 9:24 entire r1111 :14
five 111 3:23
hereby
c1119:6
10:1,2,9 12:20
entitled c119:2
focusing r1115:25
himself
r1116:17
deciding 1218:17 9:25
entries 11J 6:1
follow r116:15
holdings 11113:13
decision 121 S:1713:22
entry 1116:18
forest 11118:1'
honed [1110:8
decisions 1118:16
erroneous 12113:22,25· forgive r118:23
honor
11013:21 4:9,17 5:5,
declaration [3] 14:25 15: essentially c11 8:24
former 1119:11
12 7:6 8:1110:1612:7 17:

www.protext.com
Sheet 2

l

~

Keyword Index
6

17:13 18:2

naming 12111:6.7
natalie t2119:5,24
made 11015:14 7:11 B:16 9: nearly 111 5:21
5 10:1313:23 14:3 15:4,5
Justice 11113:23
necessarily 1114:19
19:8
justiciable 1216:1 o B:25
need r213:11,24
magnesium 11113:9
never 121 6:5 7:4
I
K
male [3116:23,2417:2
new f4J a:718 13:18,21
identified r1119:18
keep r11 12:20
manager r11 16:17
nine £4117:2,3A,8
inadmissible 141-8:6,7 9: keeping 11113:1
mandated 111 6:24
notary r21 19:5,25
1615:6
kirkland t5J 6:4,2211:25
manifest 11113:23
notes 11116:4
inaudible r1111 :10
many [31 5:24 13:20,20
16:14117
nothing 1414:113:17,21
incorrectly 111 8:24
knowing r21s:1013:1
march r1119:21
17:24
indeed 1119:19
market 1114:8
notices
1114:20
L
independent 11119:10
material 1515:15,19 13:25
laid r11 14:8
0
indicates 1116:15
14:2115:21
lake
r2119:5,~4
individuals [3J6!4J2211:
matter 1214:21 6:1
objection (1J 8:6
language 1216:1511:11
6
matters [414:11, 19,2519: obtained 11114:10
last r213:23 12:8
industry 11113:9
14
odd r115:20
lastly 11116:8
information 11116:1
okay 11013:2 7:19 B:912:
mean 12110:2414:12
later
r21
4:
13
5:
1
initial r214:20 6:3
meeting 11116:4
1116:13,25 17:4,518:9, 12
law 11715:18 6:22 7:2,4, 1o meetings 12116:16 19:B
initiated 1113:21
once 11J 5:11
8:12,13,14,15 9:2310:113: memo 111 13:9
injust 11113:25
one [1913:3,11,18 5:14 7:
6,7,7,1011414:1
instead J3J 12:15,18,19
memorandum r11 8: 14
16,25 8~18,20 9:1810:13
laws
r11
7:
11
interest 1215:118:6
men c1112:14
11 :11 12:6 13:9, 16 14:9, 13,
lawsuit t6J 4:2,2,4, 12 14: mentioned 11113:8
interested r1119:16
13~ 1915:14
1116:11
interests r114:12
mic l1J3:16
only C5J s:1511:1812:115:
lay 12112:814:15
interpretation r116:21
might (314:7 7:12 9:12
117:21
laying
12112:1914:2
intervening 11113:16
mind 1117:21
open 111 9:25
lease 11111:20
intervenors t5J 9:1510:
minute 1216:1,18
operation r216:21 7:9
least 1415:2111:512:9, 15 nJinutes r115:22
13,1711:717:11
opposite [3115:16,2117:
leave r11 9:25
intervenor's 11116:20
months £31 5:13, 18 8:5
14
legal 11110:24
isn't 11115:11
motion [3113:1 4~21 5:8,9, order [915:14,17 9:16,20
issue re15:18 6:13 7:10,12 legitimate r1116:18
13,17 7:6,23 8:5,5,8,10,18
10:21 11:1912:318:15, 19
license [11 19: 11
8:19,20-S:20 10:613:11
9:6,810:7,1012:7,13,16,25 ordered [1114:5
issues [1615:15,19 6:10 8: listed [3110:23,2411:19
13:1,1914:8,18 16:5,617: other l3J 3~3 4:4 17:19
22,25 9:4,5,2510:1,8 13:24 lists [3J 7:15, 15 10:14
9, 13 18:2, 13
ought 1213:2,10
litigation
[3J
4:8
6:318:3
14:21,2315:20 16:8 17:12
motions 11113:11
out [317:12 11 :1514:8
itself l4l 4:7 7:15 9:1610: little £1111:11
moved [1112:16
outcome c1119:16
long [213:10 7:3
12
much [214:110:5
out-of-court r1115:5
longer 11115:9
multiple r1115:17
over £514:8 5:24 9:1.910:6
J
look ca111 :3,5 18:2
must r116:15
11:9
January [1119:23
looked r11 5:11
N
john r213:19,20
looking 11111:14
joined r214!2,17
lowe r2119:9,27
name 1417:15 16:20 19:19, p.2d r1J 13:9
judgment 12713:1 5:10,13, lund £2413:4, 14 5:8, 12,237: 20
page r11 5:25
18 6:12 7:7,23 8:3,10,18,19 6, 13, 14, 19,25 8:312:24 13: named (4111:12,24 12:1,2 paraphrasing 1118:23
9:610:6,7,1012:7,13,16,25 3,5 14:615:1,1416:2,8,12, names [417:16 10:24 11:
part 12115:23 16:17
13:6111,1914:10,1916:6
14,21 17:1,6
18 16:21
partially r118:19
hour [114:14
however ts14:16 B:2112:
1713:715:1516:3
huge~1114:12

M

judicial 11110:4
judicially 1119:5

p

www.protext.com
Sheet 3

f

•

<

Keyword Index
rather £218:16 9:25
read 1418:13 11 :4,5,9
really [214:1,14
1119:18
reason [314:11 s:s 11:14
party r114:6
reasonable t1J 11 :5
passed r1113:20
reasoning [1J 6:2
pay [114:14
reasons r2114:9,13
pending l1J 4:22
rebut [1111 :17
people [2111:1216:25
rebuttable [1111:17
per t1114:12
recall 11117:2
pieces l1lS:4
place [7] 5:17 6:14, 18,20 9: recognized c1116:18
recognizes c1113:10
1215:2,14
record rs13:3 5:25 6:1415:
plaintiff c116:2
24 16:1,4,5 19:18
playing 11112:21
recording r1119:15
please c118:23
records t2116:3 19:8
point 141 5:4 6:25 7:1, 1o
referred t11 6:23
portion 11112:9
regarding r119:9
position r11 6:2
positions t11 14:4
related r1119:14
relieve 1114:23
possibility l1J 10:16
potential [316: 1o 11 :8, 13 remaining rs18:21,25 9:4
remove 11114:8
prefer r11 11 :9
reply r218:14 13:8
·prepare 111 19:9
prepared r1118:15
reporter's c2119:1, 11
representing c213:24 4:6
present r1113:19
presided [119:19
represents 11118:5
presumption [3111:17,
required 11111:4
requirement r1111 :25
18,23
requirements [4J 6:512:
previously 11110:15
prior 1218:5 13:22
3,415:25
probably c1115:24
rerrick r119:18
proceeding 11119:7
residing r1119:26
proceedings [1112:10
resolve 11118:3
process 111 6:2
resolved 111 14:24
produced 11115:18
respond ra112:25 13:3 16:
proposition 11113:13
6
provided [1114:18
responded r2111:12,20
responding 11112:15
public r2119:5,25
purposes 12110:2513:6 response [419:15,17 10:
put 1211:1211:16
2015:15
responsibility [114:24
Q
rest r119:5
qualifjcation r1111:a
result r1115:8
qualify 11110:22
results r1114:24
question r114:16
review 1115:3
revisits r116:13
R
rights £416:8 7:811:1312:
raised r1114:17
particular [1118:1
parties rs13:5 6:4,22 16:

17

simply teJ 9:2410:2,412:7,

road 1113:22
rolling [11 7:20
rsr r1119:27
rule 12115:25 17:17
ruled 1415:15 6:914:20 15:

11, 13,22 14:16 17:13

since 131 e:20 8:7 11 :23
sitting 1114:15
situation c119:24
six [1J 3:23
smith [316:3,16 9:2
9
rules [1117:14
soaking [114:15
solve c119!20
ruling 11J 13:24
someone [2115:4,5
rummier t113:3
running [114:18
soon [114:13
ryan [119:17
sorry [113:19
sort t2110:2312:16
speaker 11119:20
salt 111 13:9
spoken [1117:19
same I5J 5:1813:11,13 17: stand l2l 15:11 1s:12
18 19:14
standing [1416:9,23,25 7:
save [31 5:2,2 14:25
8,9.14, 17 10:15, 17 12:4 16:
saw c118:24
8 17: 11,11,23
saying r216:9 17:13
standpoint r213:21,23
says t2J 14:23 15:7
starkey [1313:4,6,9,15,16,
se r1114:12
20 4:9,13,15,24 5:2,6,7
seal r11 19:21
state r2119:2,5
second [7] 5:13 7:6 8:3 9: stated 1119:15
2,6,813:19
statement rs115:4,5 19:
see 1s14:11 7:1,24 8:2311: 19
_1612:1518:4,17
states r11 B:15
seems r11 11 :5
stating r21s:1s 15:14
seen r219:13 17:24
statutes r1119:12
send 1114:20
step 11117:25
sense [11 5:4
steven 12116:14,17
september 1116:18
stewards t5J 10:21~2211:
setting [117:21
7,8,19
several [2113:1214:8
stewardship £4111:13,20
shouldn't r215:912:21
16:1917:8
show l5J 6:24 12:12, 14,22 stewardships r1116:9
13:14
still r014:7, 18 7:3,20 12:20
showing [3J 12:1813:24
13:115:516:1517:11
14:14
strike 1s15:812:1713:1
shows r217:17 15:2
16:5 18:18
side [313:4,4 B:10
subject r2113:1215:11
sides r1112:a
submission [117:23
sign r11 11 :20
submitted r11 8:14
signatories r116:6
subsequent 11113:11
signed ra16:24 10:2216:9, sued c1114:10
1917:4,20
suggest 12114:3,15
signing 12111:1317:8
summary £26] 3:1 5:10, 13,

www.pretext.com

Sheet4

s

I

t·~.-.'

Keyword Index
17 6:12 7:7,22 8:3.10118,19 two (614:18 8:4,21,25 9:4
y
9:610:Sl,1012:7113, 16,25 15:21
years l513:23 5:2413:20
13:6,11,1914:18 16:6 17:
14:5,14
1318:2
under [1216:6 7:11,2311:8,
support l2J B:3 14:4
1913:116:18 17:1618:10
T
19:7,10,11
table t1112:19
understand t117:10
terms r216:618:10
understanding r214:4,9
testify r11 15:4
unidentified 13116:23,24
thanks 1115:6
17:2
themselves t1J 10:17
unjust r1113:25
therefore r1119:19
unless r214:1313:14
thereof 11119:17
until 1114:25
there's re14:17 6:10 B:7,81 unusual r117:21
1910:1613:21,23 17:24
up m4:3 5:22 7:3 9:5 10:s,
they've [3) 13:23 14:1517: 1517:13
19
urged r216:12,16
three rs112:14 13:14,2116: urging r1111:15
2518:7
utah t4J 13:719:2,6,11
threshold r216:7,8
V
today r2112:918:16
vacuum 111 9:5
today's r114: 11
valid 1318:2010:1918:11
toqele [2119:4,26
value
1114:8
took [416:18 9:12 15:2,14
verifies t1J 15:5
top 11) 16:21
vs 11) 13:9
transcribed r1119:7
transcript r2119:10,13
transmitter r1119:8
waiting 11114:15
trees t215:2 18:1
wants !114:14
trial 14110:3,6,B 18:18
washington [7] 3:6,7, 12,
tried [11 9:8
14,20 4:1418:6
true 13111:2514:1619:13
way t2111 :8,14
trust 12s16:5, 7,8, 15,21,25
ways 11115:17
7:14, 16 8:20 10:12, 14, 18,
whether 1515:16 a:20 9:1,
20,2411:4,'6,9,10, 12,20,24
2,10.
12:114:10,1116:15,1818:
whole [2111:4,6
6,10
who's 1114:5
trustees 11715:16 6:11 7:1,
wlll 1215:2 18:19
18 9:1,10,13,1810:1612:
wings r1117:9
11,2214:8,10,1915:1716:
within [418:16 9:8, 13 12:
318:7
17
trustees' 11116:4
without 11114:11
trustor £4111:9,11,2516:
witness 11119:21
14
work 1211:1113:23
truth c1115:10
working r1119:10
trying 12110:411:4
wrap [114:3

u

w

www.pretext.com
Sheet 5

